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CONFLICT OF LAWS

BETWEEN
Julyin1,Texas
1972,orand
31, 1973,
federal
forty and
conflict-ofsomecourts
decidedTexas
in December
Texas appeals
courts sitting
laws cases by published opinion. This rather remarkable figure includes
two Texas Supreme Court and five Fifth Circuit decisions., Furthermore,
at the outset of the period here covered, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,2 which involves a
major Texas interest.
There is also some ground for believing that Texas interests are increasingly involved in sister-state and foreign litigation, 3 but no attempt will be
made here to cover these activities comprehensively. On the other hand,
two developments in neighboring states deserve special mention. In a dramatic reversal of a position long held and recently defended with some vehemence, 4 Louisiana has abandoned the lex loci rule for torts, and has adopted
the governmental-interests approach developed by Brainerd Currie.5 More
recently, Colorado, too, has abandoned the traditional choice-of-law rule for
torts, replacing it by the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second).6 Since Louisiana continues to furnish the major part of
Texas torts conflicts cases,7 and as Colorado was the locus of Marmon v.
Mustang Aviation, Inc.,8 these two developments are not likely to remain
without impact here.
The 63d Legislature enacted an unusually large number of reform measures. Some of these, especially the ban on indirect choice-of-venue clauses
in consumer contracts, 9 the repeal of archaic and confusing service-of-process
provisions relating to out-of-state corporations, 10 and the revamping of jurisdiction, venue, and residence requirements in the family law area," are of
direct interest for present purposes. Other enactments designed to protect
consumers against deceptive trade practices and "hard-sell" home solicitation
transactions,' 2 are likely to test the ingenuity of out-of-state predators and
the determination of the judiciary to protect Texas consumers.' 3
* A.B., Syracuse University; LL.B., LL.M., Duke University; Dr. iur., University
of Kiel. Albert Sidney Burleson Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
1. Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1973); Howell v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 483 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1973); Dailey
v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 475 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1973); Jetco Electronic Indus.,
Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500
S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973); Rodgers v. Williamson, 489 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1973).
2. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
3. See notes 36, 63, 101-04, 189-207, 357-58 infra, and accompanying text.
4. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970).
5. Jagers v. Royal Indemn. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 311 n.2 (La. 1973), citing and
quoting Couch, Choice-of-Law, Guest Statutes, and the Louisiana Supreme Court: Six
Judges in Search of a Rulebook, 45 TUL. L. Rav. 100 (1970). See also Romero v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 649 (La. 1973); notes 220-21 infra, and
accompanying text.
6. First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
7. See note 24 infra; text accompanying notes 202-21 infra.
8. 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
9. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (1973); see text accompanying
notes 126-28 infra.
10. Ch. 431, §§ 1-2, [1935] Tex. Laws 1688-89 (repealed 1973); ch. 376, § 1,
[1943] Tex. Laws 674-75 (repealed 1973).
11. See part VII infra.
12. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-13.01-.06 (1973).
13. See text accompanying notes 292-94 infra; cf. Nabhan & Talpis, Le droit inter-
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JURISDICTION

The Long-Arm Statute

Foreign legal entities and non-resident natural persons who "engage in"
business in Texas are subject to service of process at the hands of the Texas
secretary of state in any action arising out of such business. "Doing business" as here understood includes contracting, by mail or otherwise, with
a resident, if the contract is to be performed in whole or in part in Texas,
14
or committing a tort, if the tort is committed in whole or in part in Texas.
Additionally, out-of-state corporations "transacting" business in Texas are
required to have a registered office and a registered agent within the state,
and if such an agent is not appointed or cannot be found, service of process against them may be made upon the secretary of state. The notion
of "transacting" business as here used is considerably narrower than the
concept of "engaging in" business. It does not include any business transactions in interstate commerce, isolated transactions completed within thirty
days, or eleven other specifically enumerated types of activity, among which
"effecting sales through independent contractors" deserves special mention. 15
It follows from the interplay of the Texas "long-arm" statute and the
Texas Business Corporations Act, as amended by the 63d Legislature, 16 that
(1) foreign legal entities and non-resident individuals are subject to the jurisdiction of Texas courts with respect to claims arising out of their Texasconnected torts and contracts, while (2) foreign corporations "transacting"
business in Texas are generally subject to the jurisdiction of Texas courts.
The operation of this scheme should ordinarily entail two similar but distinct
tasks of state statutory construction: the ascertainment of minimum contacts
for claim-related ("relational") jurisdiction over nonresidents, and the determination of criteria for finding foreign corporations to be "generally present"
17
in view of their unrelated within-state transactions.
Like all state law, Texas long-arm legislation is subject to federal constitutional restraints; it may not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""' Here as elsewhere, these restraints draw the outside limits within which state legislative power may be exercised, but do not determine the contents of the state enactments themselves. However, since state
judiciaries have tended to err on the side of caution when faced with this
type of constitutional constraint, the most expansive initial interpretations
of the Texas long-arm statute have come from the federal courts. These
national privd qu~becois et canadien de la protection juridique du consommateur, 33
R. DUB. 330 (1973).
14. TEx. REV. Ov.STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, §§ 3-4 (1964).
15. Id. art. 2031b, § 1; TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 8.10 (1956), 8.OIB(1)(13) (Supp. 1974). That list is not exclusive. See generally 2 R. HAMILTON, BusiNESS ORGANIZATIONS

§ 973 (1973).

16. See Doty & Parker, Changes in the Texas Business Corporation Act and Re-

lated Statutory Provisions, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 1009, 1027 (1973).
17. There appear to be no Texas cases on this latter point. 2 R. HAMILTON, supra
note 15, § 973, at 460, states that "[w]here the cause of action does not arise out of
the activities of the defendant within the State, a considerably more substantial and

continuing presence in the State is necessary."

18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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courts have generally equated the reach of that statute with the maximum
permissible under the federal constitution.' 9 This approach has been challenged on occasion,2 0 but as the following four cases indicate, seemingly
without much hope of success.
In Dorsid Trading Co. v. Du-Wald Steel Co. 2 1 a Colorado company had
purchased a quantity of steel angles, C.I.F. Duty Paid Port of Houston, from
a Texas company. The order had been placed by telephone from Denver
to Houston. The written contract was prepared and signed by the seller
in Houston and mailed to the buyer in Denver, where it was executed and
mailed back. A clause in the contract provided for arbitration in Houston
(not requested by either party); another clause stated that the contract was
to be governed by Texas law. The goods were shipped to Denver but rejected by the purchaser, and the seller sued on the contract in Texas. In
reversing the dismissal of the action by the trial court upon the special appearance of the defendant, the Houston court of civil appeals observed
that it was "clear that the cause of action arose of and was connected with"
a purchase contract with a Texas company through the Port of Houston,
and that the assumption of jurisdiction by a Texas court in the circumstances
did "not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'22
The court nevertheless felt the need to state, additionally, that the defendant
had in the past made similar purchases from Texas.2 8 It is to be hoped
that this gesture of prudence will not serve to encourage those who (like
the trial judge in the instant case) still find it difficult to accept that Texas
may and does claim jurisdiction over out-of-state parties to single-transaction
24
contracts to be performed at least in part in Texas.
Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U.S. Silver & Mining Corp.25 involves
claims arising out of the alleged breach of a contract for the drilling of a
test well in Panama. Plaintiff Geodynamics was an out-of-state corporation
licensed to do business in Texas, and defendant Silver was an out-of-state
corporation not so licensed. The negotiations between the parties had been
conducted in Texas, and two agreements, styled "settlement agreement" and
"loan agreement" respectively, had been executed by the defendant's president in Dallas. The loan agreement provided that it was "entered into and
executed entirely" in Texas and to be construed pursuant to Texas law; the
19. See, e.g., Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847, 852

(5th Cir. 1966), and authorities cited therein, and the authorities listed in 2 R.

HAMIL-

supra note 15, § 973, at 458 n.18. The most recent manifestations of this approach are Jetco Electronic Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir.
TON,

1973) (see text accompanying notes 35-45 infra); Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U.S.
Silver & Mining Corp., 358 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (see text accom-

panying notes 25-30 infra); and Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Austin 1973), errorref. n.r.e. (see text accompanying notes 374-75 infra).
20. See sources cited in 2 R. HAMILTON, supra note 15, § 973, at 458 n.18 in fine.
21. 492 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973).

22. Id. at 381.
23. Id. at 380-81.

24. Another example of this attitude is implicit in Stewart v. Walton Enterprises,
Inc., 496 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e.

In Dodson v.

Fontenot, 285 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 1973), a Texas default judgment against a Louisiana one-transaction purchaser was given full faith and credit. See also Coleman v.
Patterson, 57 F.R.D. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
25. 358 F.Supp. 1345 (S.D.Tex. 1973).

SOUTHWESTERN

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

settlement agreement contained the same choice-of-law provision and fixed
the place of payment and venue in Nueces County, Texas. A promissory
note also sued on in this action was payable in Corpus Christi, where the
suit was brought in federal court. In addition to breach of contract, plaintiff
alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, an allegation which the court characterized as sounding in tort under Texas law. 26
Judge Cox had no difficulty in concluding that under the facts stated,
defendant Silver had sufficient minimum contacts in the State of Texas, in
connection with the transaction before the court. The Texas long-arm statute, he held, "will reach just as far as the constitutional eye can see. "27
The principle of minimum contacts, he continued, "is now the order of the
day," and the only limitation on this expanded reach, "if this is any" is,
in his view, the requirement of Hanson v. Denckla that there be "some
act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the Forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."128 While it would indeed be foolhardly to suggest that
Texas lacked the power to subject Silver to the jurisdiction of its courts constitutionally with respect to claims relating to the transactions described
above, the narrow question before the court was whether the Texas longarm statute, as properly read by Texas judges, had asserted that power.
The statute is in terms limited to contracts "with a resident" of Texas,
and a crucial point relating to the contract cause29 in the Geodynamics case
might have been whether a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
Texas is a "resident" within the meaning of that statute. This question is
passed over in silence, probably because the defendant, well aware that it
had been recently answered in the affirmative in National Truckers Service,
Inc. v. Aero Systems, Inc.30 wisely chose not to raise it again.
Tabulating Systems & Service, Inc. v. I.O.A. Data Corp.,31 a carefully
reasoned decision by Chief Judge Nye of the Corpus Christi court of civil
appeals, serves well to illustrate the basic, but frequently neglected, point
that the Texas long-arm statute is "relational," that is, that it requires a
connection between the Texas contact and the specific contract or tort underlying the cause of action against the out-of-state defendant. Plaintiff
Tabulating Systems had purchased some computer equipment from the first
defendant, IPS. The equipment was to be shipped via the third defendant,
North American Truck Lines, to the plaintiff at Harlingen, Texas. It was
to be serviced by the second defendant, IBM, and insured by the fourth
defendant, the Home Insurance Company of New York. None of these
26. Id. at 1347-48.
27. Id. at 1347.
28. Id., citing and quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
29. The Texas long-arm statute does not require that the victim of a tort committed in whole or in part within this state be a resident. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 2031b, § 4 (1964).
30. 480 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e., discussed
in Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 85, 124-25
(1973). Further authorities on this point are collected in Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier,
486 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1973).
31. 498 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973).
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parties challenged the jurisdiction of the Texas court to determine which
of them, if any, was liable for the allegedly insufficient insurance coverage
and the malfunctioning of the computer equipment. I.O.A., fifth defendant
and the only one to make a special appearance for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction, was the owner of the equipment at the time of the sale.
The delivery was made at the instruction of IPS from the New York warehouse of I.O.A. through the truck line, with I.O.A. designated as the shipper
in the bill of lading. The record was silent as to the relationship, if any,
between IPS and I.O.A.
The trial judge severed the cause of action against this defendant, and
dismissed it for want of jurisdiction. At first sight, this disposition of the
case seems questionable, for the defendant had a number of contacts with
the transaction and with Texas. As stated in the appellate opinion, I.O.A.,
which owned at least part of the equipment, had advertised the computer
in a national trade journal seeking a buyer. Some of the advertising reached
into Texas through the trade journal's within-state subscribers. The defendant had also contacted another Texas company, to see if it could find a
buyer, and had made numerous telephone calls to prospective purchasers,
including one to the plalntiff. However, nothing came of this contact. Finally, the defendant had sold 2 some computer machinery on one occasion
to a bank in Harlingen, Texas.3
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to protect
the computer equipment while it was in storage and while it was being transported, but did not assert that the defendant had committed any tort in
whole or in part in Texas. Furthermore, there was no allegation that the
cause of action was connected with any Texas transaction between these
parties. The court of civil appeals concluded, therefore, that plaintiff did
not allege a cause of action which "relates to any of the foregoing contacts
in Texas."'3 3 The tort, if any, had occurred elsewhere; there was no purchase contract between the parties; and the bill of lading did not constitute
a contract between a shipper acting under the seller's instructions and the
purchaser-consignee. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the action
against I.O.A. for want of jurisdiction was, accordingly, affirmed.
Could it not have been argued that the negligent loading of goods in another state for shipment to Texas, together with damage suffered in Texas
by the recipient due to malfunction caused by such shipment, constitutes
a tort "committed in whole or in part within this State" under the longarm statute?3 4 This brings us to Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner,35 a recent Fifth Circuit decision by Judge Thornberry. Engineers Testing Laboratory (ETL), an Arizona corporation with its principal place of
business in that state, had been employed by Gardiner, an Arizona manufacturer of treasure hunting devices, to authenticate a previous comparative
test by Gardiner of his own products and those of his competitors, including
32. Id. at 694.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (1964).
35. 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973).
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those of the two plaintiffs, who were Texas residents. The report verifying
Gardiner's self-complimentary comparison (which, incidentally, earned ETL
the lavish fee of $85) was then incorporated in a catalog of Gardiner products. Gardiner advertised these products in several magazines of widespread circulation, and some of the advertisements offered the readers free
copies of the catalog, stating that it contained the report of the comparative
test. Some 20,000 persons were said to have requested and received this
catalog, and plaintiffs alleged that their sales had been adversely affected
thereby.
Assuming that ETL had been negligent in authenticating Gardiner's test,
and further assuming its liability for the consequences of that negligence
was triggered by the mailing of Gardiner's catalog independently prepared
by the latter, did ETL come within the reach of Texas long-arm jurisdiction?
Judge Thornberry observed that this was a question controlled by state law,
subject to federal constitutional restraints imposed by the due process
clause.36 He also pointed out that the Texas long-arm statute reached nonresidents doing business in Texas only in respect of suits arising from such
business. ETL had, in fact, performed two soil testing jobs in El Paso in
1970, but because the suit did not relate to these tests, only the tort clause7
of the long-arm statute could support Texas jurisdiction in the instant case.8
Had the plaintiff made a prima facie showing" that ETL had in part
committed a tort in Texas? Judge Thornberry answered this question in
the affirmative. First, he wrote, "[i]t is immaterial that the tortious act
occurred outside the state, for it is well established that the statute extends
to injury occurring within the state as a result of a wrongful act committed
outside the state."3 9 Secondly, and more fundamentally, he observed that
"Article 2031b represents an effort by Texas to exploit to the fullest the
expanding limits of in personam jurisdiction. ' 40 Thirdly and finally, as regards the due process limitation, Judge Thornberry stated:
When a nonresident defendant introduces a product into interstate commerce under circumstances that make it reasonable to expect that the
product may enter the forum state, the forum may assert jurisdiction
over the defendant in a suit arising out of injury caused by the product
in the forum, if the defendant's other activities within the forum, even
unrelated to the suit, satisfy the minimum contacts rethough wholly
quirement. 4 1
He then resurrected the two 1970 El Paso soil tests (yielding less than twotenths of ETL's gross receipts for that year) in order to find such unrelated
other activities sufficient to satisfy the due process requirement in the instant
case.

42

36. Id. at 1230, 1232.
37. Id. at 1232.
38. Judge Thornberry held that the plaintiff only had to make a prima facie showing at this point, although the jurisdictional facts might still need to be proved at trial
by a preponderance of the evidence if challenged. Id. at 1232 & n.4.
39. Id. at 1232 n.5.
40. Id. at 1234.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1234-35.
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The crucial step in this line of reasoning is the second one, which turns
entirely on Texas law. Unfortunately, Judge Thornberry cites only federal
authority in support of his construction; even more unfortunately, he did
not then have the advantage of the Corpus Christi court's opinion in Tabulating Systems, which was decided almost five months later.43 In that case,
Texas declined to exercise jurisdiction in spite of rather substantially stronger
within-state contacts, both relational and unrelated, and it expressly refused
to use the latter in order to bolster the former. 44 It is perhaps not entirely
without significance that the decision in Jetco, which was available in the
Federal advance sheets some two months before the filing of the opinion
in TabulatingSystems, finds no mention in the latter. 4 5
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Texas long-arm statute is entirely
"relational"; that even isolated sales to and from Texas come within the
contract clause of that statute; but that within-state injury due to the isolated
shipment of goods from out of state does not come within its torts clause
as presently construed by Texas courts. It therefore seems highly desirable
that Jetco should be reexamined in the light of Tabulating Systems, and
that the concept underlying the latter be further elaborated at an early date,
for what is ultimately at stake here is, of course, Texas jurisdiction in what
David Cavers has recently called the "burgeoning field" of products liability. 40
B.

Federal Question Cases

Pursuant to section 12 of the Clayton Act, actions under the federal antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought in any district "wherein
it may be found or transacts business."'4 7 In San Antonio Telephone Co.
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,4s twenty-two out-of-state regional subsidiaries of AT&T moved to dismiss, as to them, a private action
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts filed in the Western District of Texas.
It was asserted that these companies "transacted business" in Texas through
providing interconnecting telecommunication facilities and sharing long-distance revenue thereby generated, and that they also advertised such service.
The district court held that these two contacts did not constitute "transacting
43.

letco was decided on Feb. 8, 1973: rehearing and hearing en banc were de-

nied on March 21. TabulatingSystems was decided on June 28 of that year.
44. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.

45. The West Publishing Company advance sheet including 473 F.2d 1228 is dated

April 23, 1973.
46. Cavers, Comparative Conflicts Law in American Perspective, [1970 3 Recueil
des Cours 193.

Garza v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 496 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-

San Antonio 1973), fails to provide guidance in this area, since the out-of-state defendant successfully denied having manufactured the product. Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498
S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e., holds that fraud is a
"two-element tort which is not actionable until relied upon to the detriment of the person to whom the representations were made," and that reliance in Texas is sufficient
to make a fradulent misrepresentation in another state a tort committed partially in
Texas under art. 2031b, § 4. In that case, however, the Texas contacts of a New
York corporate officer sued in his personal capacity were found to be so tenuous as
to preclude, under the due process clause, the application of the Texas long-arm statute.

47. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970); see, e.g., Fulton Co. v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
604 (N.D. Miss. 1972), and cases there cited.
48. 364 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
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business" within the Western District of Texas under section 12. It noted
in connection with the latter point that the advertisements had been made
in the respective districts of the out-of-state AT&T subsidiaries. The court
also rejected the single-entity theory which would treat these subsidiaries
as mere components of the parent corporation, as there had not been sufficient disregard of the corporate structure to warrant application of that
49
doctrine for venue purposes.
This decision evidences the continued, if greatly limited, vitality of the
Cannon doctrine, and shows the difficulties inherent in attempts to reach
parent companies through subsidiaries or, as here, the subsidiaries through
the parent. These difficulties were even more manifest in Frito-Lay, Inc.
v. Procter & Gamble Co.,50 a patent invalidity suit. The parent company, which was the owner of the patent and hence an indispensable party,
was not licensed to do business in Texas and did not maintain a regular
place of business or a registered agent here. Its products were marketed
in Texas through the Procter and Gamble Distributing Company, a whollyowned subsidiary. Four of the seventeen directors of the parent were members of the five-man board of the subsidiary, and fifteen of Procter and
Gamble's twenty-nine officers were the officers of the distributing company.
There was undisputed though self-serving evidence that while the parent
ultimately controlled the subsidiary through stock ownership and was informed of important decisions, the subsidiary enjoyed independent responsibilities for the management of its business, including control over dayto-day operations. On the other hand, the parent company had made reference to consolidated earning reports and to combined employee figures in
financial statements and in a prospectus for sinking fund debentures, filed
with the SEC, stating that liability for these debentures was to be assumed
by the parent and all domestic subsidiaries. 5'
Judge Mahon proceeded from the premise that Cannon Manufacturing
Co. v. Cudahy Co. 52 was still good law, and that "'as a general rule, the
relationship of parent corporation and subsidiary corporation is not of itself
a sufficient basis for subjecting the non-resident parent corporation to the
jurisdiction of the forum state.' "15 He held that under the facts as outlined
above, the plaintiff had not "made a prima facie showing of actual control
'5 4
of the internal affairs of the subsidiary by the parent.
The plaintiff had also relied on some federal decisions in the antitrust
area, especially United States v. Scophony Corp.55 Judge Mahon pointed
out that jurisdiction in antitrust matters rested on section 12 of the Clayton
49. Id. at 1160-61, citing Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Pkg. Co., 267 U.S. 333
(1925).
50. 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973).

51. Id. at 248-49.

52. 267 U.S. 333 (1925). Note, incidentally, that Cannon could now sue Cudahy
in North Carolina under either of two pertinent North Carolina long-arm statutes. N.C.
§ 1-75-4(5)(d) (1969); § 55-145(1) (1973).
of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 176 S.E.2d 784 (1970).
GEN. STAT.

See Goldman v. Parkland

53. 364 F. Supp. at 247, quoting 2 W. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTrCE
1174 (2d ed. 1970).
54. Id. at 249.
55. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).

4.25[6], at

19741

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Act, whereas in the instant case, out-of-state parties could be reached only
through the Texas long-arm statute.5 6 For the reason previously stated, the
defendant parent company was not "doing business" in Texas, and although
patent infringement sounded in tort, there was nothing to show that the
defendant had committed all or any part of a tort in Texas or elsewhere.
The action was accordingly dismissed for want of joinder of an indispensable
57
party.
There might be some question whether this latter holding is compatible
with Jetco, which is cited as authority. 58 Surely, the registration of an invalid United States patent and the exclusive licensing of that patent to a
Texas distributor inflicts harm in Texas on others who are thus unjustifiably
restrained from making use of technical innovations, and who thus have to
compete with the licensee or his purchasers on unequal terms. On a fundamental level, the Frito-Lay case raises the question whether it might not
be desirable to enact a general venue statute for federal causes of action
(possibly modeled on section 12 of the Clayton Act), instead of leaving
the localization of federal-question litigation to the vagaries of state longarm statutes.
C. Service of Process and Special Appearance
It is "imperative and essential" in Texas "that the record affirmatively
show a strict compliance with the provided mode of service." 5 9 A recent
illustration of this requirement of strict compliance is Day-Bright Lighting
Div. v. Texas Metalsmith, Inc., 60 an appeal by writ of error from a default
judgment against a foreign corporation. Plaintiff's amended petition stated
that it had attempted to serve defendant-appellant's last named registered
agent who could, however, not be found at his address, and had thereupon
served process upon the secretary of state pursuant to article 2031b. The
Dallas court of appeals stated that "the statutory prerequisites to substituted
service must be clearly shown by allegations in the petition."'" As the statute requires two such unsuccessful attempts before service on the secretary
of state may be resorted to, the decision below was reversed. 2 In accordance with rule 123 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure which conclusively
presumes the filing of an appeal or a writ of error because of defective
service of process to be a general appearance at the term of court at which
the mandate is filed, the case was not dismissed but remanded for trial.
Thus, by his election to pursue this remedy rather than to appear specially,
56. 364 F. Supp. at 249-50.
57. Id. at 250.
58. Id.
59. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965).
collected in 2 R. HAMILTON, supra note 15, § 981, at 470.
60. 499 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
61. Id. at 337.

Further authorities are

62. Id. In James Edmond, Inc. v. Schilling, 501 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1973), plaintiff had failed to allege that defendant was a corporation, and that
it did not maintain a regular place of business in Texas. For these reasons, and on

the same grounds as in Day-Bright Lighting, a default judgment in favor of a Texas
seller against an out-of-state purchaser was reversed, and the cause remanded for trial.
Id. at 434.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

the "victorious" out-of-state appellant was precluded from pressing his additional points of error that there had been no proof of facts which would
bring it within the terms of the long-arm statute, and that article 2031b was
unconstitutional if applied under the facts and circumstances of the case.63
The category of facts required to be shown affirmatively by the record
in default judgments based on substituted service was re-defined and perhaps somewhat expanded by the supreme court in its recent decision in
Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp.6 4 The appellees had leased apartments to
the defendants in Dallas for one-year terms. During the term, the defendants had abandoned their apartments, moved out of the state, and ceased
rental payments. The appellee thereupon took default judgments against
them after service of process on the secretary of state as authorized by article
2031b. However, the record did not indicate whether the secretary of state
had forwarded a copy of the process to the out-of-state defendants.
Section 6 of article 2031b provides that when a party becomes a nonresident after a cause of action arises against him in Texas, he can be "served
with citation by serving a copy of the process upon the secretary of state
of Texas, who shall be conclusively presumed to be the true and lawful
attorney to receive service of process; provided that the Secretary of State
shall forward a copy of such service . . . by certified or registered mail,
return receipt requested."65 The same requirement, in somewhat different
language, is contained in section 5, which relates to substituted service under
the Texas long-arm statute in general. 66
Is the part of section 6 italicized above an integral part of substituted
service without which such service is not properly made, or is it an independent statutory duty of the secretary of state? Writing for a unanimous supreme court, Chief Justice Greenhill conceded that the statute was ambiguous in this respect, but should be construed in the former sense, since Texas
decisions requiring particularity in pleading amenability to service "reflect
a strong policy that defendants ought not to be cast in personal judgment
without notice. ' 6' 7 More particularly, he stated that while the requirement
of proof of forwarding of process would not cause any significant hardship
to plaintiffs seeking judgments against nonresidents, the absence of such a
63. Woodcock, Cummings, Taylor & French, Inc. v. Crosswell, 468 S.W.2d 864,
866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1971); Roberts Corp. v. Austin Co., 487
S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972). See also text accompanying
notes 72-75 infra.
64. 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973).
65. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
66. Whenever process against a foreign corporation, joint stock company,
association, partnership, or non-resident natural person is made by delivering to the Secretary of State duplicate copies of such process, the
Secretary of State shall require a statement of the name and address of
the home or home office of the non-resident. Upon receipt of such process, the Secretary of State shall forthwith forward to the defendant a
copy of the process by registered mail, return receipt requested.
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 5 (1964). A like requirement is contained,
with respect to domestic corporations, in TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.11B (1956).
67. 500 S.W.2d at 97. In Southwestern Remodelers of Houston, Inc. v. Lumaside,
Inc., 501 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973), the proof-of-forwarding requirement was extended to substituted service on domestic corporations pursuant to TEx. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 2.11B (1956).
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requirement would entail a much more serious hardship for out-of-state defendants. The latter would then be precluded from timely review by writ
of error and relegated to the bill-of-review remedy, with the initial burden
of proving that there was a good defense and absence of fault in failing
to appear.0 8 These disadvantages, incidentally, were graphically illustrated
by the case of Dosamantes v. Dosamantes,6 9 which will be discussed further
below.
Chief Justice Greenhill wrote in Whitney that a certificate from the office
of the secretary of state, which could be furnished for a trivial fee, would
suffice as proof of forwarding of process. 70 This suggestion was quickly
taken up by the secretary of state, who now furnishes such certificates rou7
tinely on request. '
While Texas requires strict compliance with the provided mode of service,
it also requires strict compliance with the mode for filing special appearances
to challenge jurisdiction. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a,
a special appearance may be made in person or by counsel, for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant on the ground
that he is "not amenable to process" issued by Texas courts. This special
appearance is to be made by sworn motion filed prior to any other plea
or motion. Every appearance, prior to judgment, that is not in compliance
with rule 120a is declared to be a general appearance.
Stewart v. Walton Enterprises, Inc.72 serves to illustrate this draconic consequence of failure to comply strictly with rule 120a. The plaintiffs, who
resided in Austin, had contacted the defendant, a Florida company, in response to the latter's newspaper advertisements. This resulted in some
transactions between the parties, but ultimately, the plaintiffs brought action
against the defendant in Texas for breach of contract to supply them with
Walt Disney toys for distribution and sale in Texas, and for fraud in inducing them to make the contract without intention to perform. The defendant
first filed, through Florida counsel, an unsworn special appearance to contest
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs urged that not being sworn, this appearance was general, not special. Defendant later filed the sworn motion under rule 120a
in proper form through Texas counsel.
68. 500 S.W.2d at 96.
69. 500 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973); see text accompanying
notes 416-34 infra.
70. 500 S.W.2d at 96.
71. The following statement appeared in 11 TEXAS LAWYERS' WEEKLY LErFR No.
44, Nov. 14, 1973, at 1:
Because of the recent Texas Supreme Court decision in Whitney v. L & L
Realty Corporation... the Office of the Secretary of State has established
a standard procedure for furnishing the required certificate to the requesting attorney. When forwarding his Citation and Petition to the Sheriff
for service on the Secretary of State under the long-arm statute, the attorney desiring a certificate showing that a copy was mailed to the defendant should send a carbon copy of his letter to the Secretary of State,
attn: Administrative Division, accompanied by the $2.00 fee and noting
upon the carbon his request to be furnished such a certificate. Upon being served by the Sheriff the Secretary of State will furnish his certificate to the requesting attorney.
72. 496 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
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The trial court implicitly rejected the plaintiffs' contention, and held
that article 2031b could not be constitutionally applied to obtain jurisdiction
over the defendants under the set of facts as described. On appeal, the
Austin court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the unsworn purported
special appearance filed through Florida counsel was indeed a general appearance since it did not strictly comply with rule 120a. Since the Florida
defendant had thus subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Texas court
for purposes of the suit, the court of civil appeals remanded the cause for
trial without passing on the point decided adversely to plaintiffs below. 73
Assuming that York v. Texas74 is still good constitutional law, and good
Texas law to the extent that it has not been specifically replaced by rule
120a, this result is not quite as absurd as it might seem. This is likely
to bring little solace to the first victim of "Rule Catch-120a, ' '75 but it might
impress him (and others in his position) with the eminent desirability of
retaining Texas counsel in connection with Texas proceedings.
D.

Forum Non Conveniens and Injunctions Against ForeignLitigation

PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co. 76 marks the beginnings of
energy crisis litigation in Texas. Continental (a Delaware corporation with
a regional office in Houston) contracted to furnish a substantial portion of
the natural gas requirements of a Lake Charles, Louisiana, chemical plant
owned by PPG, a Pennsylvania corporation with plants and offices in Harris
County, Texas. The gas furnished under this contract is produced totally
from Louisiana lands and delivered through pipelines in that state; it may
be used by PPG only at its Lake Charles facilities and may not enter interstate commerce. In 1969, Continental determined that it would have
difficulties in meeting the delivery requirements of its contracts with PPG
and with the Olin Corporation, another natural gas user. Olin is a Virginia
corporation that also has offices and plants in Harris County; all three companies are, of course, licensed to do business in Texas.
Negotiations between the parties having proved fruitless, Continental
brought suit against PPG and Olin in Texas, seeking a declaration of its
obligations and an equitable decree allocating its available supplies of natural gas. Continental alleged that because of the energy shortage and
due to changes in government regulations, the delivery of the gas required
had become impossible or commercially impracticable. Three weeks after
the filing of the Texas suit, PPG filed suits against Continental in a Louisiana state court, and in the United States district court in Lake Charles,
Louisiana. These actions were stayed pending the outcome of the Texas
litigation, and the stay issued by the federal district court was upheld on
73. Id. at 959.
74. 137 U.S. 15 (1890), aff'g York v. State, 73 Tex. 651, 11 S.W. 869 (1889).
See generally Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, the Texas "Long Arm"
Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279 (1964).
75. This expression was suggested to the present author in conversation by his colleague, Professor David Anderson of the University of Texas School of Law.
76. 492 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.

1974]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

appeal by the Fifth Circuit. 77
The Texas trial court found that the Texas action was filed first, that
the two controversies were identical, and that the prosecution of the Louisiana suit would interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas court.
It accordingly granted the injunction sought. PPG appealed, contending,
in essence, that judicial discretion had been abused in restraining foreign
litigation between foreign companies where no Texas interests were involved,
and where the controversy clearly was a "Louisiana controversy between
'78
two foreign corporations and should be litigated in Louisiana.
As regards the first point, the Houston court of civil appeals held that
a foreign corporation licensed to do business here "is treated as a resident
of the state within the principles involved in suits for injunctions against
proceedings in other states."179 These principles, it went on to state, were
the duty of the court to protect its jurisdiction, and the objective of preventing a multiplicity of suits. On the other hand, the Houston court said, the
power of the court to enjoin proceedings in a foreign state should be used
sparingly, and only to prevent manifest wrong and injustice.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion here because the matter could be
more appropriately tried in Louisiana? The Houston court formulated the
following pertinent test: "If under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
a serious question arises as to whether the Texas court should retain jurisdiction of the case, it would amount to an abuse of discretion to continue
in force an injunction prohibiting trial in a convenient foreign jurisdiction." 80
It then listed the following as some of the factors to be considered in that
connection: (1) the private interest of the litigant; (2) ease of access to
sources of proof; (3) availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (4) the
ability to give effective relief; (5) whether foreign law must be applied to
the facts of the case, and, if so, whether it is so dissimilar to the laws of
this state as to be difficult or incapable of enforcement here.8 '
As regards the factor last mentioned, it was as yet uncertain, despite
what is termed the "Louisiana flavor" of the case, whether Texas or Louisiana law would ultimately be held applicable. Accepting Mr. Justice Jackson's famous statement in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert8 2 that unless the balance
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed, the Houston court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment
below. However, the Houston court pointedly observed that the facts with
reference to forum non conveniens were not as yet fully developed, and
that such a plea might yet be presented at a later point.8 3
The PPG case can be cited for three propositions: that forum non con77. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed in 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1252 (1973).
78. 492 S.W.2d at 299.

79. Id.

80. Id. at 300.
81. Id.
82. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).

83. 492 S.W.2d at 301; see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
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veniens as authoritatively elaborated in Gulf Oil is part of the law of Texas;
that injunctions in restraint of foreign litigation, although to be used sparingly, are reviewable only if there is at least a "serious question" whether
the Texas action should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds;
and that in applying these two propositions, foreign corporations licensed
to do business in Texas are to be treated as Texas residents. The last proposition seems plausible;8 4 the first one is debatable; s5 and the second one
is novel. Texas trial courts should have general power to protect their jurisdiction over matters that are properly before them; whether the matters are
properly before the court should be developed by the usual methods, including, perhaps, pleas based on the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Resort to that doctrine at an earlier stage seems as uneconomical as it
seems misplaced, as the subsequent history of this litigation amply demonstrates. On remand, and some ten months after the litigation has commenced, PPG filed its forum non conveniens plea in abatement and the
trial court dismissed the suit on this ground. -In Continental Oil Co. v. PPG
Industries,6 the Houston court of civil appeals reversed this order of dismissal, and remanded the cause for trial.
In its second PPG opinion, the Houston court held, on the authority of
H. Rouw Co. v. Railway Express Agency,87 that "a foreign corporation having a permit to do business in Texas has a statutory right to sue in the
Texas courts another foreign corporation having a permit to do business in
Texas." 8 It then went on to state, in much broader terms, that Texas
courts "have no discretion to exercise in the matter of retaining the jurisdiction acquired, and are required to try such a case just as such courts would
be required to try a case brought against a Texas corporation by another
Texas corporation, or by a citizen of Texas against another Texas citizen,
regardless of where the cause of action might have arisen." 89 The opinion
might have stopped here, but Justice Coleman, speaking for the unanimous
Houston court, proceeded to drive a few more nails into the coffin of forum
non conveniens in Texas. He held that, in any event, the moving party
had the burden of proving the facts required to sustain a plea of abatement,
and that this proof had to be made by competent trial evidence. Thus,
affidavits were not only insufficient, but even inadmissible. So was, oddly
enough, the official transcript of testimony at the previous trial in the same
case, for there was no showing that the former trial was on the same issues
or that the witnesses were now unavailable. Finally, the Houston court
held, the degree of trial court discretion in declaratory judgment proceedings is not materially different from trial court discretion in other actions. 90
84. For a parallel point, see text accompanying note 30 supra.
85. Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962), expressly did not pass on "the
extent to which the forum non conveniens principle is recognized in Texas." Id. at
876. According to Van Winkle-Hooker Co. v. Rice, 448 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1969), where further authorities are collected, the doctrine has been applied "only sparingly" in Texas.
86. 504 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1973).
87. 154 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941), error ref.

88. 492 S.W.2d at 620.
89. Id.
90. id. at 623.
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It thus appears that in Texas, the plea of forum non conveniens is never
available against Texas residents, Texas corporations, or foreign corporations
qualified to do business in Texas. The rule is different in federal courts
and in what appears to be a growing number of other states, including some
of the more important ones. a ' It also seems that Texas courts will not follow
the lead of the federal courts in letting a prima facie showing suffice at
92
the jurisdictional stage, subject to verification at trial if challenged.

Most

remarkably, if the view of the Houston court of civil appeals in the second
PPG case should prevail on this point, the verification of jurisdictional facts
for forum non conveniens purposes requires a separate full-blown trial on
that issue.
This chilly attitude towards forum non conveniens by a state court is not
entirely illogical. When a federal district court, acting pursuant to the Gil93
bert doctrine as now codified in section 1404(a) of the Judiciary Code,
transfers a case to another federal district court sitting in another state, the
latter must now apply the choice-of-law rules prevailing at the transferor
forum,9 4 so that "ease of application of law" consideration in forum non

conveniens becomes an innoccuous term. The PPG litigation devastatingly
shows that this simply is not so between courts of different states having
different choice-of-law rules. Few will quarrel with Justice Coleman's expression of confidence in the ability of Texas courts to apply Louisiana law
if called upon to do so.9 5 What is at issue is not the correct administration
of the law held to be applicable by both Texas and Louisiana, but the initial
selection of that law by processes which, at least in the opinion of the parties
to this litigation, are crucially different in these two states. As tersely stated
by Judge Thornberry in the Fifth Circuit case of PPG Industries, Inc. v.
Continental Oil Co.: "Since the filing of the original Texas suit by Conoco,
PPG has undertaken several manuevers [sic] designated to relocate the litigation on the contractual questions in Louisiana, where it believes the applicable
choice-of-law rule and the substantive contracts law are more favorable, and
Conoco has battled-successfully so far-to confine the litigation to the
Texas forum." 96
In these circumstances, forum non conveniens becomes what the United
States Supreme Court has called, in Van Dusen v. Barrack, "primarily . . .
a forum-shopping instrument. '97 For that very reason, that Court held that
as between federal courts, the transferee forum had to apply the choiceof-law rules prevailing at the transferor forum. Since state courts are by
definition unable to control the choice-of-law process in sister states once
91. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.30 (1973); J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chem.
of Canada Ltd., 462 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1972); Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973); Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278
N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972); cf. Cray v. General Motors Corp., 389 Mich.

382, 207 N.W.2d 393 (1973).
92. See note 38 supra.

93. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
94. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).

95. 492 S.W.2d at 621.

96. 478 F.2d 674, 676 (5th Cir. 1973).

97. 376 U.S. at 636, citing Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,
22 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 405, 441 (1955).
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they have relinquished jurisdiction over a controversy pending before them,
forum non conveniens should in principle not be available where choiceof-law rules are likely to lead to conflicting results, and a motion on this
ground should never be granted where such a difference in choice-of-law
rules is the very reason for the motion.
However, it is conceivable that the application of the choice-of-law rules
of the forum leads to the conclusion that the law of another state should
be applied. In Texas contracts conflicts cases, this will be so if the forum's
"connection with the transaction is minimal and fortuitous, and if it has no
interest in the . . .controversy." 98

In such a situation, the normal course

would be to apply the law of the other state and decide the controversy
on its merits. In applying the law of another state, however, a court is
acting much in the manner of an amateur photographer; it is not called
upon, nor indeed competent, to develop that law in a creative manner so
as to meet new situations. Therefore, if it should develop that no Texas
interest is involved, and that Louisiana law might have to be applied not
mechanically but creatively (that is, in the manner of an architect rather
than a photographer)99 dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds might
still be appropriate even at that late date.
E.

Jurisdictionby Consent: Arbitrationand Choice-of-Forum Clauses

The record compiled above will hardly impress the student of judicial administration or the layman interested in the speedy dispensation of justice.
None of the ten cases discussed was decided on the merits. Two of the
three federal district court cases were dismissed for lack of venue or jurisdiction, as was one of the cases decided by a Texas court of appeals. 100
Thus assigned to limbo in Texas, these three cases will have to be filed
elsewhere de novo, if at all. Two further cases in the Texas courts were
remanded because of improper service. 1'0 Trial courts declined to exercise
of
their jurisdiction in no less than six of the ten cases discussed. 1Four
02
these dismissals were challenged on appeal; three of them successfully.
The layman might be told that this bleak picture reflects the pathology,
not the anatomy of interstate litigation, since easy cases do not figure promi98. Continental Oil Co. v. Lane Wood & Co., 443 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1969);
see text accompanying notes 336-68 infra.
99. This picture is suggested by W. GOLDSCHMIDT, SUMA DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO

92 (2d ed. 1961).

100. San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 364 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D.
Tex. 1973); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex.
1973); Tabulating Systems, Inc. v. I.O.A. Data Corp., 498 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Corpus Christi 1973).
101. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973); Day-Bright Lighting Div. v. Texas Metalsmith, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
102. Jetco Electronic Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing trial court); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D.
Tex. 1973); San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 364 F. Supp. 1157
(W.D. Tex. 1973); Stewart v. Walton Enterprises, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (reversing trial court); Dorsid Trading Co. v. DuWald Steel Co., 492 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973) (reversing trial court); Tabulating Systems, Inc. v. I.O.A. Data Corp., 498 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.
Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1973).

1974]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

nently in the law reports. However, both he and his counsel are not likely
to be impressed by the current state of the art as shown by the record,
and will look for appropriate precautionary measures designed to avoid jurisdictional pitfalls. The two most important devices currently employed for
this purpose are arbitration agreements and choice-of-forum clauses.
Arbitration. Texas follows the traditional common law rule that in the absence of statute, executory contracts to submit future disputes to arbitration
are unenforceable.103 The Texas General Arbitration Act, which became
effective on January 1, 1966,104 was supposed to remedy this deficiency,
but fell short of its objective in two important respects. First, it does not
apply to the construction and insurance industries. Secondly, even outside
these two areas, an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable under the act only
if it is "concluded upon the advice of counsel to both parties as evidenced
by counsels' signatures thereto."' 0 5 This second requirement is unique in
the United States, and is reported to be met with "amusement and incredulity" at sister state bar association meetings. 10 6 Its short-range impact on
arbitration in Texas has been nothing short of disastrous. 10 7 However, in
recent years, the gap left by the Texas General Arbitration Act has been
closed by the progressive application of the Federal Arbitration Act' 0 8 to
arbitrate clauses in Texas-connected contracts involving interstate or foreign
commerce.
In Lawn v. Franklin °9 a federal district court compelled the then Roman
Catholic Bishop of Austin, Msgr. Reicher, to submit to arbitration in New
York on the basis of an arbitration clause contained in a contract involving
interstate commerce. The arbitration clause called for arbitration in New
York City under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Msgr.
Reicher contended that his co-defendant Franklin, who is a member of the
Texas bar, had signed the contract as an escrow agent, and not as his counsel. Therefore, he asserted, the arbitration clause was invalid as not in conformity with the Texas arbitration statute. The district court considered this
issue immaterial, holding that the state statute could not, in any event, pre103. Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973); REA Express v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 447 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969).
104. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-38 (1973).
105. Id. art. 224. The legislative history of this clause is documented in Carrington,
The 1965 General Arbitration Statute of Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 21, 61-62 (1966), and in
44 TEXAs L. REV. 372 (1965).

106. Coulson, Texas Arbitration-ModernMachinery Standing Idle, 25 Sw. L.J. 290
(1971).
107. Id. at 295.
108. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970). Section 2 reads as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal
to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.
Pursuant to § 1, "commerce" as here used means interstate and foreign commerce generally.
109. 328 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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vail over the Federal Arbitration Act, in that the latter "created Federal
substantive law." 110
This doctrine was further extended in Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp.,"' a decision of the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Collins, an Iowa corporation with a plant in Texas, had purchased three
shipments of computer parts from Ex-Cell-O, a Michigan corporation. The
third purchase order contained an arbitration clause and a choice-of-law
clause to the effect that Texas law governed the agreement. Collins brought
suit in federal district court on the purchase orders, and Ex-Cell-O countered
by demanding arbitration. This was met with the contention that the arbitration clause was invalid under Texas law, which had been expressly chosen
by the parties to govern their agreement. In a unanimous opinion written
by Chief Judge Mathes, this argument was rejected. The Chief Judge
wrote: "While we have grave doubts that the Texas statute contains the
provincial requirement that the advising attorneys be licensed in Texas, we
need not decide that state law question of first impression because we hold
the Federal Act bars resort to state arbitration rules to determine the valid12
ity of arbitration clauses in interstate contracts."'
The third and so far the most recent case to be considered in this context
is Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc."13 The plaintiff had been employed by
the defendant, a New York manufacturer, as a sales representative in Texas
and in five other states. The contract contained a choice-of-law clause selecting New York law, and the standard arbitration clause calling for
arbitration in New York City in accordance with rules of the American Arbitration Association and the laws of New York. Mamlin brought suit, alleging non-payment of commissions earned. The employer-defendant filed
a sworn plea in abatement, alleging that it had demanded arbitration pursuant to the contract. The plea was sustained and the action eventually
dismissed when neither party seasonably commenced arbitration. On appeal, Mamlin argued that as no motion had been made to take judicial notice of New York law, that law had to be presumed to be identical with
Texas law," 4 with the result that the arbitration clause was invalid for failure to comply with the Texas arbitration statute and otherwise unenforceable
at common law.
The Dallas court of civil appeals held that the choice of New York law
did not evince an intention to exclude the federal statute which declares
the arbitration clause to be enforceable, as the parties could not be presumed
to have chosen an invalidating law." 5 This was clearly a transaction involving commerce as defined by the Federal Arbitration Act, and the latter had
been "held to be substantive rather than procedural, and equally applicable
in state and federal courts, even though the contract provides that any dis110. Id. at 794.
111. 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972).
112. Id. at 997.
113. 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
114. Id. at 636. See generally text accompanying notes 149-56 infra.
115. 490 S.W.2d at 637, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §
187, comment c (1971 ); see text accompanying notes 250-51 infra.
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pute should be settled by arbitration under the laws of a particular state."'116
It follows that arbitration clauses in transactions involving commerce are
now enforceable in federal and state courts alike within the terms of the
Federal Arbitration Act. This is a remarkable advance, which is likely to
make such clauses more attractive for Texas enterprises in the future than
they have been up to now. On the international level, there is the additional advantage of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1 7 which extends to most major
trading nations, 118 and of numerous (though somewhat less progressive) provisions on arbitration in bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation." 9
Choice-of-Forum Clauses. While arbitration clauses in transactions involving interstate and foreign commerce have thus become an effective device
for the localization of dispute settlement, there is reason to believe that their
utilization, though substantially increased, will still be limited. First, it
might be felt that there is less certainty as to the outcome (and the parties'
influence on it) in arbitration than there is in adjudication, so that geographical certainty is bought at the price of the diminished predictability
of the outcome. Secondly, the dispute that actually arises may not be one
that is arbitrable, or the arbitrator may not be competent to grant the appropriate relief. For instance, there is continuing doubt as to the arbitrability
(if any) of disputes arising out of securities transactions, and in trademark
controversies where injunctions are the prime remedy, arbitration is not
likely to be very fruitful. For reasons such as these, even existing and presumably enforceable arbitration clauses are not infrequently ignored by both
parties."m
For these reasons, among others, parties frequently resort to choiceof-forum clauses that seek to select not a locus for arbitration but a court
for adjudication. Such clauses have two functions: they confer jurisdiction
upon the court chosen (prorogatio fori), and they oust, or at least suspend,
the jurisdiction of other courts that would otherwise by operation of law
be competent (deregatio fori). Will such clauses be given effect in Texas?
The contractual conferral of jurisdiction on Texas courts does not seem
to pose formidable obstacles, at least outside of the area of consumer trans116. 490 S.W.2d at 637. Lawn v. Franklin, 328 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), is
among the authorities cited in support of this statement. 490 S.W.2d at 637 n.3.
117. 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-08 (1970); T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958). It
is understood that the text of this treaty, and of other multilateral treaties relating to
the resolution of transnational civil and commercial disputes, will be reproduced in a
forthcoming edition of Martindale-Hubbel'sLawyers' Directory.
118. The list includes Mexico, see Carl, Relevance to Texas Practitioners of Recent Conventions on International Conflict of Laws, 35 TEx. B.J. 425 (1972). Unfortunately, it does not include Canada.
119. E.g., with Germany. See Batson Yam & Fabrics Mach. Group, Inc. v. SaurerAllma GmbH-Allgauer Maschinenbau, 311 F. Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970).
120. Compare Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, 39 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1974) (No. 73-781), with Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal,
345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (transactions involving securities), and Scovill Mfg.
Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972) (trademark infringement);
cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). See
also Dorsid Trading Co. v. Du-Wald Steel Co., 492 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1973).
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actions. In National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent' 2 ' the United
States Supreme Court held that service upon a contractually designated withi-n-state process agent was sufficient to comply with federal rule 4(d)(3),
which permits service on "any . . . agent authorized by appointment . . .

to receive service of process." The Szukhent clause is directly applicable
only where the requirements of substantive federal jurisdiction are otherwise
met, that is, where there is federal-question or diversity jurisdiction. However, the Texas long-arm statute authorizes service on a "person who, at
the time of the service, is in charge of any business in which the defendant
or defendants are engaged in this State . . . ,122 so that the designation
of a within-state business agent might achieve the same result for Texas
state courts. The danger is, of course, that the appointment is revoked before service is effected.
An express choice-of-forum clause, for example, "the appropriate Texas
state court sitting in Harris County, Texas, shall be competent to decide
all disputes arising under, out of, or in connection with the present agreement," might similarly be effective under the Texas long-arm statute as a
"contract . . . with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in
part by either party in this State .... ,,123 However, Texas courts have
consistently held that contracts to change the law with reference to venue
are void as in violation of public policy, 124 and there is some possibility
that they might take the same approach towards jurisdiction-conferring
clauses. A more promising approach would be the drafting of a clause localizing at least partial performance of the contract in Texas. This would
be the equivalent of the customary device for conferring venue in Texas,
which is through specifying that a contract is to be performed in a specific
25
county named.
In a recent pioneering article, Professor John J. Sampson has drawn attention to the possibilities for "distant forum abuse" made possible by this
scheme, and has called for remedial consumer protection legislation. 1 26 The
63d Legislature has heeded his call, and article 1995(5)(b) of the Texas
Civil Statutes now localizes venue for money claims arising out of consumer
transactions for goods, services, loans, or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural use in the county
where the defendant in fact signed the contract or where he now resides.
This provision cannot be waived contractually. 1 27
121. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
122. TaX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 2 (1964).
123. Id. § 4.
124. See Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1972).
125. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(a) (1973) provides that if a person
has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, "expressly naming such
county, or a definite place therein," he can be sued on that obligation in the county
thus designated. "Expressly," it has recently been reconfirmed, means exactly what it
says. Harkness v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 497 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1973).
126. Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed Solution, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 269 (1973).
127. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Supp. 1974). "Agricultural" use
was not covered by Professor Sampson's draft statute, Sampson, supra note 126, at 287.
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It seems clear that so far as Texas courts are concerned this localization
of venue is applicable to consumer transactions of the type described between Texas consumers and out-of-state sellers. Clauses deviating from this
scheme will not be enforced in Texas. Furthermore, if forum non conveniens
is part of Texas law or if jurisdiction-oustingclauses are eventually upheld
here, Texas courts still should not enforce choice-of-forum clauses in favor
of out-of-state forums with respect to such Texas consumer transactions. In
appropriate cases, they should issue injunctions restraining foreign litigation
with respect to these transactions. Texas courts are of course unable to
control the effect given these clauses in such cases by out-of-state courts,
but it is to be hoped that the latter will not fail to take into account their
illegality under Texas law.
Until 1972 Texas counsel would probably have regarded choice-offorum clauses in favor of out-of-state courts, for example, "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice," as quite ineffective
to "oust" the jurisdiction of otherwise competent Texas courts. In the leading case of International Travellers' Ass'n v. Branum, the supreme court
of Texas stated, in no uncertain terms, its conviction that "it is utterly against
public policy to permit bargaining in this state about depriving courts of
jurisdiction, expressly conferred by statute, over particular causes of action
and defenses"' 128 and this position has been frequently reiterated in the
course of the last fifty years. 12 9 But in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co.180 the rather inelegantly drawn choice-of-forum clause just quoted was
given effect by the United States Supreme Court, so as to stay proceedings
by a Houston-based Delaware corporation against a German ocean-going
tug before an otherwise competent American court, and to remit the proceedings to the High Court in London. The latter had already declared
itself competent in this dispute between two foreign parties arising out of
an ocean towage contract, and this decision affirming the jurisdiction of the
English courts over the matter solely on the basis of the choice-of-forum
clause had been upheld by the Court of Appeal.' 3 '
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger observed that choice-offorum clauses have "historically not been favored by American courts.' 3 2
However, he noted a recent trend towards a "more hospitable attitude" towards such clauses, and concluded by endorsing Judge Wisdom's view, expressed in a powerful dissent below,'3 3 that such clauses are prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown to be unreasonable under the circumstances. 34 This, he said, was merely the "other side"
of the proposition recognized by Szukhent, that "in federal courts a party
128. 109 Tex. 543, 548, 212 S.W. 630, 632 (1919).
129. See, e.g., Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1972).
130. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
131. Unterweser Reederei GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., [1968] 2 Lloyd's List
L.R. 158 & 161 (C.A.).
132. 407 U.S. at 9.
133. 428 F.2d 888, 896-912 (5th Cir. 1970), and 446 F.2d 907, 908-11 (5th Cir.
1971) (en banc).
134. 407 U.S. at 9-10.
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may validly consent to be sued in a jurisdiction where he cannot be found
for services of process through contractual designation of an 'agent' for receipt of process in that jurisdiction."1 5
Like Szukhent, Zapata is directly applicable only in federal courts, and
initial reaction was to regard it as limited to admiralty matters-although
the internal reference to Szukhent suggests otherwise.' 36 However, subsequent decisions have applied the Zapata rule quite generally in diversity
cases,'137 and it is believed that this is now supported by better opinion.'1 8
Still, where the prerequisites for federal jurisdiction are lacking, the
Zapata rule will prevail in Texas only if, and to the extent that, the state
supreme court reconsiders its position announced in Branum.139 Such a reconsideration need not endanger the interests of Texas consumers sought
to be protected by the "Sampson Act,"' 40 for Chief Justice Burger was careful to limit the Zapata holding to agreements "unaffected by fraud, undue
influence, or overweening bargaining power.' 14 ' The reason for abandoning
Branum in favor of Zapata would, it is submitted, be as simple as it is
compelling. As Chief Justice Burger wrote so eloquently in Zapata, the
elimination of uncertainties "by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable
to both parties is an indispensable element in internationaltrade, commerce,
and contracting.'1 42 The bleak record of disputes relating to jurisdiction
presented in this Survey amply demonstrates that this need for certainty is
just as strong in interstate trade, commerce, and contracting.
II. PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW, CHARACTERIZATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY
A.

Proof of Foreign Law

In State Courts. Texas state courts take judicial notice of Texas law, including Spanish and Mexican law where applicable as the law of a former Texas
territorial sovereign (that is, primarily in historical land title and water rights
disputes).' 43 They also take judicial notice of federal law, but are not, it
seems, required to take judicial notice of federal administrative regulations
not brought to their attention.
135. Id. at 10-11.
136. This was first pointed out by Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of ForumSelection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L. Rav. 49, 59-60 (1972).
137. In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 234 n.24 (6th
Cir. 1972) (dictum); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 347 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In
Mannesmann, it is submitted, the Zapata test was not correctly applied. In Roach v.
Hapag-Lloyd, A.G., 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973), Zapata was applied to enforce a choice-of-forum clause in an ocean bill of lading between two West German
parties.
138. See, e.g., Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Law,
Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 363 (1973).
139. See notes 128-29 supra, and accompanying text.
140. See notes 126-27 supra, and accompanying text.
141. 407 U.S. at 12.
142. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
143. State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 307, 318 (1877); cf. Strong v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp.,
405 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966), error ref. n.r.e.; State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961), a! 'd, 355
S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962).
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In Tippett v. Hart44 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had knowingly interfered with her performance of a Cropland Adjustment Agreement
with the United States Department of Agriculture. The specific regulation
pertaining to "Noncompliance" was introduced into evidence by the defendant, but the plaintiff seemingly did not introduce the other pertinent federal
regulations. The Amarillo court of civil appeals held that the plaintiff had
established her case in this respect because "Texas courts are required to
take judicial notice of the laws of the United States, including all the public
acts and resolutions of Congress, and proclamations of the president thereunder, as well as administrative rules and regulations adopted by boards,
departments and commissions pursuant to federal statutes."'1 45 In a brief per
curiam opinion, the supreme court refused error but observed that the statement just quoted was overbroad and unnecessary insofar as it postulated
a requirement to take judicial notice of federal administrative rules and reg146
ulations.
Pursuant to rule 184a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, judicial notice "shall" be taken, upon the motion of either party, of the "common law,
public statutes, and court decisions of every other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States."'1 47 There is no equivalent provision for law
of foreign countries. However, article 3718 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provides that the printed statute books of "any State or territory of
the United States or of any foreign government, purporting to have been

printed under the authority thereof, shall be received as evidence of the
acts and resolutions therein contained.' 148
It is well established in Texas that no judicial notice can be taken of
sister state law unless the appropriate motion has been made under rule
184a, and that foreign-country law requires strict proof, that is, by expert
testimony and by proof documentary of the type covered by article 3718.
Where the appropriate motion has not been made as regards sister state
law, or where there is failure of proof as to foreign-country law, it is conclusively presumed that the law of the foreign state or country concerned
is identical with Texas law. This presumption applies to civil law as well
as to common law jurisdictions, and to statutory as well as judicially declared
law.149

The uncertainties of the choice-of-law process combine with the attractiveness of the presumption to divert the attention of counsel from the niceties
of pleading and, if need be, of proving, foreign law in Texas. In Brazeal
v. Renner'5 ° plaintiff sought to recover arrearages for child support under
144. 497 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), ajf'd per curiam, 501 S.W.2d 874
(Tex. 1973).
145. 497 S.W.2d at 613.
146. 501 S.W.2d at 874-75.
147. TEx. R. Cry. P. 184a.
148. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3718 (1926) (emphasis added).
149. See 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 99 (2d ed. 1956),
and the numerous authorities therein cited; Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449
S.W.2d 458, 465 n.2 (Tex. 1969); Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex.
1963).
150. 493 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
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a Missouri decree. No motion to take judicial notice was filed with the
trial court, although the trial judge examined, over the defendant's objection,
a book represented as containing a copy of Missouri law. The record did
not show whether this copy was authenticated, nor indeed what its contents
were. The Dallas court of civil appeals sustained the dismissal of the action, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that her rights to pastdue installments were vested and not subject to modification under Missouri
law. As no motion under rule 184a had been made, Missouri law was presumed to be identical with Texas law, and under the latter, the rendering
court had authority to modify or suspend child support decrees "as the facts
and circumstances and justice may require."''"I
Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bennett' 2 involved a claim under an insurance policy held to be governed by Mississippi law, which permitted recovery. Texas law, however, did not; and the question to be decided on
appeal was whether Mississippi law was properly before the court so as to
be capable of being noticed judicially. Plaintiff's counsel had made an oral
motion under article 184a, requesting the court to take judicial notice of
three cases not otherwise introduced in evidence. Defendant had claimed
surprise, but seemingly did not press its objection at this point when the
plaintiff assumed the burden of proof in this respect. The Houston court
of civil appeals cited Professor Thomas for the proposition that under rule
184a "the motion for judicial notice should set forth with some particularity
the law that is to 'be relied upon,"' 53 and went on to hold that this requirement had 'been met in the instant case. This generous disposition of the
issue was perhaps influenced by the fact that the question of foreign law
was narrowly circumscribed, that the moving party had voluntarily assumed
the burden in this respect, and that the opponent, although expressing surprise, had not seen fit to ask for a continuance.
In State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co.'5 4 the State
of Texas sought to escheat some bank deposits maintained by a foreign corporation in a Texas bank for the benefits of its stockholders. Ordinarily, the
power of escheat may be exercised only by the state of the last known address of the creditor as shown by the debtor's books and records. However,
where there is no record of any such address at all, or where that address
is in a state which does not provide for the escheat of the property in question, the state of the corporate domicil may escheat the property. 5 5 The
state maintained that it was incumbent upon the defendant liquidators to
offer proof that the laws of the sister states of last known address had provisions for escheat of the funds in question. This contention received short
shrift indeed from the Waco court of civil appeals, which noted that neither
151. Ch. 127, § 1, [1953] Tex. Laws 439, now repealed and replaced by TEX. FAM.
§ 14.08(c) (Supp. 1973); see text following note 436 infra.
152. 492 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1973).
153. Id. at 663-64, citing Thomas, Proof of Foreign Law in Texas, 25 Sw. L.J. 554
(1971).
154. 497 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error granted.
155. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
CODE ANN.
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party had invoked rule 184a, nor made any pleading or proof of any law
of any other state. Consequently, "the trial court was obliged to indulge
the presumption that the law of all the other states in question is the same
as the law of Texas."' 156
In Norris v. State157 the court of criminal appeals affirmed a finding below
that the appellant had been previously convicted of a felony in Oklahoma.
The law of that state was proved by copies of Oklahoma statutes purported
to have been published under official authority. This mode of proof was
clearly appropriate under article 3718, which is cast in general terms. The
trial judge, however, additionally observed that he took judicial notice of
the Oklahoma statutes under rule 184a. Unfortunately, the court of criminal appeals did not address itself to this observation, which appears to mark
the first instance of resort to that rule in a criminal proceeding. Previous
authority, both statutory and decisional, supports the proposition that the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to criminal proceedings, with
the result that sister-state and foreign-country law can be proved in such
proceedings only pursuant to article 3718 or through strict proof by expert
testimony.' 58 In -the absence of proof, the presumption of identity applies
in criminal cases as well, but only-at least so it appears-in favor of the
accused. 159 While the legislature might well consider the desirability of
facilitating the proof of foreign law in criminal cases, 60° it seems unlikely
that the Norris case signifies a judicial departure from previous authority
as here summarized.
Mention has laready been made of Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 61
where the out-of-state defendant successfully invoked a clause calling for
arbitration "in the City of New York in accordance with the then current
arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association and the laws of
the State of New York.' 62 Since the defendant failed to make a motion
pursuant to rule 184a, the plaintiff was able to advance the stunning argument that New York law had to be presumed to be identical with Texas
law, which would have invalidated the arbitration clause because it had not
been adopted on the advice of counsel -to both sides as evidenced by their
signatures.' 65 The Dallas court of civil appeals overruled this contention,
156. 497 S.W.2d at 529.
157. 488 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
158. TEX. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 1731a (1941); TEx. R. Civ. P. 2; Ex parte
Peairs, 283 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955); Holloway v. State, 178 S.W.2d 688,
689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944).
159. Ex parte Ivy, 419 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Ex parte Parker, 390
S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965), citing further authorities; Green v. State, 303
S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). Contra, Ex parte Gesek, 302 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1956).
160. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1: "A party who intends to raise an issue concerning
the law of a foreign country shall give reasonable notice. The court, in determining
foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether
or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 26. The court's determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law." For discussion, see 2 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE § 431 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT & MILLER].

161. 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1973).
162. Id. at 636.
163. Id.; see text accompanying note 105 supra.
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holding that the arbitration clause was valid under the Federal Arbitration
Act which prevailed over Texas law. 164 In the alternative, ,the court stated
that even if the parties had the power to exclude the federal act by their
contract, they could not be presumed to have intended to do so by choosing an invalidating law. 16 5 Thus the defendant was saved by the fact that
the Federal Arbitration Act, as federal law, is subject to judicial notice without motion. If this avenue had not been available, failure to make the
appropriate motion under rule 184a would indeed force the Dallas court
to presume that "the exotic provisions of the Texas Act," which "always
produce amusement and incredulity" with informed observers throughout the
United States,' 66 are also in effect in the very state where the American
Arbitration Association has its headquarters and where most of the nation's
commercial arbitration activities are centered. It is difficult to envisage a
more extreme example of the sweep of the Texas presumption of identity,
and of the possible consequences of the failure to make the appropriate
motion under rule 184a.
In Federal Courts. Federal courts take judicial notice of international
law,' 67 and of all law that emanates from authorities subject to the Constitution of the United States. This includes federal, territorial, and state law;
the last category includes the law of all states of the Union.' 68 Since sisterstate law need not and perhaps even may not be pleaded in federal
courts,' 69 and since no motion is required to induce a federal court to take
judicial notice of United States state law, two of the six cases discussed in
the previous section would have been decided differently, or for different
reasons, by federal courts; and at least three of the remaining four would
hardly have been contested on the point disposed of on appeal.
The requirements as to the pleading and proof of foreign-country law in
federal courts are now codified in federal rule 44.1. This rule, which is
the product of a major and well-conceived reform effort," 70 lays down three
basic principles. First, a party who intends to raise an issue concerning
the law of a foreign country has to give notice in his pleadings "or other
reasonable written notice." Secondly, in determining foreign law, the court
may consider "any relevant material or source, including testimony,"
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible in evidence. Finally,
the court's determination of foreign law is a ruling on a question of law,
and thus Subject to appeal.
The second of these principles is, of course, the most important one. Its
purpose is to permit the efficient, speedy, and economical proof of foreign
164. 490 S.W.2d at 637; see text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.

165. 490 S.W.2d at 637; see text accompanying notes 250-51 infra.
166. Coulson, supra note 106, and accompanying text.

167. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 379 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
168. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 23 (1939); Harley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S.
1, 6 (1885); Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 607 (1835).
169. FEi. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1253.
170. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER §§ 2441-49 (1971); Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the
"Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine,
65 MIcH. L. REv. 613 (1967).
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law by rational means, unencumbered by the technical rules of evidence.' 71
Nevertheless, experience continues to show that there is no more convincing
evidence of foreign law than expert testimony in open court. 17 2 Consequently, if the foreign-law issues are controversial and crucial, prudent counsel will still resort to formal proof through the testimony of duly qualified
73
experts.
This continued preference for traditional means in complicated foreign74
law cases is illustrated by Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp.,
a much-publicized dispute over the proposed takeover of a Texas-incorporated American "multinational" corporation by a Canadian government corporation. 176 Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the Canada Development Corporation (CDC) from implementing its cash takeover tender, and
contended, inter alia, that the CDC-nominated Texasgulf directors would
be duty-bound to advance the Canadian national interest and would thus
be unable to fulfill their fiduciary obligations towards the non-Canadian
shareholders of the latter company. This contention was based, in the main,
on the language of the statutory charter of the CDC, which defined the
objects of that corporation in terms of the Canadian national interest. (It
also provided, however, that these objects were to be "carried out in antici76
)
pation of profit and in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole.'
Plaintiff's expert witness, Professor Ivan R. Feltham Q.C. of Osgoode
Hall and of the Ontario bar, testified that "in his opinion based on his familiarity with the statute and its legislative history, CDC would be bound at
all times to give priority to and emphasize industrial development in Canada.' 177 This testimony was supported by the only Canadian member of
Texasgulf's pre-takeover board, but flatly contradicted by the president and
the chairman of the board of CDC, who stated that, should they become
directors of Texasgulf, they knew of "no limitation in CDC's charter or
otherwise which would prevent [them] from discharging [their] duty to
seek a maximum profit for Texasgulf, commensurate with sound business
practices."'1 78 Judge Seals expressed his inclination towards the view that
CDC, should it become a controlling shareholder of Texasgulf, could some
day be faced with conflict of interest problems. However, he regarded such
conflicts as not different in kind from those arising in interlocking directorate
171. See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2441 (1971).
172. See Baade, International Civil and Commercial Litigation: A Tentative Checklist, 8 TEx. INT'L L.J. 5, 6-8 (1973).

173. Id. at 8-9. In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 707
(2d Cir. 1970), the "difference of opinion on the part of German legal experts with
respect to the applicable German law" was deemed material in determining that defendant had not acted in bad faith in a trademark infringement case.
174. 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).

175. One widely publicized event was the testimony of Senator Bentsen on behalf
of Texasgulf on Aug. 9, 1973. The junior Senator from Texas apparently expressed
his concern about investments by foreign governments in United States corporations.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1973, at 29, col. 3 (late city edition). The relevance of such
testimony is not immediately apparent, and its propriety seems doubtful. It deservedly

escaped mention in Judge Seale's opinion.
176. 19-20 Eliz. II,c. 49, § 6 (Can.).

177. 366 F. Supp. at 416 & n.63.
178. Id. at 416.
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situations generally. As Texas law provided adequate protection to minority
shareholders in such situations if and when they might occur in the future,
he declined to issue an injunction on this ground at the present time.
It might be worth noting that Professor Feltham based his conclusions
not only on the text of the Canadian statute creating CDC, but also on
the legislative history of that statute. As Canadian courts may not resort
to legislative history in aid of statutory construction, 179 the question arises
whether a United States federal court construing Canadian statutory law has
to observe the same constraint. There seems to be no clear-cut answer to
this question, as even where formally excluded, legislative history has a way
of seeping into judicial consciousness through past political experience, public knowledge, incorporation into books of authority, and the like. In the
instant case, in any event, resort to such evidence seems to have been entirely proper, -for the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas was not called upon to determine the meaning of the statutory
charter in the same manner as a Canadian court would have done, but to
ascertain the actual impact of the charter of the CDC on its present officers
and directors.
While the Texasgulf case demonstrates that rule 44.1 will not necessarily
provide expeditious shortcuts to litigants in complicated and controversial
foreign-law disputes, the recent decision of the Fifth Circuit in Ramirez v.
Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roia, S.A. 180 illustrates the operation of that rule
in its intended setting. Plaintiff sought to recover for a wrongful death that
occurred in Mexico, and defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Texas
would not enforce the applicable Mexican law due to its dissimilarity with
Texas law (all of the parties were Mexican, and dismissal in dissimilarity
cases is without prejudice).' 8 ' The dissimilarity between the two laws was
established, to the satisfaction of the court, by unauthenticated copies of
the pertinent Mexican codes. As Judge Brown noted, rule 44.1 "was intended to provide a uniform and liberal federal procedure for determining
foreign law divorced from the limitations of conflicting state and former fedto
eral doctrines," and it "clearly and properly permits the District Court
82
consider any relevant material or sources in determining foreign law.'
Outlook. The question arises whether the Texas law on pleading and proof
of foreign law should be brought into line with this modern and liberal federal scheme. In his leading study of the subject which appeared in these
pages three years ago, Professor Thomas noted that "the Texas law pertaining to proof of foreign law as gleaned from cases is confused, incomplete,
and in some instances behind the time.' 83 He nevertheless did not go so
far as to urge the adoption of the federal method, that is, automatic judicial
notice of sister-state law without any requirement as to pleading or notice,
179. Attorney General of Canada v. Reader's Digest Ass'n (Canada), [1961] S.C.R.
775.
180. 486 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1973).
181. Id. at 494; see text accompanying notes 318-39 infra.
182. 486 F.2d at 497 n.1l, citing Miller, supra note 170, and 9 WRIGHT & MILLER
§§ 2441-49 (1971).
183. Thomas, Proof of Foreign Law in Texas, 25 Sw. L.J. 554, 570 (1971).
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and notice pleading plus unrestricted proof of foreign-country law. The
reason for his reluctance to recommend this obvious remedy is not difficult
to fathom: the outmoded and cumbersome Texas rules on the proof of foreign law are, in essence, triggering devices for the presumption of identity,
and that presumption is, in turn, the most important safety valve of a much
more dangerously outmoded choice-of-law system.
Two examples may suffice here to illustrate a proposition basic to employing the presumption, which is intuitively familiar to practitioners in the nowfading garb of the "Texas convention"-the tacit agreement of counsel not
to raise conflict-of-laws questions. In Garza v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.'8 4
plaintiff sought to recover for injuries suffered in a bus accident in Mexico.
He met the dissimilarity defense, but as defendant sought to prove Mexican
statute law by a copy of the Mexican Civil Code not purporting to be published under the authority of the Mexican government, this proof failed and
plaintiff recovered under Texas law. On its face, this case is the identical
,twin of Ramirez, decided differently only because of the difference in Texas
and federal rules pertaining to the proof of foreign-country law.' s5 Nothing
could be further from reality: Garza was a citizen of the United States
and a resident of Texas who had booked a round trip in San Antonio with
Greyhound to Monterrey and back. Absent the use of the "Texas convention," Texas choice-of-law rules might have relegated him to a Mexican remedy in a Mexican court. This would have been so irrational as to raise
serious questions of due process. Mrs. Ramirez, on the other hand, was a
Mexican national who had bought a one-way ticket, printed in Spanish, on
a Mexican bus to her home in Mexico. The only connection with the United
States was that the trip commenced in the United States border town of Laredo. In -this case, saddling the Mexican defendant with liability under
Texas law would have been a wholly irrational act of meddling, which would
have raised constitutional issues of at least similar magnitude. 8 6
In the more recent case of NHA, Inc. v. Jones,18 7 which was picked literally at random from the advance sheets, twenty former employees of NHA
sought to recover damages for breach of employment contract. The sole
purpose of their employment was the repair of United States Army helicopters in Vietnam, and it would have been entirely possible for one side or
the other to argue -that Vietnamese law applied as the law of the place of
performance.' 8 Mercifully, the "Texas convention" prevailed, and the Fort
Worth court of civil appeals disposed of the case almost as if it had occurred
at Dallas Love Field.' 8 9 Of course, the defendant could have chosen to
184. 418 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967).
185. See text accompanying notes 180-82 supra, and 318-39 infra.
186. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964); Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
187. 500 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
188. See text accompanying note 260 infra.
189. This is, however, subject to one exception. The Fort Worth court noted that
"[t]he contracts involved required each of the plaintiffs to perform services around
9,000 miles from home, in a war zone in and near Vietnam ....
We hold that because of the very nature of the subject matter of these contracts this Court will take
judicial notice that the time of payment of a workman's salary under an employment
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plead and prove Vietnamese law-at considerable expense, and with doubtful results. However, in the face of the Texas requirement of strict proof
as reinforced by the presumption of identity, it could not simply have introduced Vietnamese law and thereby forced the plaintiff to share, or perhaps
even to carry, the burden of coping with that law. In a case where the
typical recovery turned out to be around $500, this seems to be an eminently
satisfactory situation.
It follows that the presumption of identity is presently an important element of the Texas choice-of-law system, and that the "outmoded" Texas
rules on the proof of foreign law should be changed only along with even
more outmoded Texas choice-of-law rules which have in the past been tolerable only because their applicability in actual cases has been severely limited by that presumption. In view of this vital function of the presumption,
the question arises whether (and, if so, to what extent) federal courts sitting
in diversity cases in Texas should give effect to it under the Erie-Klaxon
rule. 190 Clearly, under long-standing and unchallenged authority, they cannot do so with respect to sister-state and United States territorial law. 19' Furthermore, where the content, tenor, or construction of foreign-country law
is actually ascertained pursuant to the "uniform and liberal federal procedure for determining foreign law" proved by federal rule 44.1, the presumption is, of course, displaced. Its potential sphere of applicability is thus
limited to cases potentially involving foreign law where that law has not been
ascertained, either because the party seeking to rely on it failed to give adequate notice, or because the court failed to receive the necessary guidance
and information. In these situations, it is submitted, federal courts sitting
in Texas in diversity cases should apply the Texas presumption that the
foreign-country law to which the Texas choice-of-law rule refers but which
has not been ascertained is identical with Texas law. 92
While it is thus concluded that the Texas rules on proof of foreign law
should not be brought into line with the corresponding federal rules by an
isolated reform, there is one progressive feature of the federal system that
might be implemented even now by a functional interpretation of existing
Texas law. Pursuant to rule 44.1, a determination of foreign law is a ruling
on a question of law, and thus subject to appeal. The Fifth Circuit, in particular, has taken its responsibilities in this connection quite seriously, and
has substituted its own contrary findings on foreign law for those of the trial
court in two out of six rule 44.1 cases decided by that court of appeals.19 3
contract under circumstances such as those existing here is of the essence." 500
S.W.2d at 947.
190. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem in Transnational
Litigation: The Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign Law, 59
CORNELLL.REV. 1 (1973).
191. See text accompanying note 168 supra.
192. See Krasnow v. National Airlines, 228 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955). Schlesinger,
supra note 190, at 20, describes the position taken in the text as stating the "prevailing
view," seemingly with approval. See, however, Miller, supra note 170, at 702-15, 72331,746-84.
193. Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1973); Gillies v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 468 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversal of
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It is well established in Texas that even without the benefit of a judicial
notice statute, foreign law is determined by the judge, not the jury; 1 94 and
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 184a provides that "(t)he judge upon the
motion of either party shall take judicial notice of the common law, public
statutes, and court decisions of every other state, territory, or jurisdiction of
the United States."'1 95 As shown by the terms here italicized, there is no
compelling reason for treating findings pursuant to rule 184a differently
from other determinations of law by the trial court. Appellate review of
trial court findings on foreign law would be desirable in Texas for at least
two reasons. First, it would provide accessible guidance on the actual operation of this aspect of the judicial process in Texas, which is now lacking
since Texas state trial court opinions are not published. Secondly, and more
importantly, it would advance the main objective of intermediate appellate
review, which is to ensure the correct application of the law.
In the Utica Mutual Insurance Co. case, for instance, the plaintiff would
have failed to recover under Texas law because the insured did not comply
with the provisions of his insurance policy, but it was successfully contended
below that the applicable Mississippi rule in point was different. The Houston court of civil appeals limited itself to observing, on this key issue, that
the law of Mississippi on this subject "is apparently different in that even
if the policy condition of giving notice to the insurer as soon as practicable
is not complied with, the insured may still recover if the failure to give such
notice did not prejudice the rights of the insurer."' 196 The word here underscored evidences an act of judicial prudence that now seems almost prescient, for a recent comment in the Mississippi Law Journal informs us that
the law on insurance notice clauses in Mississippi is "in great need of clarification," and that Mississippi counsel "confronted with a problem involving
a notice clause will be faced with various inconsistencies in his research
which may plague him throughout his handling of the case."' 197 Still, it is
submitted, the cause of justice would have been advanced, and judicial time
and energy much better invested, if the Houston court of civil appeals had
ventured into this thicket and made its own determination of Mississippi law.
This could not, of course, have been done unless the issue had been squarely
presented on appeal, and perhaps should not be done even then unless Mississippi law was adequately briefed and argued. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that these requirements will be increasingly met once Texas
courts of civil appeals indicate their willingness to review lower court findings on foreign law in a more comprehensive manner.' 98
foreign law findings below); McDaniel v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 455 F.2d 137

(5th Cir. 1972) (contents of foreign law not disputed); Diaz v. Southeastern Drilling
Corp. of Argentina, S.A., 449 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1971); Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432
F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970); First Nat'l City Bank v. Compania de Aguaceros, S.A., 398
F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1968) (reversal of foreign law findings below).
194. Willard v. Conduit, 10 Tex. 213 (1853); Williams v. State, 27 Tex. Crim. 466,
472, 11 S.W.481, 482 (1889).
195. TEx. R.Civ. P. 184a (emphasis added).
196. 492 S.W.2d at 659.
197. Comment, Insurance Notice Clauses in Mississippi, 44 Miss. LJ. 947 (1973).
198. A good example was set by Chief Justice Calvert's detailed discussion of the
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Characterization

In the lucid analysis of Professor Weintraub which is here adopted, the
process of characterization (or of qualification; classification) is employed
at three levels in the traditional solution of conflict-of-laws problems. 19
First, it is used to pidgeonhole the case at hand as, for example, sounding
in tort or in contract. 20 0 Secondly, after first-level characterization has led
to the ascertaining of the nature or "character" of the controversy and the
selection of the appropriate choice-of-law rule, the characterization process
is used again in order to localize the connecting factors of the rule thus selected, for example, the place of the wrong or of the making of the contract.
Thirdly and finally, if this process leads to the "choice" of a system of law
other than that of the forum, characterization is used once again in order
to determine how much of the foreign law thus chosen shall be applied to
the case at hand.
Texas presently follows the traditional rule that "[m]atters of remedy and
procedure are governed by the laws of the State where the action is sought
to be maintained."' 2 0 1 Texas courts must therefore engage in third-level
characterization for the purpose of determining whether a particular rule of
the foreign law selected is "substantive" and thus applicable, or "procedural"
and therefore displaced by the apposite rule of Texas law. The most common example of this process is furnished by statutes of limitation. In Culpepper v. Daniel Industries, Inc.20 2 plaintiff sought to recover for damages
suffered in a valve explosion accident that had occurred in Louisiana. The
action was brought in Texas after one year, but within two years following
the date of the accident. It was thus timely under the Texas statute of limi20 3
tation, but prescribed in Louisiana.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the action as timebarred under the applicable Louisiana law, and the Houston court of civil
appeals reversed. The basic question, according to the latter court, was
"whether this is a matter of substantive right, controlled by the laws of
Louisiana, or whether it is a matter of remedy and procedure, governed by
the laws of Texas. '20 4 The action had been brought under article 2315(1) of
the Louisiana Civil Code which provides: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it."2 0° 5 Actions under article 2315(1) must be initiated within one year (arLouisiana authorities in Francis v. Herrin Transp. Co., 432 S.W.2d 710, 713-17 (Tex.
1968).
199. R.

WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 40-46 (1971).
200. Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493, 495 (5th
Cir. 1973), required analysis under both of these headings. See text accompanying

notes 256-64, 318-39 infra.
201. Hobbs v. Hajecate, 374 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964), error
ref.
202. 500 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
203. Id. at 958. The Texas "borrowing statute," TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.

5530 (1958), applies only to foreign judgments, not to foreign causes of action generally.
204. 500 S.W.2d at 958.
205. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1971). For a trenchant study of Louisiana torts law as judicially developed on this statutory basis, see Robertson, Reason
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ticle 3536); and the latter provision, the Houston court noted, had been held
to be "prescriptive, and therefore is procedural; it bars the remedy but does
'20 6
not extinguish the right."
The problem of characterizing statutes of limitations within the commonlaw family is formidable enough, but it seems almost easy when compared
with what Learned Hand once termed "the attempt to import into the
French law the refined notion which pervades our own, of a right barred
of remedy, but still existing in nubibus. ' ' 20 7 In Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique'208 from which this quotation is taken, the
fact that the French judge cannot raise the issue of prescription ex officio
tipped the scales in the direction of the characterization of the French limitation as "procedural," 20 9 while in the recent Fifth Circuit case of Ramsay v.
Boeing Co. 210 the fact that the Belgian judge could and indeed had to raise
the issue of prescription there involved led to the opposite conclusion.
The Houston court of civil appeals did not pursue this avenue, but limited
itself to citing two Fifth Circuit cases and one Louisiana decision in support
of the proposition that article 3336 was prescriptive and, hence, procedural. 211 The court was thus able to distinguish the present case from Francis v. Herrin TransportationCo., 21 2 where the Supreme Court of Texas had
held the built-in limitation for wrongful death actions contained in article
2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code to be peremptive, and as such, a substantive condition on the right of recovery. The Houston court saw the decisive
distinguishing element of the Francis case in the fact that there, "the very

statute which created that right of action also incorporated an express limi' 213
tation upon the time within which the suit could be brought.
The Culpepper case raises more questions than it seeks to resolve. First,
when dealing with a codified civil-law system, does it make much sense to
speak in terms of the "very statute which created the right of action"? After all, the Civil Code is one statute, and it is a basic proposition of the

civil law that all of its provisions have to be interpreted in a harmonious
manner. 2 14 Secondly, if Learned Hand was correct in saying that "a right
without any remedy is a meaningless scholasticism," 215 why are some statutes
of limitations regarded as "substantive" and others as "procedural"? And
last but certainly not least, which system of laws furnishes the ultimate criteria for drawing this distinction?

Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.,
34 LA. L. REv. 1 (1973).

206. 500 S.W.2d at 958-59.
207. Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 942
(2d Cir. 1930).
208. 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930).

209. Id. at 942-43.

The transcript of the expert's testimony on this point is re-

produced in R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 129-42 (3d ed. 1970).
210. 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970).
211. 500 S.W.2d at 959, citing Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27 (5th Cir.
1970); Page v. Cameron Iron Works, 259 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1958); Istre v. Diamond
M. Drilling Co., 226 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 1969).
212. 432 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1968).
213. 500 S.W.2d at 959.
214. See Robertson, supra note 205, at 23-27.

215. Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 943
(2d Cir. 1930).
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Some light is shed on this last question by Nelms v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,210 a Fifth Circuit decision in a Texas appeal.
Plaintiff, seemingly a Texas resident, had been bitten by his grandfather's
dog while visiting in Louisiana, and he brought a direct action against the
grandfather's insurer as permitted by Louisiana law. 217 Since Texas law
does not permit direct actions against insurers and as the action was brought
in a federal district court sitting in Texas, the court had to decide whether
the Louisiana direct action statute was "substantive" or "procedural." The
plaintiff-appellant argued that the Louisiana courts, after much hesitation,
had finally concluded that the Louisiana direct action statute was "substantive." This, the Fifth Circuit noted, was not dispositive of the issue at hand:
A federal district court located in Texas and sitting on the basis of diversity jurisdiction must indeed apply the Louisiana 'substantive' law,
but only if that Louisiana law is or would be characterized as 'substantive' by the state courts of Texas. .

.

. That characterization is a matter

for Texas law, not Louisiana law, although Texas courts have examined
the characterizations and interpretations
accorded by the courts of other
2 18
states to their own state laws.

As Texas courts and federal courts applying Louisiana law had "uniformly
concluded that direct actions are, under Louisiana law, 'procedural,' " the
court concluded that the cases cited by the appellant would not convince
a Texas court "that these earlier Texas cases were an incorrect interpretation
of Louisiana's 'substantive' interests in direct actions. '2 1 9 The judgment below in favor of defendant was accordingly affirmed.
The same defendant did not fare equally well in Romero v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 22 0 a direct action of a Louisiana wife-

passenger against her husband's insurer for damages arising out of a Texas
accident caused by the husband's negligence. The intermediate Louisiana
appellate court applied Texas law as the lex loci delicti and reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, since Texas does not permit direct actions against
insurers and since, moreover, under Texas law, wives do not have an action
in tort against their husbands. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in turn,
reinstated the judgment of the trial court. After pointing out that the lex
loci delicti rule was no longer followed in Louisiana, the court stated:
Since the factual situation in the instant case presents one where only
Louisiana has an interest in the application of its laws and Texas has
none, the law of Louisiana will be applied. Under Louisiana law, a
wife can bring a direct action in tort against her husband's liability insurer. .

.

. Furthermore, there is no prohibition in Louisiana to a suit

by a guest passenger against his host driver. Accordingly,221plaintiff's
claim must be determined by the Louisiana law of negligence.
216. 463 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1972).
217. LA. Rnv. STAT. § 22:655 (1959).
218. 463 F.2d at 1192 (emphasis in original).

219. Id.
220. 277 So. 2d 649 (La. 1973).
221. Id. at 651.
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It should be noted that this passage does not contain any reference to
the talismanic words, "substance" and "procedure." Louisiana has adopted
a modern, functional approach to the choice of law, and under this approach, the applicability of potentially pertinent rules of law is determined
not by their labels, but in the light of their underlying purposes as measured
against the particular issue at hand. Within the last year, two states-New
Jersey and Wisconisn-have applied the functional method to statutes of
limitation as well. 222 Their example is likely to be followed, and it is hoped
that Texas, too, will soon re-evaluate the practical utility of third-level characterization.
This re-examination is not likely to burden Texas courts with claims that
are stale in Texas, but still current under their "proper" law. As regards
tort actions brought pursuant to article 4678 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, that article expressly provides that such actions must be commenced
"in the courts of this State within the time prescribed for the commencement
of such actions by the statutes of this State. ' 223 The same principle is easily
applied, if need be, by analogy to tort conflicts actions outside of article
4678,224 and it is but a small step from there to the general conclusion that
all Texas statutes of limitations are intended to function as "time clocks"
225
for all actions brought in Texas courts.
C. Public Policy
Even if foreign law is selected by the appropriate domestic choice-of-law
rule, established to the satisfaction of the court, and characterized as "substantive" rather than "procedural," it may still be refused effect domestically,
under the traditional system, if found to be contrary to public policy. As
the Supreme Court of Texas has said, courts in this state will not follow
the general choice-of-law rule as to contracts "when to enforce a foreign contract, according to the provisions of the foreign laws, will contravene some
established rule of public policy of the state of the forum. ' 226 A more recent formulation of the public-policy exception is found in California v.
Copus, where that court stated: "To justify a court in refusing to enforce
a right of action which accrued under the law of another state, because
against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is against good morals
or natural justice, or that for some other such reason the enforcement of
' 227
it would be prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens."
This latter passage was quoted with approval by the supreme court in
Rodgers v. Williamson,22s where it was contended that a passage in an MIi222. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Air Prods. &
Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
223. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).
224. On the issue whether art. 4678 is the exclusive Texas choice-of-law rule for
foreign tort and wrongful death actions in Texas, see text accompanying notes 303,
307-09 infra.
225. See, e.g., Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930); H.
GOODRUCH, CONFLICT OF LAwS 155 (4th ed. Scoles 1969).
226. King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 657, 201 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1947).
227. 158 Tex. 196, 204, 309 S.W.2d 227, 232 (1958).
228. 489 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1973).
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nois adoption decree which permitted the natural father visitation rights was
against Texas public policy. After stating that the full faith and credit
clause had not as yet been extended to sister-state equity decrees and that
the approach urged by the adoptive parents was thus not foreclosed, 229 the
supreme court nevertheless proceeded to find "no compelling reason of public policy to deny effect to the Illinois decree. '230 There is only one reason
assigned for this conclusion: The Illinois court, it was pointed out, had evidently felt that it would be in the best interests of the child for the father
231
to visit him at the designated times and places.
While this cautious use of the public-policy exception surely merits approval, one might have hoped for a somewhat more detailed articulation of
the standard applied. It seems likely, however, that the court was not uninfluenced by the fact that this was an adoption of a six-year-old legitimate
child by his mother and her second husband, a situation to which any Texas
policy in favor of anonymity of blood parentage 232 can hardly be said to
apply. Furthermore, the supreme court expressly directed the trial court to
re-examine the matter of visitation "according to the welfare of the child
under present circumstances," 233 thus assuring that the operation of the Illinois decree pro futuro would be in compliance with Texas law and policy.
III.

CONTRACTS

When Professor Stumberg first addressed himself to the subject of the validity of contracts under Texas conflict-of-laws rules, he prefaced his remarks
with a quotation from a then leading treatise, to the effect that this was
"the most confused subject in the field of Conflict of Laws. '234 Some four
decades later, his successor at the University of Texas recorded that it is
still "common for American Conflicts scholars to refer to contracts as the
most complex and confused area of choice-of-law problems. ' 235 Writing in
1932, Professor Stumberg arrived at the conclusion that Texas authorities
then extant supported the place of the making, the place of performance
as presumably intended by the parties, and the application of that law which
upholds the contract. He called for a supreme court decision "to clear, so
to speak, the legal atmosphere. '236 Since that time, the Supreme Court of
Texas has had several opportunities to speak on the subject, 23 7 but a casual
observer may well doubt whether this has brought much of a change.
It is submitted, nevertheless, that the subject loses most of its mythical
qualities if approached along the lines recently suggested by Professor Wein229. Id. at
ment c (1971).

560, citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 102,

com-

230. 489 S.W.2d at 561.
231. Id.
232. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.17(b), (d) (1973).
233. 489 S.W.2d at 561.
234. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Validity of Contracts-Texas Cases, 10 TEXAs L.
REV. 163 (1932), quoting H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 228 (1927).
235. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 199, at 263.
236. Stumberg, supra note 234, at 183.
237. See Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697 (Tex.
1968); Castilleja v.Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967).
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traub. Questions relating to the validity and the construction of contracts
pose different issues, and require separate analysis. The interpretation of
contracts, on the other hand, that is, the determination of the actual intent
of the parties, does not as such raise choice-of-law questions. 238 The framework of analysis here adopted applies only to judicially developed choiceof-law rules. Statutory choice-of-law rules, which
are less uncommon than
239
might be thought, will require separate treatment.
A.

Validity

As classically formulated by Professor Weintraub, a "choice-of-law problem involving the validity of a contract arises when, under the domestic law
of one state having some contact with the problem, a provision in a contract
is invalid, but under the law of another contact state, the same provision
is enforceable. '240 The actual intention of the parties can be ascertained,
but one state refuses to give effect to that intention. Whether the provision
in issue is enforced "depends upon which law is 'chosen' to govern its valid24
ity." 1

In Dailey v. Transitron Electronic Corp.242 plaintiff sought to recover
damages for wrongful early discharge from his three-year employment as the
engineering manager of a Nuevo Laredo plant which was a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Transitron, a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Massachusetts. Transitron seemingly wore its corporate garments rather haphazardly, for the offer was made by Transitron Mexicana, S.A., a whollyowned Mexican subsidiary; the written contract was executed in Nuevo
Laredo with Transitron Overseas Corporation, a wholly-owned Delaware
subsidiary; and Dailey was discharged by Transitron itself. This aspect of
the case will require brief mention below in another connection, but the
parties apparently accepted Transitron Overseas as the real employer and
243
the proper party defendant.
The district court held Texas law to be applicable, and denied a motion
to dismiss the action as time-barred under the pertinent rule of Mexican
law, which appears to be of the type characterized as "substantive" under
the traditional approach.2 44 This decision was affirmed on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit. Speaking for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Wisdom said that Texas
follows "the traditional rule of applying the law of the place of performance
or the law of the place where the contract was made, in the absence of a
contrary manifestation of intent by the parties. '245 He added, however, that
this traditional rule was "not conclusive but is presumptively applied if the
238. R. WEINmatm, supra note 199, at 263-64.
239. See text accompanying notes 278-94 infra.

240. R.

WEINTRAUB,

supra note 199, at 263.

241. Id.
242. 475 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1973).

243. See text accompanying notes 376-83 infra.
244. It had been construed as "substantive" under Florida choice-of-law rules in Gillies v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 468 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 931 (1973).
245. 475 F.2d at 14.
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parties' intent is not determinable. ' 24 6 Nevertheless, he held in view of the
"overwhelming relationship of the parties to Texas and the United States,"
it was unnecessary to engage in further inquiries in this direction. 247
A second significant route for determining intent, Judge Wisdom added,
was the "presumption that the parties intended to make a legally binding
agreement. '2 48 Article 40 of the Mexican New Federal Labor Code limited
the duration of employment contracts to one year, so that, presumably, the
contract of employment here sued on, which was for a three-year period,
would have been wholly or partially void. Since Dailey and Transitron
would not be presumed to enter into an agreement that was not legally binding, Judge Wisdom concluded that "the intent of the parties was to be bound
'249
by the law of Texas.
The same proposition was stated, in even stronger terms, in Mamlin v.
Susan Thomas, Inc. which has been mentioned repeatedly above. 250 There,
the parties had expressly chosen New York law to govern the arbitration
clause, and that law (at least as grotesquely distorted by the Texas presumption of identity) made ,the clause unenforceable. In refusing to give effect to
this real choice of a (fictitiously) invalidating law, the Dallas court of civil
appeals stated:
When courts apply the law chosen by the parties, they do so for the
purpose of giving effect to their intention. . . . The law chosen by them
will not be applied when it would defeat their intention by invalidating
the contract, since they can be assumed to have intended that the contract be binding. . . . In order to give effect to -that presumed intention, when courts have
a choice of law, they will apply the law which
upholds the contract. 251
If Daley and Mamlin should come to be accepted as authoritative statements of the law presently prevailing, it seems possible, at long last, to summarize current Texas choice-of-law rules on the validity of contracts with
some hope of accuracy. The keystone of these rules is the presumption,
adopted from domestic Texas contract law, that "when parties make an
agreement they intend it to be effectual, not nugatory. '252 Accordingly,
contracts and contract clauses will be given effect if they are valid under
the law actually chosen, or the law that might have been chosen, by the
parties. The latter includes, but is not logically limited to, the law of the
places of contracting and of the place or places of performance. The ex246. id.
247. Id., citing Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697

(Tex. 1968).
248. 475 F.2d at 14, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6,
188, 196 (1971) and R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 103 (1968).
See also

text accompanying notes 376-83 infra.
249. 475 F.2d at 14.
250. 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 113-16, 161-66 supra.
251. 490 S.W.2d at 637, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
187, comment c (1971); Robbins v. Pacific E. Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 241, 65 P.2d 42, 58
(1937); Storing v. National Sur. Co., 56 N.D. 14, 215 N.W. 875 (1927); Ryan v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 65 Tex. 13 (1885).
252. Texas Gas Util. Co. v. Barrett, 460 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. 1970).
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press choice of an invalidating law, on the other hand, is disregarded as an
egregious error. These rules are subject, of course, to Texas statutory prohibitions or restrictions where applicable, and to the general prohibition against the enforcement of contracts, by whatever law governed,
s
against Texas public policy.25
B.

Construction

Problems of construction rather than validity arise, in Professor Weintraub's parlance, whenever "the intention of the parties on some important
aspect of their agreement is unknown and unknowable. '254 To take an example previously mentioned: If it turns out that due to the present energy
shortage, Conoco can no longer meet its contractual obligations towards PPG
and Olin, the question arises whether this supervening impossibility excuses
performance. This question could have been disposed of by contract, in
which case both Louisiana and Texas would have given effect to the terms
agreed upon. In the hypothetical situation here posed, there was, however,
no such agreement, and (again pursuant to that hypothesis) there is a crucial difference between Texas and Louisiana "stopgap" contract law on the
issue of excuse by virtue of supervening factual or commercial impossibility. 255
In Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A. 256 plaintiff sought
to recover damages from a Mexican bus company for the wrongful death
of his mother in a Mexican collision caused by the negligence of the driver
or the unsafe condition of the vehicle. The only connection with Texas was
that plaintiff's decedent had purchased a one-way bus ticket, printed in
Spanish, in Laredo for the fateful trip commencing there and scheduled to
take her to Saltillo, Coahuila, Mexico. Plaintiff urged liability under a
Texas contract of safe carriage as an alternative ground for recovery, obviously in order to escape dismissal under the "dissimilarity" rule which is
2 57
limited to torts.
The parties could theoretically have chosen Texas law as the law of the
contract of carriage, although this seems barely short of absurd.2 58 Since
253.

See text accompanying notes 226-33 supra.

254. R. WnINTRAun, supra note 199, at 263.
255. See text accompanying notes 76-96 supra. In PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental

Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 676 nn.3-4 (5th Cir. 1973), the court stated: "While the parties apparently agree that a state or federal court in Louisiana, using the Louisiana
choice-of-law rule, would apply Louisiana substantive contract law, it is uncertain

whether the Texas court will apply Texas or Louisiana contract law." The Uniform
Commercial Code forms a part of the Texas law of contracts, but Louisiana has not
adopted the UCC. Apparently, the UCC provision which PPG hopes to escape by litigating in a Louisiana forum is § 2-615, which provides in part: "Delay in delivery
or non-delivery in whole or in part by seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under
a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made .... ." TEx. Bus. & COMM. CoDE ANN. § 2.615 (1968).

256. 486 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1973).
257. See text accompanying notes 318-39 infra.
258. In Hodgson v. Union de Permisionarios Circulo Rojo, S. de R.L., 331 F. Supp.

1119, 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1971), Judge Garza said, in declining to apply United States
minimum wage law to the drivers of a Mexican bus company operating between Matamoros, Mexico, and Brownsville, Texas: "Employees of this Mexican bus company
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no such express choice had in fact been made, the court had to determine
which was the applicable law so as to ascertain the appropriate rules of construction. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas would not, in any event, permit
recovery for wrongful death on a contract rather than a tort theory. Judge
Brown, speaking for a unanimous panel, nevertheless added that it was "far
from clear" whether the plaintiff would fare any better under Texas contracts choice-of-law rules. He summarized the latter as follows:
(1) "In Texas, the law of the place where the contract is made generally
governs ;-259
(2)"When a contract is made in one state to be performed in another, the
' 260
place of performance governs;
(3) "[W]here a contract is to be performed in more -than one place, the
place of making governs unless the parties intended otherwise." 2 61
The present case, Judge Brown continued, involved "a Mexican National
who purchased a one way bus ticket to Mexico printed in Spanish, in a
Texas border town from a Mexican bus company which did not operate between cities in the United States.

'2 62

While the contract was made in Texas,

it was "to be performed almost entirely in Mexico. '263 Consequently, he
concluded, the facts of the instant case lent "more support to the inference
that the parties may have assumed that the laws of Mexico rather than
Texas governed this transaction and its incidents. 12 64 For the reason already indicated above, however, the court chose not to resolve this question.
Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bennett265 involveh an attempt by the vic-

tim of a Texas motor vehicle collision to collect an unsatisfied judgment from
the defendant's insurer as a third-party beneficiary under the insurance contract. As already mentioned, there had been no strict compliance with the
notice provisions of the insurance policy. This was fatal to plaintiff's claim
against the insurer under Texas law, but not-at least so the trial court
found and the Houston court of civil appeals assumed-under Mississippi
law. 266 The insurance policy had been issued in Mississippi to the insured,
earn less per week than most United States laborers earn per day, and the bus fares
are priced accordingly. This valuable bus service would obviously have to be discontinued in the event the company was forced to pay a minimum wage, because if fares
were raised to compensate for the wage-hike, the buses would be devoid of passengers."
These considerations, it would seem, are equally pertinent to accident claims, as Mexico
"does not allow damages for pain and suffering or physical injury in the common tort
suit but rather provides compensation for lost wages calculated through a formula based
on the injured party's former wages and the Mexican federal labor wage standards."
Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1973),
citing Ley Federal del Trabajo (Federal Labor Law) arts. 287-89, 293-94, 301, 502
[1945] D.O.; C. Civ. Dist. y Terr Fed. (Federal Civil Code) art. 1915 (Editorial
Porrua 1966).
259. 486 F.2d at 496, citing Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432
S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1968).
260. 486 F.2d at 496, citing Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967).
261. 486 F.2d at 496, citing Hatchett v. Williams, 437 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 492 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973). See also text
accompanying notes 152-53, 196-98 supra.
266. 402 S.W.2d at 663; see text accompanying notes 196-98 supra.
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a Mississippi resident, through Utica's agent, a Mississippi insurance agency.
The Houston court decided, safely enough, that Mississippi law applied,
by the laws of the
since "[o]bligations of contracts are to be determined
2 67
performed."
and
made
were
contracts
the
where
state
Ramirez and Utica Mutual can be read as supporting the proposition that,
in Texas, the construction of contracts is governed by the law actually chosen
by the parties, or in the absence of such an express choice, by that law which
they presumably would have chosen. In ascertaining the presumptive intent
of the parties, the place of performance would appear to be regarded as
a more weighty factor than the place of contracting. This process of ascertaining the presumed intent of the parties is governed by objective, not subjective, criteria. As had been said by eminent authority, when a court presumes that the parties intended the law of the place of contracting or of
performance to be applied, it is "not making a nice assessment of the probabilities that this was the law that the parties actually had in mind," but
to
"formulating a norm to guide decision, a rough-cut standard of fairness,
268
parties.
the
by
law
of
choice
express
an
of
absence
the
in
be used
It is submitted that the presumptive-intent rule as thus described is preferable to a mechanical place-of-the-making or place-of-performance rule, but
that it is still far from satisfactory. For one thing, as English and West German experience has amply demonstrated, the "proper law of the contract"
or the law chosen by the "hypothetical intent of the parties" has persistently
26 9
eluded efforts at judicial formulation in terms assuring predictability.
Secondly, but of course not secondarily, the rule does not take into account
the policies underlying potentially conflicting rules of substantive law, thus
preventing a functional analysis that might eliminate spurious or false conflicts. To illustrate: Only Mexico had an interest in compensating the survivors of Mrs. Ramirez and in admonishing the bus company to exercise
more care. Mexican law seemingly tilts the balance in favor of encouraging
potentially harmful conduct rather than full compensation for the damage
suffered, and the application of this lesser standard between these two
parties in relation to a Mexican road accident does no violence to the
policies underlying the much more stringent Texas rules as to liability for
damage. Similarly, only Mississippi had an interest in permitting a Mississippi insured to shift liability to his "Mississippi" insurer 270 in situations
where the insured had not strictly complied with his obligations under the
267. 492 S.W.2d at 664.
268. Cavers, Oral Contracts to Provide by Will and the Choice-of-Law Process:
Some Notes on Bernkrant, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW, ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN
SCOTT 38, 49-50 (1964). Professor Cavers quotes the delightful comment of George
Stumberg, now to be found in G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 23435 (3d ed. 1963), that under the "presumed intention" rule, "the contract is governed

by the law which the parties should have intended if the court had been there to give
advice."

Cavers, supra, at n.31.

269. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation
SA, [1971] A.C. 572 (1970); Miller v. Whitworth Estates, [1970] A.C. 583; U.
DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 229-240 (2d ed. 1972). See
also, e.g., BGH, Sept. 19, 1973, [1973] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2151.
270. The insurance policy was issued to a Mississippi insured in Mississippi through
a local insurance agency representing Utica Mutual. 492 S.W.2d at 664.
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policy. As it was, the application of the Mississippi rule also worked to the
benefit of the Texas plaintiff, since he now found a deeper pocket to satisfy
his claim. This result was, however, neither required by, nor contrary to,
the teleological objectives of Texas insurance law. The latter would have
given the plaintiff no recourse here, but this stricter reading of correspective
obligations under insurance contracts was intended for the protection of companies writing insurance in Texas or for Texans.
It thus appears, in conclusion, that in terms of functional analysis, Ramirez and Utica Mutual were false or spurious conflict cases, and that they
were correctly decided, although not diagnosed, in those terms. This outcome should come as no surprise, for the presumptive intent rule serves, as
Professor Cavers observed, as "a rough-cut standard of fairness."'271 It is
submitted, however, that the process of articulation would have been more
visible, and the result more predictable, if functional analysis had been
adopted instead.
C. Statutory Choice-of-Law Rules
Several Texas statutes contain provisions as to their territorial or personal scope, and the reach of several other Texas statutes is readily delimited
by their nature and purpose without resort to choice-of-law rules. Express
unilateral statutory choice-of-law rules occur primarily, though not exclusively, in laws relating to consensual agreements. Thus, the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law is expressly applicable where "an employee, who
has been hired in this State, sustain[s an] injury in the course of his employment .... ,,272 Similarly, the Texas Insurance Code provides that "[a]ny
contract of insurance payable to any citizen or inhabitant of this State by
any insurance company or corporation doing business within this State shall
be held to be a contract made and entered into under and by virtue of the
laws of this State relating to insurance, and governed thereby. '273 The Mechanics' Lien Law makes contractors and subcontractors the trustees of funds
paid to them "under a construction contract for the improvement of specific
real property in this state. ' 274 The Uniform Commercial Code is applicable
to "transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state," but subject
to several specific exceptions listed in the Code, the parties may agree on
the application of the law of another state or county with respect to a transaction that "bears a reasonable relation" both to Texas and to the state or
country thus designated. 275 A recent amendment of that Code, enacted by
the 63d Legislature, lays down detailed choice-of-law rules on the perfection
2 76
of security interests in multiple state transactions.
The implied delimitation of the sphere of the spatial and personal reach
of a statute by the nature and purpose (but not the language) of that stat271.

Cavers, supra note 268, at 49.

272. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (1967).
273. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (1963).
274. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472E, § 1 (1973).
275. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(A) (1973).
276. Id. §§ 1.105(b), 9.103.
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ute itself occurs primarily in those areas where according to conventional
wisdom, foreign law is not applied at all, that is, public, fiscal, and penal
law. Remarkably enough, the new Texas Penal Code enacted by the 63rd
Legislature contains an express provision generally delimiting the penal jurisdiction of the State of Texas, 277 so that the reach of Texas criminal law is
now determined by express unilateral choice-of-law rules rather than by necessary implication.
There are, however, other areas where the latter
method is still appropriate. These include two subjects touching upon consensual obligations: state antitrust law and, it is submitted, at least some
aspects of consumer protection.
Express Rules. Howell v. American Live Stock Insurance Co.2 78 was an
action on a livestock insurance contract to recover for the death of a horse.
The insured was a citizen of Texas, although his breeding and training farm
was located in New Mexico. The horse had been kept at that farm at all
times material, and the insurance contract had been made and executed in
New Mexico. In addition to the value of the horse, plaintiff sought to recover twelve percent of that value plus reasonable attorneys' fees as provided by Texas law whenever an insurance company unjustifiably fails to
pay the claim within thirty days after demand.2 7 9 Howell maintained that
Texas law was applicable by virtue of the unilateral choice-of-law clause of
the Texas Insurance Code which provides in terms that any contract of insurance between a Texas resident and any insurance company which is doing business in Texas is to be governed by Texas law.280 Since the American Live Stock Insurance Company does business in Texas as well as in
New Mexico, that clause seemed literally applicable.
In an opinion written by Judge Wisdom -the Fifth Circuit affirmed a trial
court decision adverse to the plaintiff on this point. The Supreme Court
of Texas, he held, had read that clause as "designed only to assure that
Texas law will apply to contracts made between Texas citizens and insurance
companies doing business in Texas, when and only when those contracts are
made in the course of the company's Texas business." 2 '1 Otherwise, Judge
Wisdom went on to observe, the law to be applied under the pertinent Texas
choice-of-law rule is the law the parties intended to apply. Under the circumstances of the case as summarized above, he concluded that it was "fair
to assume.

.

.

s
that the parties intended New Mexico law to apply. 282

Implied Rules. It is well established in Texas that a contract by which a
distributor obtains an exclusive territory for the resale of articles purchased
from the supplier, and by which the distributor is given a contractual right
277. TEx. PEN. CODE ArN. § 1-104 (1974).
278. 483 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1973).
279. Id. at 1358; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (1963).
280. TEX. Ins. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (1963). Recent illustrations of the seemingly
automatic application of Texas law where the insured is a Texas resident are Fritz v.
Old Am. Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 514 (S.D. Tex. 1973), and Mustang Beach Corp. v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 348 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
281. 483 F.2d at 1359. The authority relied on is Austin Bldg. Co. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1968).
282. 483 F.2d at 1361.
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to prevent sales by the supplier to others in that territory, violates the antitrust laws of Texas and is unenforceable. 283 In E.F.I., Inc. v. Marketers
International, Inc.28 4 it was held that this rule applied to an exclusive dealer
agreement between a Florida manufacturer and a Texas distributor. A summary judgment in favor of the Texas defendant was nevertheless reversed
by the Houston court of civil appeals, since the defendant had not established by the record that the contract was intrastate as to performance or
that the transactions contemplated by and carried out under the contract
were essentially intrastate. Under the exclusive distributorship agreement
Marketers was (subject to some minor exceptions) the exclusive distributor
of E.F.I. products throughout the United States, and there was evidence that
Marketers had made some deliveries of these products to customers in other
states. These "transactions in interstate commerce," the Houston court held,
"were contemplated by the contract and were not subject to control by Texas
'28 5
antitrust statutes.
This narrow construction of the Texas antitrust acts as not affecting transactions in interstate commerce reflects venerable authority, and finds some
additional support in the titles of the original enactments which uniformly
described that statute as intended to "promote free competition in the State
of Texas."' 286 A reading of the older authorities would appear to show, however, that they were primarily motivated by the desire to reconcile the exercise of Texas legislative power with federal constitutional constraints as
then perceived. 28 7 The Fifth Circuit has recently held that "state and federal governments may enforce concurrently their antitrust laws,"' 28 8 and has
cited with approval a Texarkana court of civil appeals decision holding that
"state protection of its own commerce against conspiracies in restraint of
trade which also violate interstate commerce, is supplementary to the Fed' 289
eral regulatory scheme.
It is therefore suggested that the restrictive interpretation of the Texas
antitrust act as not reaching transactions in interstate commerce should be
reexamined at an early opportunity. This question is of substantial current
importance because, as the E.F.I. case shows, Texas antitrust law as to exclusive distributorships is considerably more restrictive than are the corresponding rules of federal antitrust law. 290
283. Sherrard v. After Hours, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1971); Climatic Air Distrib. v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc., 162 Tex. 237, 345 S.W.2d 702 (1961).
284. 492 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
285. Id. at 305.
286. See the captions of Act of March 31, 1903, ch. 94, [1903] Tex. Laws 119;
Act of April 30, 1895, ch. 83, [1895] Tex. Laws, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS

842 (1898); Act of March 30, 1889, ch. 117, [1889] Tex. Laws, 11 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 202 (1898).
287. See, e.g., Albertype Co. v. Gust Feist Co., 102 Tex. 219, 114 S.W. 791 (1908).
288. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1313 (5th Cir. 1971).
289. State v. Southeast Tex. Chap. of Nat'l Elec. Contractor's Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d
711, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 965 (1963). See
generally, to the same effect, J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION
109-226 (1964).
290. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Comment,
Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions Under the Sherman Act: Decisions
Since United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 22 J. PuB. L. 483 (1973).
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Quite apart from this, however, a long line of cases supports the principle
that an agreement between an out-of-state supplier or manufacturer and a
Texas distributor that allocates the latter an exclusive territory in Texas is
in violation of Texas antitrust law and will not be enforced. 291 This conclusion is reached independently of the wording of the titles of the original enactments, which have in any event long receded from memory and are not
contained in the Revised Civil Statutes. Furthermore, this conclusion is
reached quite uniformly without resort to choice-of-law considerations regarding contracts, such as the law of the place of contracting or the parties'
presumed choice of a validating law. The reason for this direct application
of the Texas antitrust law to interstate contracts without the intermediary
of choice-of-law rules seems quite clear: these laws are not subject to the
disposition of private parties, and they cast what Arthur Nussbaum once
called their own "spatial shadow."
It is submitted that such a "spatial shadow" is also cast by the Home Sol-2
29
icitation Transactions Act, which was enacted by the 63d Legislature.
Pursuant to that act, consumer transactions concluded at the consumer's residence for a consideration in excess of $25 can be unilaterally cancelled by
the consumer within three business days next following the transaction. The
merchant must furnish the consumer with a statement calling attention to
this right of cancellation. Sales or contracts entered into in violation of this
act are declared void and unenforceable, and the consumer is given other
remedies to vindicate his rights thereunder. It seems clear that this statute
is intended to protect Texas consumers, and to apply to all door-to-door
salesmen operating in this state, no matter whom they represent. Thus, any
attempt, by, for example, an out-of-state encyclopedia sales enterprise, to
circumvent the Texas Home Solicitation Transactions Act by the "choice"
of the more lenient law of another state should fail not because it is against
Texas public policy, but because under the Act, there is no room for considering anything but Texas law in this connection.
A strong argument can similarly be made for the integral application of
the new Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act to all Texas-connected transactions involving consumers who are residents in Texas.
That act expressly declares any waivers of its benefits by a consumer to be
contrary to public policy, unenforceable, and void. Furthermore, the sanctions include criminal penalties, and the Consumer Protection Division of the
state attorney general's office is assigned key functions in the enforcement
of the act.2 93 This suggests the presence of an overriding state interest in
controlling consumer transactions affecting Texas consumers in Texas. It
also appears that examples will not be lacking if the legislature should feel
the need to clarify its intent as to the personal and spatial reach of Texas
291. National Automatic Mach. Co. v. Smith, 32 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1930) (citing further authorities); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Houck,
27 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), af'd, 88 Tex. 184, 30 S.W. 869 (1895).
292. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-13.01-.06 (Supp. 1974).
293. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Supp. 1974). See Comment,
Caveat Vendor: the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act,
25 BAYLOR L. REV. 425 (1973).
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consumer protection legislation. 294 It is hoped, however, that the judicial
construction of this legislation in the light of its manifest purpose will make
such action unnecessary.
IV.

TORTS

In his concurring opinion in Click v. Thuron Industries Mr. Justice Daniel
noted that "at least twenty" states and the District of Columbia "have abandoned the rigid 'place-of-wrong' rule, under which only the law of the state
of the injury or death may be considered and applied," and that they "have
Bdopted the state-interest analysis or 'most significant contacts' rule, under
which is applied the law of the state having the most significant relevant
contacts with or interest in the parties or the occurrence." 29 5 Since the last
Survey in which Click was noted, 29 6 the Supreme Court of Texas has not
had occasion to speak again on this issue. Some more states, however, including the neighboring states of Colorado and Louisiana,29 7 have joined this
trend, and Texas has at least not taken the retrogressive step, initiated by
Connecticut and North Carolina,2 98 of proclaiming everlasting commitment
to the lex loci delicti. In view of the dramatic shift of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana within two years after what seems to be the most eloquent articulation of lasting commitment to the traditional rule, 299 this was surely
not unwise.
Against this background of continuing uncertainty, it seems advisable to
start with three basic propositions still clearly commanding judicial support.
First, it seems assured, in the light of the decisions of the Texas Supreme
Court in Marmon and in Click,300 that the Texas wrongful death statute
as currently construed by Texas courts has no extra-territorial effect. Secondly, there is a Texas statutory choice-of-law rule with respect to out-ofstate torts. Article 4678 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes expressly provides that whenever the "death or personal injury of a citizen of this State
or of the United States, or of any foreign country having equal treaty rights
294. Other legislatures have recently preferred to address themselves to this issue
more directly. Thus, the 1971 Quebec Consumer Protection Act provides that every

clause of a consumer contract making it subject in whole or in part to an act other
than Canadian Dominion or Quebec provincial legislation shall be void. Quebec Stat.
1971, ch. 74, § 8. See generally Nabhan & Talpis, Le droit international privg qugbecois et canadien de la protection juridique du consommateur, 33 R. Du B. 330 (1973).
The 1972 South Australian Consumer Protection Act declares itself to be applicable
to consumer transactions (a) of which South Australian law is the "proper law" by
virtue of choice-of-law rules there prevailing, or (b) relating to goods or services that
are delivered or rendered within that state. 21 Eliz. II no. 135 of 1972, § 6 (S. Aust.).
295. 475 S.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Tex. 1972).
296. Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey oj Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 164, 16667 (1973).
297. First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); Jagers v. Royal Indem.
Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
298. Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Shaw v. Lee, 258
N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
299. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970),
overruled by Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); see Note, Conflict of Laws-Torts-False Conflicts-Louisiana Rejects Lex Loci Delicti, 48 TULANE
L. REV. 149 (1973).
300. Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1972); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
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with the United States on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be caused
by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another in any foreign State or
country for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages thereof
is given by the statute or law of such foreign State or country, such right
of action may be enforced in the courts of this State." 30 1 Thirdly, however,
this statutory choice-of-law rule, and the judicially-developed choice-of-law
rule which it parallels or perhaps displaces, does not apply to Mexican tort
law, as the latter is so "materially different" from Texas law that Texas
3
courts cannot adjudicate the rights of the parties . 02
The sense of certainty conveyed by these three basic propositions is considerably undercut by four recurring and as yet unanswered questions. First,
does article 4678 displace judicially-developed choice-of-law rules on torts,
or does it merely provide an alternative or an additional remedy?3 3 Secondly, on either assumption, does the traditional Texas rule refer to the
place of the act or omission or to the place of the injury? (The statute
refers to the "wrongful act, neglect or default of another in any foreign State
or country," seemingly pointing to the place of conduct or omission, 30 4 but
dicta heavily favor the place of injury.)3 0 5 Thirdly, can the dissimilarity
doctrine be expected to shrink again, as it has in the past with respect to
sister-state law,30 6 as Mexican law becomes more similar or as Texas state
courts grow more confident of their ability to apply it? Fourth, but by no
means last, how will the state supreme court decide when the question of
continued adherence to the lex loci delicti is inescapably presented, and the
issue turns solely on the viability of a judicially developed choice-of-law
rule?
On these four questions the reader of the current Survey should expect
rather less additional insight than Saul is recorded to have received on the
road to Damascus. First, on the issue whether article 4678 is the sole
choice-of-law rule for foreign tort and wrongful death actions in Texas, two
recent court of civil appeals decisions can be cited as supporting opposite
conclusions. In Culpepper v. Daniel Industries, Inc.,3 0 7 which has already
been mentioned in another connection,308 the Houston court referred to that
article as "applicable" to a personal injury claim based on damages suffered
in a valve explosion accident that had occurred in Louisiana. In Lee v.
Howard, an out-of-state duck hunting accident between two Texas residents,
the trial court applied Arkansas "substantive" law "since the alleged tortious
conduct occurred in Arkansas. ' 30 9 The application of Arkansas law in the
301.

TEx.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).

302. Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1973).
303. The latter possibilities are suggested by Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products
Liability: The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code and Recent Developments in
Conflicts Analysis, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 1429, 1441-42 n.46 (1966).
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Autobuses BIancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493, 496
(5th Cir. 1973).
306. See text accompanying notes 319-24 infra.
307. 500 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
308. See text accompanying notes 202-13 supra.
309. 483 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (emphasis added).
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latter case was not disturbed by the Eastland court of civil appeals, which
seemingly felt no need to refer to article 4678 in this connection.
It seems reasonably certain that both in Culpepper and in Lee, the tortious conduct as well as the injury occurred in the same foreign state, so that
nothing turns on the question whether article 4678 granted the sole remedy
available in Texas. Lee, however, requires some brief further comment.
As already mentioned, both the plaintiff and the defendant were from
Texas, and members of a four-man hunting party. Howard accidentally
shot Lee in the back; there was some doubt whether he had his gloved finger
on the trigger while raising his gun when a duck appeared. The jury found,
however, that Lee was contributorily negligent in failing to keep an adequate
lookout.
Under Texas law as it then stood, contributory negligence on the part of
the defendant constituted an absolute defense. Arkansas is a comparativenegligence state; but under its law, as under Texas law at the present, the
plaintiff cannot recover if his negligence exceeds that of the defendant. 310
The jury, instructed on the basis of Arkansas law, found against the plaintiff
on that issue. On appeal, it was argued that the trial court committed error
by failing to instruct on "discovered peril," a Texas variant of the last-clearchance doctrine3 1' which, the plaintiff contended, was established in the instant case as a matter of law.
The Eastland court of civil appeals quite earnestly, and without a backward glance, discussed the applicability of the "discoverd peril" doctrine to
the instant case in terms of Texas law.31 2 It has noted initially that the
case was to be decided pursuant to Arkansas "substantive law," but a scant
three pages later, that guidepost seems to have simply disappeared.
This is not to suggest that Lee v. Howard was wrongly decided. Far from
it: the jury found that the plaintiff could not recover under Arkansas law,
and the court, applying the Texas "discovered peril" doctrine, eventually
found that he would also lose under Texas law. If Texas law had been
applied as to both contributive/comparative negligence and "discovered
peril," the result would have been the same. If Arkansas law had been
applied as to these two issues, the outcome would hardly have been different. It is highly unlikely that a comparative-negligence jurisdiction would
continue to apply common-law doctrines such as last clear chance or discovered peril, which are basically "humanitarian" exceptions to the harshness
of contributory negligence, but still operate in the same chilly winner-takeall atmosphere.3 13 Be that as it may, whenever a rule of foreign law is selected for the purpose of deciding a local controversy, that rule will have
to be applied according to its own, and not according to the forum's enlargements and exceptions. To quote Brainerd Currie: "It is one thing to fall
between two schools; it is quite another to put together half a donkey and
310. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1973).
311. See Gentry v. Southern Pac. Co., 457 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1970).
312. 483 S.W.2d at 925-26.
313. Comment, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 11 HousToN L. REV. 101, 11417 (1973).
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half a camel, and then ride to victory on the synthetic hybrid. '3 14
That, however, did not happen in Lee v. Howard. Taken by itself, the
application of the Texas discovered peril doctrine to this case makes good
sense. The facts are virtually indistinguishable from the classic first prototype employed by Dr. Morris in his seminal study on the "proper law" of
tort, 316 and there seems :to be no conceivable reason for a Texas court to
apply anything but Texas law to the consequences of this particular accident
between these particular parties. By its automatic application of Texas law
on the issue of discovered peril, the Eastland court of civil appeals seems to
have tacitly or at least instinctively indicated its preference for a more modem, enlightened approach to choice of law in -torts.
On the question whether Texas follows the place-of-impact rule or the
place-of-conduct rule, within the confines of traditional doctrine, the current
crop of cases offers little additional insight. Lee speaks of "conduct," but
nothing turns on this. Ramirez talks of "place of injury," but again, the
difference is not decisive. 316 The long-arm statute cases should probably
not be considered in this connection. Both Jetco and Hoppenfeld could
probably be read in terms of place-of-impact, for the torts there involved
are discussed exclusively in Texas terms.317 All they decided at that stage,
however, was that a tort had been committed "in whole or in part" in Texas,
which was the question to be decided under the Texas long-arm statute.
This jurisdictional requirement is ordinarily met by either conduct or injury
within the state, given reasonable (and perhaps constitutionally mandated)
forseeability, and in the nature of things, torts cases under -the long-arm statute will typically involve within-state injury caused by out-of-state conduct
rather than the obverse pattern.
Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 3 18 has once again focused attention on the issue of "dissimilarity." This was an action for damages for a wrongful death that had occurred in Mexico, and under the authority of Marmon as reiterated in Click, recovery could not be had under
the Texas wrongful death act, which is strictly territorial. The plaintiff
314. As quoted in D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 39 (1965).
315. Morris, The ProperLaw of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1951):
An American co-educational school establishes for its students a summer
vacation camp in the lake and forest country of northern Quebec. The
camp is entirely self-contained and self-supporting and there is no other
human being within 50 miles. One of the girls is seduced by one of the
boys so that she becomes pregnant; another is bitten by a dog kept in the
camp by another boy. Neither incident would have happened but for the
negligence of the camp organizers, who are instructors in the school. The
girls, the boys, and the organizers are all residents of State X, an American state, where also the school is located. Does it make sense to say
that the question whether the girls or their parents can sue the boys or
their parents or the camp organizers in State X 'must' be governed by the

law of Quebec, merely because the incidents happened there? To the
present writer it does not.
316. See text accompanying notes 305, 309 supra. In both cases, the conduct and
the injury occurred in the same foreign state or country.
317. Jetco Electronic Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (5th Cir.

1973); Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error
ref. n.r.e. The latter case is discussed in text accompanying notes 374-75 infra.
318. 486 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1973).
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could recover, if at all, only under Mexican law, and here, he met the defense of "dissimilarity."
In this connection, a few historical observations are called for. In the
leading case of Willis v. Missouri Pacific Railway the Texas Supreme Court
held that the Texas wrongful death statute applied only to "cases occurring
within (Texas) borders."3 19 It added, however, that an action for wrongful
death occurring in another state might be entertained in Texas if that other
state had the "same statute. '3 20 In Texas & Pacific Railway v. Richards recovery for wrongful death in Louisiana was refused because there was no
"like right" (of survivorship) in Texas. 321 The Willis-Richards rule served
to preclude recovery under an Arkansas statute which was "dissimilar in
many respects" from the Texas statutes in St. Louis, I.M. & S. Railway v.
McCormick. 22 In DeHarn v. Mexican National Railway3 23 the rule was
applied to Mexico, with, however, the warning that Texas would enforce
"substantially" similar rights conferred by foreign law. In Mexican National
Railway v. Jackson32 4 the Willis-Richards rule was applied to bar a personal
injury claim based on an accident in Mexico. The Texas Supreme Court
stated the rule to be that ",the courts of this State will not undertake to adjudicate rights which originated in another State or country, under statutes
materially different from the law of this State in relation to the same sub5
ject."32
Subsequent to Jackson courts of civil appeals approved the application of
sister state wrongful death statutes characterized as substantially similar to,
or not essentially different from, the Texas statute.3 26 In De Herrera v.
Texas-Mexican Railway,3 27 however, the same enlightened treatment was refused Mexican law. At this precise point, the legislature intervened, enacting the first precursor of article 4678. The emergency clause of the 1913
Act stated, appropriately enough, that "the fact that there is now no law
permitting citizens of this State who receive injuries in a foreign country
from bringing an action for said injuries under the laws of this State, creates
an emergency ....,,328 A subsequent re-enactment of 1917 extended the
benefits of the 1913 Act to foreign nationals.3 29 These two enactments were
combined into the present article 4678 by the draftsmen of the 1924 Re3 80
vised Civil Statutes.
319.

61 Tex. 432, 434 (1884).

320. Id. at 435.

321.
322.
323.
324.

68
71
86
89

Tex.
Tex.
Tex.
Tex.

375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887).
660, 668, 9 S.W. 540, 543 (1888).
68, 69, 23 S.W. 381 (1893).
107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896).

325. Id. at 113, 33 S.W. at 860.

326. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Gross, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 621, 128 S.W. 1173 (1910),

error ref.; Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Miller, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 287, 128 S.W. 1165 (1910),
error ref.; St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Sizemore, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 491, 116 S.W. 403
1909); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Kellerman, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 274, 87 S.W. 401
(1905), error ref.

327. 154 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913), error ref.

328. Ch. 161, [1913] Tex. Laws 338.

329. Ch. 156, [1917] Tex. Laws 365; see Allan v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1932), error ref.

330. It is hardly surprising that the 1913 Act was introduced by Senator Hudspeth
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Even without the benefit of this legislative history, Judge Brown noted,
in Ramirez, that article 4678 "would appear to grant the courts of Texas
a clear mandate to apply the law of Mexico where applicable." 3 '1 Nevertheless, he went on to observe, even in the face of this statute "the Texas
courts have consistently refused to apply the tort laws of the Republic of
Mexico and its political subdivisions . . . on the ground that they are too

dissimilar to the laws of Texas. '8 32 This line of authority is traceable to
El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, where the Commission of Appeals
held that the 1917 statute "merely declared" pre-existing law, and that it
had become the "settled policy" of Texas not to enforce Mexican tort law because it is "so materially different from the laws of our state relating to torts
' 33 3
that Texas courts cannot undertake to adjudicate the rights of the parties.
In Ramirez the Fifth Circuit seems to have assumed without further inquiry that the dissimilarity defense is dispositive in federal courts sitting in
diversity in Texas where Mexican tort law fails to be applied. This again
requires some historical comment, for much to its credit, the Fifth Circuit
sitting in Texas appeals had initially refused to participate in this twice-misguided exercise in "Anglo" racism. 83 4 In Slater v. Mexican National Railroad,33 5 however, the United States Supreme Court held that while Mexican
law created an obligation (obligatio) in respect of torts committed in Mexico
that was enforceable in the United States, the remedy provided by Mexican
law was comparable to an alimony decree, which could not be granted by
United States federal courts sitting at law.3 36 Subsequent to Slater the Fifth
Circuit routinely dismissed Mexican tort and wrongful death cases without
prejudice to "an action in any court willing and competent to administer re33 7
lief under the laws of Mexico.
All of this occurred three decades before Erie and the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ramirez seems to be the first federal
case in over sixty years where the dissimilarity issue was squarely raised.
Since the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity in federal
courts has now almost receded from momory, could it not presently be said
that federal courts are perfectly competent, and that they should be willing,
to administer relief under Mexican tort law? If so, the question arises
whether federal courts sitting in Texas in diversity cases should nevertheless
from El Paso who, in 1917, assisted Representative Thomason, also of El Paso, in obtaining passage of the second enactment.

331. Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A., 486 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir.
1973).
332. Id.

333. 255 S.W. 159, 160 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923), holding approved; see Carter
v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953), error ref. n.r.e.
334. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Marshall, 91 F. 933 (5th Cir. 1899); Evey v. Mexican
Cent. Ry., 81 F. 294 (5th Cir. 1897). So far as can be ascertained, the rule was almost exclusively used to deny recovery by Texas "Anglo" workers or their widows from
their American corporate employers. The enactment of the precursor of TEx. Rlv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (1967) in 1918 mitigated this repulsive practice by
extending the benefits of Texas workmen's compensation law to workmen "hired in"
Texas.
335.

194 U.S. 120 (1904).

336. Id. at 126-28. See also Central Mexican Ry. v. Eckman, 205 U.S. 538 (1907).
337. Central Mexican Ry. v. Eckman, 156 F. 1023 (5th Cir. 1907); Choquettee v.

Mexican Cent. Ry., 156 F. 1022 (5th Cir. 1907).
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apply the Texas dissimilarity doctrine as part of the forum's choice-of-law
rules. On the authority of Angel v. Bullington3 18 an affirmative answer to
this question seems inescapable. It is much to be hoped, however, that
Texas state courts will soon find the opportunity to re-examine the dissimilarity doctrine.
In spite of what Judge Brown quite appropriately called the "clear mandate" of article 4678, the Fifth Circuit was therefore compelled by existing
authority to dismiss the action. This dismissal was, however, "without prejudice to any future attempt to bring this action in a different and more appropriate forum. ' 3 09 The last three words just quoted should guide defendants
in future cases of this type: where, as here, all of the parties are Mexican
nationals and the accident occurred in Mexico, a federal court can be expected to be very receptive, indeed, to a motion to dismiss for forum non
340
conveniens.
Ramirez was a wrongful death action where the Texas choice-of-law rule
is clear, at least so long as both the conduct and the injury occur in the
same foreign state. Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 41 a recent federal district
court decision which has so far inexplicably escaped notice by Texas commentators, involved a tort action, and thus was better suited to raise the
basic questions as to the present contours of the Texas choice-of-law rule
for torts generally.
J.M. Couch, a Texas resident, was hired in Texas by the Arabian Bechtel
Corporation for work in Libya pursuant to a contract between his employer
and defendant, the Mobil Oil Corporation. While in Libya, he was severely
injured when a Mobil employee prematurely turned on a gas valve, causing
an oil tank to explode. After returning to Texas where he was hospitalized
and received treatment, Couch brought action against the Mobil Oil Corporation. Plaintiff's theory sounded in common law negligence, and no reliance was placed on article 4678.
Defendant contended that Libyan law should be applied as the lex loci
delicti. There was extensive evidence as to the contents of that law, the
crucial point apparently being that under Libyan law as contradistinguished
from Texas law, Couch would be "liable" for Bechtel's failure to supervise
Mobil's employee. Put somewhat differently, Libya seemingly does not apof a
ply respondeat superior so as to impose tort liability in the absence
8 42
party.
injured
the
and
principal
the
between
nexus
contractual
direct
Judge Singleton's decision of the choice-of-law issue in Couch is summed
up as follows in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion: "With all the
relevant Texas contacts of both the plaintiff and defendant and due to the
difficulty of applying Libyan law in a jury case as well as the inherent conflict of public policy on particular issues . . .

,

it would seem more appro-

priate to apply Texas law, which this court will do, thereby adopting the
338.
339.
340.
1972).
341.
342.

330 U.S. 183 (1947); see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 199, at 450-52.
486 F.2d at 497.
See, e.g., Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.
327 F. Supp. 897 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
Id. at 902, 903.
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interest analysis test in this thorny field of conflicts of law." '3 43 This remarkable conclusion rests on a series of equally spectacular analytical steps.
First, Judge Singleton expressed the view that the case was not governed
by Marmon and by the choice-of-law rule contained in article 4678. The
latter, he wrote, was not applicable because, "as stated in the introductory
paragraph to the entire Title 77 of the statute, the act was intended to encompass only 'injuries causing the death of any person.' 344 With respect,
this construction cannot be followed. It is not only contrary to the legislative
history of article 4678 as above described and as readily bolstered on this
very point, but also contrary to the express language of that statute and,
as Culpepper continues to demonstrate, to the routine construction of that
statute by Texas courts.34 5 Judge Singleton would have been on much safer
ground if he had held, along with what appears to be better authority, that
article 4678 is not the exclusive Texas choice-of-law rule for torts.
Once article 4678 has been eliminated from the frame of reference, the
next logical step is, of course, the selection of an alternate choice-of-law rule.
The considerations governing this second stage are not fully articulated, but
Judge Singleton appears to have started from the premise that even without
the mandate of article 4678, a Texas court would still have looked to Libyan law. For at the third stage of his analysis, he holds Libyan law to be
inapplicable as "obnoxious" to Texas law and as too unstable to permit accurate ascertainment.
Two arguments are advanced to bolster this breath-taking third step.
First, it is said that the Libyan "theory of holding an employee liable for
his employer's lack of supervision would be obnoxious to Texas public policy
by denying recovery against a primary contractor. '3 46 Secondly, the "efficient aids" of federal rule 44.1 are declared to be of "little assistance" in
the instant case, for "the complexities of interpretating [sic] the laws of a
country that is in political upheaval and unrest is tenuous at best."13 47 (It is
understood that the court had before it the expert deposition testimony of a
former member of the Supreme Court of Libya, and Judge Singleton shows no
difficulty in analytically discussing, and quoting from, a number of articles of
the Libyan Civil and Commercial Codes.)
The next step in Judge Singleton's analysis is the conclusion that in the
interest of "effective justice," Libyan law should not be applied. 34 8 The
learned Judge's view of that precept seems somewhat blurred by the odd
notion, apparently inspired by some language in Zapata which was then
pending before a full bench of the Fifth Circuit, that the plaintiff was somehow in danger of being deprived of his day in court. Upon review of the
facts, Judge Singleton wrote, "it would be a denial of justice to close the
doors of this court to an American plaintiff suing an American company,
343.

Id. at 905.

344. Id. at 900.

345. See text accompanying note 307 supra.
346. 327 F. Supp. at 903.

347. Id.
348. Id.
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and require him to travel half way around the world to find a forum. '34 9
It is difficult not to express one's agreement with unqualified enthusiasm;
a motion on the part of Mobil to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds
would have stood about as good a chance as a snowball in Libya.35 ° The
issue was, of course, not whether the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas should hear and decide this case on the merits,
but which legal rule or rules it should apply in so deciding.
On this last issue, Judge Singleton's decision can only be accepted as correct on either of two alternative grounds. 8 5' First, within the conventional
framework of analysis, a Texas court may well have held that Libyan law,
as prima facie applicable here, was against Texas public policy. In view
of the sparing use of that notion by Texas courts, 52 this conclusion would
however appear to require much further substantiation than it received in
the Couch opinion. Secondly, in the alternative, Judge Singleton might after
all be justified in his visceral hunch that in or because of cases like this,
Texas courts are now ready for a modern, functional approach to torts conflicts cases. Before a Texas state court speaks to either of these two issues,
the Couch case is seemingly destined to remain a warning sign rather than
a guidepost.
V.

SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS

Pursuant to section 1.105 of the Texas Business and Commercial Code,
the parties are generally free to choose the law of some state or nation other
than Texas with respect to a transaction that bears a "reasonable relation"
to the jurisdiction selected. In its original version, this freedom to choose
the applicable law was restricted, as regards security transactions, by any
limitations that might be contained in the law (including the conflict of law
rules) of the jurisdictions specified by sections 9.102 and 9.103. These covered the policy and the scope of the chapter on secured transactions. Under
section 1.105 as revised by the 63d Legislature, this restrictive reference is
now limited to section 9.103 which, as simultaneously revised, deals with
the perfection of security interests in multiple state transactions only. As
stated in Mr. Coogan's authoritative exegesis of the new version of article
9, the consequence of this amendment is that "the parties to a security
agreement are permitted by the revised code to stipulate the governing law
349. Id. at 904-05.

350. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,

1344 (2d Cir. 1972); Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.
1972).
351. A third possibility is spelled out by Mendiola v. Gonzales, 185 S.W. 389, 390
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916):

This court judicially knows that a condition of revolution, anarchy,

and strife prevailed in Mexico, when the wrong was committed and this

suit instituted, that the courts of that republic were powerless, and that
force alone was dominant, and under such circumstances when a party
who has been in that country disregarded the rights of our citizens and

appropriated their property, he should be held responsible in our courts
for such wrongs.

It is very doubtful, however, whether a historical parallel can be drawn between Libya

in 1970 and Mexico in 1915.
352. See text accompanying notes 227-33 supra.

1974]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

on matters which do not involve the rights of third parties in the way that
''353
the perfection provisions do.
Section 9.103 of the Texas Business and Commercial Code in its present
form lays down choice-of-law rules on the perfection and the effects of the
perfection or non-perfection of security interests for four separate categories
of assets. (1) Documents, instruments, ordinary goods, and possessory security interests in chattel paper are "governed" (i.e., as to these issues) by
"the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the last event occurs
on which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or unperfected. ' 35 4 (2) Certificates of title are "governed" by "the law (including
the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate until four
months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter until the goods are registered in another jurisdiction, but in any event not beyond surrender of the certificate. '3 55 (3) Accounts, general intangibles,
mobile goods, and non-possessory chattel interests in commercial paper are
"governed" by the "law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. ' 35 6 (4) Finally, as to minerals, perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest
which is created by a debtor who has an interest in minerals or the like
(including oil and gas) before extraction and which attaches thereto as extracted, or which attaches to an account resulting from the sale thereof at
the wellhead or minehead, is "governed by the law (including the conflict
of laws rules) of the jurisdiction wherein the wellhead or minehead is lo357
cated."
The first three rules set forth here are subject to numerous exceptions.
As to these, a summary reference to Mr. Coogan's commentary and to other
pertinent literature must suffice for present purposes. 58 An outside observer and a non-specialist in the law of secured transactions may note one
point of general significance: The four choice-of-law rules formulated in
section 9.103 of the Texas Business and Commercial Code as amended by
the 63d Legislature are what is commonly termed multilateral or general
choice-of-law rules. They do not merely specify the spatial and the territorial reach of the forum's own enactments, but lay down, more or less in
the manner of the first Restatement on the Conflict of Laws, rules "governing" the applicability of foreign law as well. This is quite a new development in Anglo-American legislative draftsmanship and, it is believed, a complete novelty in Texas.
There are no current Texas conflicts decisions on article 9, and none, of
course, on its recent revision which became effective on January 1, 1974.
The only recent case on security interests is Nuclear Corporation of America
353. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 530 (1973). See
also TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105(b), 9.103 (Supp. 1973).
354. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(a) (Supp. 1973).
355. Id. § 9.103(b).
356. Id. § 9.103(c).
357. Id. §§ 9.103(c), (d), (e). Note § 9.103(c)(3), relating to debtors located outside the United States.
358. Coogan, supra note 353, at 529-58; Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Bus. LAw. 321, 337-46 (1971).
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v. Hale,3 59 a materialman's lien case. Nuclear, a Delaware corporation with
its headquarters in North Carolina, had sold two quantities of steel joists
and related materials to Mac Steel Inc., a Texas steel fabrication company.
The first shipment was used by Mac Steel as a subcontractor for construction
work at an air force base in Texas, and the second shipment was similarly
used at a hospital construction site in Oklahoma. Mac Steel Inc. was paid
by the contractors for both jobs, but became bankrupt before paying Nuclear. The latter sought to hold Hale, Conley, and Ruby, the three leading
shareholders, managers, and directors of Mac Steel, liable individually as
trustees in respect of funds paid to the corporation for materials supplied
by Nuclear for these two projects but expended for other purposes.
The defendants contended that Texas law was applicable to both causes
of action, as the agreements under which the materials were supplied were
made and performed in Texas. Nuclear, on the other hand, argued that
while Texas law applied to the Texas project, Oklahoma law applied to the
Oklahoma project. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas accepted the plaintiff's view. A materialman's lien, it held, "is
a creature of the law of the state where the real property, benefited by the
'3 60
materials, is situated and that law governs the mode of its operation.
This was so, the court added, even where the contract for supplying -the materials was made and performed in another state by individuals and corporations who were not residents of the state where the real property was located.1 61 No Texas authority was cited in support of the rules thus stated.
The real dispute in the instant case concerned the liability of Ruby, who,
while formally an officer and a director, did not participate in the management of Mac Steel. Under the Texas materialmen's lien law, officers, directors, or agents of corporations "having control or direction of same" are liable for misapplying funds received for the benefit of materialmen under
construction contracts for the improvement of real estate.3 62 The Oklahoma
lien law, on the other hand, imposes a like liability on the "managing officers" of construction companies.3 63 It was urged by Nuclear-although no
Oklahoma authority in point was produced-that Ruby was a "managing
officer" of Mac Steel under the Oklahoma statute even if he should not have
"control or direction of the same" under the Texas statute.
The court rejected this reading of Oklahoma law. It found that Hale and
Conley were liable under both Texas and Oklahoma law, and that Ruby
was not liable under either. With Texas and Oklahoma law thus in full
harmony, Nuclear seems to be a false-conflicts case in every conceivable understanding of that term: nothing turns on the choice of law because as
on issue to be decided, all conceivable alternatives lead to the same result.
Let us assume, however, that Ruby would in fact have been liable under
Oklahoma law as a "managing officer," but not under Texas law because
359. 355 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
360. Id. at 196.
361. Id. at 197.
362. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e, § 1 (Supp. 1974).
363. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 153(2) (Supp. 1973-74).
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he did not have "direction or control." Should a Texas court (or a federal
court sitting in diversity in Texas) hold him liable under Oklahoma law as to
the Oklahoma project merely because the real property benefited by that
work is in Oklahoma?
A Texas court would presumably have applied Texas law as to Ruby's
liability simply by virtue of the unilateral statutory choice-of-law rule contained in the Texas materialman's lien law, which renders the resulting -trust
provisions of that law applicable to funds paid to subcontractors "under a
construction contract for the improvement of specific real property in the
state. '364 Statutory choice-of-law rules, if constitutional, prevail over judicially-developed ones, and that is the end of the matter so far as the Texas
air force construction project is concerned. But this unilateral choice-of-law
rule cannot simply be "multilateralized" or generalized by analogy in the
same manner as unilateral choice-of-law rules in the French or German civil
codes. 365 In contradistinction to these, the Texas rule-which probably was
unknown to the parties before this litigation, as it certainly was to the present author-is not part of an attempt to codify the conflict of laws, but a
minor element in a statutory scheme designed for the protection of materialmen. It was also, in a sense, a statute for the protection of shareholders
in construction companies, for it assured those who invested in such companies that they would not be held personally liable for the mismanagement
of company funds unless they themselves exercised control or direction.
Ruby, a Texas shareholder in a Texas company, had an apparent right to
rely on that protection, and Texas had an interest in protecting him from
liability not contemplated by Texas law. Assuming Oklahoma law to be
different on this point, did Oklahoma have a contrary interest in the instant
case? If so, should and would a Texas court yield to that Oklahoma interest in our hypothetical variant of Nuclear?
Part of the answer can seemingly be found in Continental Oil Co. v. Lane
Wood & Co.,86 6 a 1969 decision of the Supreme Court of Texas that has
unfortunately so far escaped notice. The facts are unusually complicated,
and simplified somewhat for present purposes. The Western Gas Service
Company ordered a quantity of plastic pipe from Allied Supply Company,
Inc., a Texas distributor, to be delivered at its work site in Texhoma, Oklahoma. Allied "bought" the pipe from Carlon, the wholly-owned Texas division of Continental, an Ohio company with a Texas plant. The goods were
delivered by Carlon to Allied in Texas and by Allied to Western in Oklahoma. Allied "paid" Continental by a check which was dishonored for insufficient funds. Continental immediately brought suit for the return of the
,pipe or, in the alternative, for the purchase price. It joined Lane Wood as a
party. The latter, by virtue of a prior factor's lien agreement and an
assignment of accounts receivable agreement with Allied, had some interest
in the fund held by Western, the ultimate purchaser. Western, an innocent
364. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e, § 1 (Supp. 1974).
365. See Baade, Foreword, New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 673, 676 (1963), and sources cited therein.
366. 443 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1969).
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bystander if ever there was one, paid the purchase price into court, and not
entirely unexpectedly, Allied went bankrupt. Continental and Lane Wood
now fought over the fund created by Western's payment into court: the
former on the theory that an intended cash sale had not been consummated
so that Continental was still the owner, the latter on a number of contrary
theories. Under Texas law as it then stood, Continental's theory was viable;
under Ohio and Oklahoma law where article 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code was already in effect,3 67 it was not.
The Supreme Court of Texas held that the sale between Continental had
been intended as a cash sale, and that Texas law applied as between Continental and Allied, with the result that Continental (the original seller) prevailed over Lane Wood (the secured assignee of the bankrupt intermediary). Writing for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Walker said:
The sale was thus arranged in Texas between parties doing business
here. The pipe had not previously been in Oklahoma but was moved
there solely for the purpose of making delivery to Western. Any title
owned by Allied would have passed in Texas if it had elected to make
delivery by common carrier rather than by its own trucks. It does not
appear that Continental, Carlon, Allied or Western is a resident of Oklahoma. Lane Wood is a Texas corporation and relies on the law of
this state to give priority and effect to its assignment of accounts and
factor's lien agreement. Oklahoma's connection with the transaction is
minimal and fortuitous, and it has no interest
in the present contro36 8
versy. We hold that the Texas law controls.

This language seems dispositive of the present case, and of its hypothetical
variant. The present author is tempted to go further, and to suggest that
in Continental Oil the Supreme Court of Texas has adopted the functional
or governmental-interests approach to the conflict of laws, at least in falseconflicts cases. The difficulty with that view is, of course, that Continental
Oil has been ignored by courts and commentators for almost five years. It
is to be hoped, however, that this deficiency will soon be remedied. Choiceof-law decisions by courts of last resort are much too precious a commodity
to be overlooked, and especially a polished gem such as this will not remain
undetected for long.
VI.

CORPORATIONS

Out-of-state corporations licensed to transact business in Texas are assimilated to Texas corporations in several important respects. They are deemed
Texas residents within the meaning of the contract clause of the long arm
statute, and thus are entitled to use it in the same manner as Texas citizens
and are entitled to vindicate their rights under contracts with non-residents
which are to be performed in whole or in part in Texas. 69 Furthermore,
367. Article 2.403(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, now TEx. Bus. & COMM.
§ 2.403(b) (1968), reads as follows: "Any entrusting of possession of

CODE ANN.

goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all
rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business."
368. 443 S.W.2d at 701.
369. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
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they receive the same advantages as Texas corporations when seeking or opposing injunctions in restraint of out-of-state litigation or dismissal on forum
70
non conveniens grounds.
At least one statutory disadvantage remains, however. Pursuant to article
1995, section 27 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, a foreign corporation
(but not a Texas corporation) may be sued in any county where it "may
have an agency or representative." The constitutionality of that provision
has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Texas and, on its authority, by
other Texas courts.37' Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Preston37 2 is the most
recent example in point, but as the United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorariin that case, a change may well be in the offing.
The separate legal entity of foreign corporations continues to be respected
in the same manner as that of Texas corporations. The Cannon rule is still
followed, and a foreign parent corporation can only be reached through its
within-state subsidiary either if the latter is its alter ego, or to the extent
373
that the within-state entity is acting as the agent of the out-of-state entity.
Hoppenfeld v. Crook 74 involved a somewhat unusual variant of this separate entity rule. Plaintiff Crook alleged that he was fraudulently induced
by defendant Hoppenfeld, the president and the majority shareholder of
Law Research Service Inc., to purchase a franchise from that corporation
for Austin and San Antonio. Law Research is a New York corporation, now
in bankruptcy, and the misrepresentations were alleged to have been made
by Hoppenfeld in New York. It seems clear that under the facts as alleged,
the corporation was amenable to the jurisdiction of Texas courts with respect
to a tort committed in part in Texas when plaintiff Crook acted there in
reliance on the representations made to him in New York. Indeed, jurisdiction had been obtained over Law Research by substituted service pursuant
to article 2031b, and plaintiff Crook had obtained a judgment against that
corporation on the merits. The trial judge, however, had granted a motion
for new trial, but before that trial could be had, the federal court sitting
in bankruptcy had enjoined all further litigation against Law Research outside the bankruptcy proceedings.
Crook now sought to hold Hoppenfeld personally responsible for the alleged misrepresentations. The Austin court of civil appeals held that Hoppenfeld was not, on the same facts, subject to Texas jurisdiction individually
for acts admittedly done in his capacity as a corporate officer unless he was
the "alter ego of the corporation" or had "personally invoked the protections
8' 75
and benefits of the laws of Texas.
Hoppenfeld illustrates the importance of observing the distinction between
370. See text accompanying notes 79, 87, 88 supra.
371. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Adams, 369 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1963). Further authorities in point are collected in 2 R. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 982 n.68
(1973).
372. 487 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumsont 1972), error dismissed, cert.
granted sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Preston, 94 S. Ct. 538, 38 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1973)
(No. 73-232).
373. See text accompanying notes 50-57 supra.
374. 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), errorref. n.r.e.
375. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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legal entities and their major shareholders, whether or not themselves corporate, in interstate and international transactions. In Dailey v. Transitron
Electronic Corp. which has already been discussed above, 3 76 this distinction
was ignored in .a truly remarkable manner by a "multinational" corporate defendant: the plaintiff was approached by the Mexican-incorporated manufacturing subsidiary which he was to manage, employed by the
Delaware-incorporated foreign operations subsidiary that was in charge of
the marketing of, among other things, the products of that manufacturing
subsidiary, and he was subsequently discharged by the parent company itself.
In that case, this disregard of corporate form was immaterial for jurisdictional purposes and of tangential significance for the choice of law. The
normal so-called multinational corporation consists of an American (usually
Delaware-incorporated) parent, a Delaware-incorporated, wholly-owned
subsidiary with international operations, and a series of foreign-incorporated
manufacturing or marketing corporations which are not subsidiaries of the
parent but of the international operations company. The interposition of
,the latter serves primarily the purpose of insulating the parent from quasi
3 77
in rem jurisdiction abroad.
As evidenced by the two-tier organization apparently chosen by Transitron for a three-company complex, and by its cavalier handling of the niceties of separate corporate existence, these considerations were not deemed
very important by it. Let us assume, however, that Dailey had actually contracted in Mexico with Transitron Mexicana, S.A., and that the corporate
defendant had deliberately pursued the objective of limiting him to his remedies under Mexican law. Would a Texas court still have applied that law,
even as regards clauses or rules that could not have been validly stipulated
between an employer and an employee under Texas law?
This question is suggested by Judge Wisdom's reference to Hellenic Lines
v. Rhoditis378 in his Transitron opinion, and by the recent decision of the
court of appeals in Sayers v. International Drilling Co. NV which, although
much commented upon abroad, has not yet attracted the attention of Texas
authors. 879 In Rhoditis the United States Supreme Court upheld a Fifth
Circuit decision written by Judge Goldberg, approving the application of the
Jones Act 880 so as to allow recovery to a Greek seaman who was injured
in a United States port on a Greek-flag vessel ultimately owned and controlled by United States domiciliaries through the intermediaries of the Panamanian subsidiary of a Greek-incorporated parent.
Although United States labor relations law has been held not applicable
to alien crews on foreign-flag vessels irrespective of such beneficial American
376. 475 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1973); see text accompanying notes 242-49 supra.
377. See Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer AG, 154 A.2d 684 (Del. 1959); Comment, Attachment of Subsidiary's Assets in Action Against Parent, 12 STAN. L. REV.
854 (1960). See generally Baade, Multinational Corporations and American Conflicts
Law, 37 RABELSZ 5, 18-20 (1973) (in German, with summary in English).

378. Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970), cited in Dailey v. Transitron

Electronic Corp., 475 F.2d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1973).

379. Sayers v. International Drilling Co. NV, [1971] 3 All E.R. 163 (C.A.).
380. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
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or American-based ownership, and although the Jones Act does not normally
apply to accidents of alien seamen aboard foreign-flag vessels in American
ports, 38s the latter rule was held inapplicable in the present circumstances
despite the fact that Rhoditis had signed on in Greece under articles specifying the exclusive applicability of Greek law. Speaking for a majority
of the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained construction so that this alien owner, engaged in an extensive business operation
in this country, may have an advantage over citizens engaged in the
same business by allowing him to escape the obligations and responsibility of a Jones Act "employer." The flag, the nationality of the seaman, the fact that his employment contract was Greek, and that he
might be compensated there are in the totality of the circumstances of
this case minor weights in the scales compared with the substantial
and
continuing contacts that this alien owner has with this country. 38 2
In Sayers, on the other hand, a similar exclusive-remedy agreement between an English skilled oil drilling rig worker and the Netherlands subsidiary of the Offshore Company of Houston was given effect, although the
agreement was in fact signed in London at the office of Offshore's English
subsidiary and although under English law, the workman's remedies in tort
may not be validly waived by contract with his employer. This decision
has been criticized with, it is believed, good reason as an unjustifiable sacrifice of English interests in the welfare of English workers hired in England. 38 3 Be that as it may, the question soon likely to be faced by Texas
courts and corporate counsel, as well as by the personal-injury bar, is
whether in transnational operations such as these, domestic corporations
should be permitted to limit their liabilities, especially towards Texas employees, by interposing foreign-incorporated subsidiaries as the formal parties
to employment contracts. In this connection, Judge Wisdom's almost casual
reference to Rhoditis in the Transitron case may yet acquire a cardinal significance.
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp.,38 4 which has also been
mentioned in another connection, 38 5 fails to raise major choice-of-law issues
concerning multinational corporations because the company sought to be
taken over by the CDC was a Texas corporation with its business headquarters in Houston, and the tender offer was made to the American stockholders in the United States. The federal securities laws were clearly applicable
to this dispute between the pre-takeover management and the CDC; 3s6 and
in addition, the relations between the directors, officers, and shareholders
381. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
382. 398 U.S. at 310.
383. Collins, Exemption Clauses, Employment Contracts and the Conflict of Laws,
21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 320 (1972).
384. 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
385. See text accompanying notes 174-79 supra.
386. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972).

SOUTHWESTERN

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

of Texasgulf were clearly subject to Texas law.8 87
In this latter connection, an odd question arose. Texasgulf contended
that if the takeover were carried through and a majority of the new Board
became Canadians, the charter of the corporation would be subject to cancellation by the secretary of state pursuant to article 1527 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. That quaint provision, which had seemingly escaped
notice by courts and commentators in the first half century of its existence,
authorizes the establishment of "international trading" corporations, with the
proviso that "the control of such corporations shall never in any instance
be vested in citizens of other countries than the United States. '38 8a Texasgulf had been chartered some twelve years before the enactment of this provision but contended, nevertheless, that any corporation which at any time
files a broad general purpose clause including a provision which could possibly 'be construed to include the trading of natural resources, is automatically subject to article 1527. Judge Seals rejected this argument as untenable under Texas corporation law. This aspect of the case is discussed elsewhere in these pages by Professor Lebowitz, and need not be pursued further at this point.
Choice-of-law doctrine regarding the "internal affairs" of corporations is
currently in a state of flux. As recently as 1963, the draft Restatement
(Second) followed the place-of-incorporation rule as regards the "internal
affairs" of corporations, that is, relations to shareholders, directors, and officers. This blanket reference was abandoned by the Proposed Official
Draft of 1969, which referred to the local law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the particular issue. However, it also provided
that this would be the state of incorporation unless another state had a more
significant relationship. This formulation and the Reporter's Comments
thereon were strongly criticized at the 1969 meeting of the American Law
Institute by corporate law practitioners; and while a motion to return to the
internal affairs rule was defeated, the Restatement (Second) now provides
that a law other than that of the state of incorporation shall only apply in
"unusual" cases.3 89
In Teague v. Home Mortgage & Investment Co. 390 the owners of a building in Arkansas sought recovery for damage alleged to have been caused
by the O.R.C., a Texas corporation which was subsequently merged into another Texas corporation, the defendant herein. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that as both companies were Texas corporations, "the merger
of the two, and the dissolution of O.R.C., are governed by Texas laws." '9
This same instinctive preference for the law of the place of incorporation
is also apparent in B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Altas Van Lines, Inc.3 9 2
387. This seems to have been assumed by all concerned, see, e.g., 366 F. Supp. at
384.

388.
389.
Baade,
390.
391.
392.

TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1527 (1962).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971);
supra note 377, at 20-22.
250 Ark. 322, 465 S.W.2d 312 (1971).
Id. at 323, 465 S.W.2d at 313.
348 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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Here, a Texas corporation sought damages for, or the rescission of, the imposition of restrictions on its right to sell its shares in defendant, a Delaware
corporation. These restrictions had first been imposed by a voting trust
agreement that had lapsed according to its own terms, and subsequently by
an amendment of the corporate charter in 1966. That amendment had
been filed with the Delaware Secretary of State, and its validity was uncontested.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
that "State law governs the assertion of rights by a stockholder against a
Delaware corporation. ' 393 This elliptic reference was apparently to the law
of the state of incorporation, for Judge Woodward then proceeded to discuss
plaintiff's contentions in terms of Delaware law. As the 1966 charter
amendment was concededly valid and dispositive of the issue, the action was
destined to fail. Plaintiff contended, however, that the 1966 charter amendment was ineffective as to the shares owned by B & H Warehouse, because
the restrictions on transferability were not stated on the stock certificates as
then required by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. This argument was rejected, first for the obvious reason that the purpose of that Act is "merely
one of providing fair notice to a purchaser for value," and secondly because
the certificates were in actual fact still in the possession of defendant so that
the missing statement could be affixed to them at any time.3 94
Judge Woodward also rejected plaintiff's arguments based on the Sandor
case, mainly because it was "not expressive of the law of the State of Delaware,"3 95 and secondly, in view of factual differences. The Texas rule, as
stated in Sandor and as now codified, is that while reasonable preemptive
obligations to resell and restrictions on the alienability of shares are not illegal, they may not be validly imposed on holders of unrestricted shares
without their consent by subsequent bylaw amendment even if the amendment of the bylaws by the board of directors is authorized in the original
bylaws.3 96 The question thus presented, but not decided, in Atlas Van
Lines was whether the Texas rule favoring the protection of the "vested"
rights of shareholders should have been applied in the instant case to protect
a Texas shareholder against the infringement of his rights.
In the instant case, it is submitted, the application of the Texas protective
rule would not have been justified. When purchasing his shares in this
Delaware corporation, B & H knew or could have ascertained that the bylaws authorized their own amendment, and that under Delaware law as it
then stood, subsequent bylaws amendments could impair "vested" rights of
nonconsenting shareholders. Since Texas law does not protect shareholders
against subsequent restrictions of this type that have been contemplated in
advance, the application of Delaware law in accordance with the presumed
393. Id. at 521.
394. Id. at 523, 524.
395. Id. at 524, referring to Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939), error ref. n.r.e.
396. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.22B (Supp. 1974); Ling & Co. v. Trinity
Say. &Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972).
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and perhaps even the actual intent of the parties does no violence to Texas
897
policy.
VII.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

The 63d Legislature has enacted some significant revisions of the law of
divorce and particularly of the law governing parent-child relations, which
is now tide 2 of the Family Code. That latter title, especially, contains
numerous new provisions on jurisdiction, venue, and even choice-of-law that
require detailed attention. No attempt will be made to discuss all of these
provisions, although it is hoped that the list in the footnotes is reasonably
complete.3 9s With that exception, coverage is limited to the three subjects
shown to be of continued prime importance by the reported cases-divorce,
support, and child custody-and the one subject likely to attain central significance as Texas continues to attract prosperous new residents, community
property.
A.

Divorce and Annulment

Texas is now primarily a no-fault divorce state. Pursuant to section 3.01
of the Family Code, a divorce may be decreed on the petition of either party
"without regard to fault if the marriage has become insupportable because
of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the
marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation." 99 The 63d Legislature has underlined the no-fault character of this
insupportability ground by expressly abolishing the defense of adultery. Condonation, however, continues to be a defense, but only "if the court finds
' 400
that there is a reasonable ground for reconciliation.
As divorces may thus plainly be obtained by "guilty" spouses, waiting periods and jurisdictional requirements have assumed added significance.
These, too, have been revised in 1973. The basic rule now is that the petitioner or the respondent must be (1) a Texas domiciliary, (2) a resident
of Texas for six months, and (3) a resident of the county for ninety days. 40
Members of the armed forces of the United States who are stationed in
397. See generally Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21
L. REV. 433 (1968).

VAND.

398. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.21-.25 (Supp. 1973) (divorce, nullity, and annulment jurisdiction and venue); id. §§ 5.26-.27, .831, .85-.87 (property interests of prisoners of war and persons missing while on federal official service); id. § 11.04(c)(5)
(residence for venue purposes of child with foreign-appointed guardian or custodian);
id. § 12.02(b) (legitimation by putative marriage of parents in another state or coun-

try); id. § 13.02 (voluntary legitimation; statement to be executed before Texas notary); id. § 14.08 (modification of custody and support orders); id. § 14.10(b) (enforcement of custody decrees of other states or nations by habeas corpus proceedings);

id. § 15.04(b)(3) (paternity under law of other state or nation); id. §§ 16.01-.02, .51
("residence" within state of child, adoptive parents, and of person adopting an adult
as prerequisite for adoption); id. §§ 21.01-.66 (uniform reciprocal enforcement of support); id. §§ 25.01-.09 (return of runaway juveniles); id. §§ 31.01-.03, .05 (removal
of disabilities of minorities; residents and nonresidents; venue; appearance by nonresident); id. § 31.08 (registration of disability-removing decrees of other state or nation;
effects thereof).
399. Id. § 3.01.
400. Id. § 3.08.

401. Id. § 3.21.
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Texas for six months or more, and at a military installation within a Texas
county for ninety days, are "considered" to have been domiciliaries of the
state, and residents of that county, for the purpose of bringing suits for divorce, annulment, and marriage nullity. 402 There is no time requirement
for annulment or nullity suits, but such suits may be brought in Texas only
if the parties were married here or if either of them is a Texas domiciliary.403 It follows that service personnel not otherwise domiciled in Texas
are subject to the statutory waiting and residence periods in connection with
annulment actions and nullity suits as well, unless these relate to marriages
entered into in Texas.
If the respondent is a Texas domiciliary and the petitioner is not, suits
for divorce may be brought in any county where the respondent currently
resides. The only time requirement in this situation is that -the respondent
404
must have been a domiciliary of the state for at least six months.
In the last few years, the constitutionality of durational residence requirements for divorce actions has been challenged in several states. 405 Until recently, the current of opinion seemed to be that a one-year residence requirement was reasonable but that a two-year requirement was not. 406 In
the more immediate past, however, one-year residence requirements as well
have been challenged successfully. 407 It is nevertheless believed that the
current Texas six-month durational requirement will survive constitutional
challenge. The constitutionality of the blatant, though probably accidental,
discrimination against Texas-domiciled divorce petitioners as regards the
ninety-day within-county residence requirement, however, is another matter.
Thus, while out-of-state divorce seekers probably can no longer complain
that Texas discriminates against them, there now is the very real question
whether Texas has not gone too far in asserting jurisdiction to divorce, to
annul, or to declare invalid the marriages of nondomiciliaries. Since Texas
will apply Texas law at least in divorce actions, the non-fault dissolution of
a marriage between two parties currently domiciled in a fault-divorce state
might be deemed an unconstitutional intrusion of Texas into a matter that
is not its concern. (This situation will arise only with respect to service personnel domiciled elsewhere but "considered" domiciled here for divorce jurisdiction purposes by statutory fiction.)
For reasons set out at greater length elsewhere, it is believed that the test
to 'be applied here is not to be found in this or that dictum in the Williams
cases. 40 8 Instead, a three-step process of analysis is called for. First, it
must be determined whether the interest of Texas in the spouses, or in either
402. Id. § 3.23.

403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. § 3.25.
Id. § 3.24.
See 51 TEXAS L. REV. 585 (1973).
See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 210 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1973), and cases therein

cited; Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973).
407. Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973).

408. Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); see Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts
Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L.
REv. 329, 333-45 (1972).
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of them, or in the marriage is "too slight and too casual" to justify the application of Texas law. 40 9 If this question is tentatively answered in the affirmative, the next issue is whether some other state actually has a better
claim to the applicability of its law. Finally, even if this, too, is answered
in the affirmative, it must be asked whether in the case at hand, the application of Texas law thwarted any interest of that other state. To take one
obvious example: On what conceivable ground could Florida (a non-fault
state) 410 object to the divorce of Florida domiciliaries on the same grounds
411
in Texas?
Rather obviously, the same arguments operate in reverse. As a no-fault
divorce state, Texas has virtually no interests at stake when the marriage
of Texas domiciliaries is dissolved in other states or nations, for whatever
remedy is granted there would presumably also have been available at
home. This means, in blunt terms, that Texas should now recognize divorces of the Williams and even of the Rosenstiel type412 as a matter of
course, even in the absence of constitutional compulsion.
The radical solution of the divorce-recognition problem here proposed is,
however, subject to two limitations. First, the possibility of reconciliation
continues to be a defense in Texas, even in actions based on the no-fault
ground of "insupportability. ' '413 Consequently, ex parte sister-state and foreign country divorces might still be denied recognition in the absence of constitutional compulsion where the foreign waiting period, for example, one
day, is such as to preclude the other party from urging the possibility of
reconciliation in a realistic manner. In simple terms, Texas should still exercise prudence in recognizing one-day ex parte Haiti divorces. 414 There
is, however, no longer any reason for refusing to recognize bilateral oneday Haiti divorces, as both parties are obviously agreed on the futility of
reconciliation. For the same reason, there might not even be much of a
point in refusing to recognize ex parte one-day Haiti divorces where the life
pattern of the spouses after such a divorce clearly shows (as it almost invariably will) that reconciliation is now pointless. Why require a second
adjudication confirming the existence of a legal situation that is now perfectly compatible with Texas law?
The second limitation upon the radical divorce-recognition solution here
recommended is to some extent equally a consequence of the fact that the
possibility of reconciliation remains a justiciable issue even in no-fault cases
under current Texas law. Whatever the foreign court does, it must do consistently with procedural due process. This means that there must be a rea409. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 182 (1964).
410. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (Supp. 1972); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla.
1973).
411. See Baade, supra note 408, at 340-45.
412. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209, N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
413. Cusack v. Cusack, 491 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973),
error dismissed.
414. Compare Kugler v. Haitian Tours, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 260, 293 A.2d 706
(1972), with Kraham v. Kraham, 73 Misc. 2d 977, 342 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
Note, incidentally, that an advertisement offering information on the law of Haiti in
the Texas Bar Journalhas been discontinued.
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sonable effort to give the Texas respondent notice of the pendency of the
out-of-state proceedings, and the realistic opportunity to interpose a de4 15
fense.
These essential requirements of procedural due process seemingly received
but scant attention in the recent case of Dosamantes v. Dosamnantes.4 16
Manuel and June Dosamantes were married in Mexico in 1963. He was
a citizen of Mexico, and she was a citizen of the United States. A child
was born to the marriage in 1965, but in 1966 June left for Texas, taking
the child with her. In 1967 Manuel brought divorce and custody proceedings in Mexico. Two days after being served in these proceedings by the
Mexican consul in Dallas, June in turn filed for divorce from Manuel in
Texas. The present controversy concerns, in the main, the regularity of service in the Texas proceedings. (Manuel also contended that a Texas court
was without jurisdiction to divorce the marriage of a foreign citizen resident
abroad, but this argument, which seemingly came with ill grace from a citizen of Mexico, was properly rejected by the Texarkana court of civil appeals.)

417

The Texas trial court issued a nonresident notice to Manuel, and service
of process was attempted by one Alcantara who attempted to deliver the
papers at Manuel's home in Mexico. Manuel came to the door, and Alcantara tried to "deliver the papers to him in English." Manuel, who could
not speak English, refused acceptance and closed the door, and this procedure was repeated once more with the Dosamantes' maid. Alcantara thereupon slipped the papers under the door where Manuel, according to his testimony, found them some two months later. After having them translated
into Spanish, he tried to intercede in the Texas proceedings through letters
rogatory, but this attempt proved unsuccessful since the divorce had already
been granted to June, and the thirty-day period for a motion for a new trial
had lapsed. Some considerable time later, Manuel brought the present bill
of review, trying to set aside the Texas divorce.
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 108, process on defendants
who are absent from the state may be served "by any disinterested person
competent to make oath of the fact" 418 in the same manner as provided
by rule 106 for within-state service. That rule, in turn, generally requires
delivering to the defendant, in person, a true copy of the citation. Where
such service is impractical, however, the court may authorize service "in any
415. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Valley Bank v. Skeen, 366 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
416. 500 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), error dismissed.
417. Id. at 236. Until quite recently, some Mexican courts have been very liberal
indeed in exercising divorce jurisdiction over citizens of the United States. J. BAYITCH
& J.

SIGUEIROS,
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103, 241-57

(1968). The authors state: "Compared with the torrential flow of Mexican divorce
decrees into the United States, the movement in the opposite direction is, for obvious
reasons, insignificant." Id. at 257. Texas cases involving the validity of Mexican divorces granted to residents of Texas are Webb v. Webb, 461 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1970), and Dunn v. Tiernan, 284 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1955), error ref. n.r.e. Cf. Risch v. Risch, 395 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1965), error dismissed, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1967).
418. TEx. R. Civ. P. 108.
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other manner which will be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice
' '4
of the Suit. 19
The Texarkana court of civil appeals held that generally, "one who is
within the jurisdiction has the obligation to accept service of process when
it is reasonably attempted," and that he is "usually held to have been personally served if he physically refuses to accept the papers and they are then
deposited in an appropriate place in his presence or near him where he is
likely to find them, if he is also informed of the nature of the process and
that service is being attempted. '420 Here, the two requirements set in italics
by the court had not been met, "especially since delivery was attempted in
English while appellant speaks only Spanish and the server was not an officer authorized under Mexican law to serve process of that country
.... "421 Furthermore, no attempt had been made to obtain prior court
authorization for an alternate method of service as contemplated by rule
106. The Texarkana court concluded, therefore, that the defendant had not
been properly served under rules 106 and 108.422
Nevertheless, the court refused to set aside the divorce decree obtained
by these illicit means. In McEwen v. Harrison the Supreme Court of Texas
had held that when the thirty-day period prescribed by rule 329-b for filing
a motion for a new trial has expired and relief may no longer be obtained
by appeal, "a proceeding in the nature of a bill of review is the exclusive
method of vacating a default judgment rendered in a case in which the court
had jurisdictional power to render it.'' 4 2 3 This category, the supreme court
went on to hold, included "those cases in which a default judgment is asserted to be void for want of service, or of valid service, of process. '424 As
expressly held in McEwen, an appellant challenging a default judgment for
want of valid service or of service of process must prove not only the invalidity of the judgment, but also that he had a valid defense to the original
cause of action. 425 Otherwise, Chief Justice Calvert said, in that case, the
setting aside of the judgment would be "a vain act and a trespass on -the
time of the court. 4 26 In Dosamantes Manuel argued on appeal that he
could show desertion and recrimination on the part of June, and that these
would constitute meritorious defenses to her cause of action. Since he had
419. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106.
420. 500 S.W.2d at 237.
421. Id. In Scucchi v. Woodruff, 503 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth

1973), out-of-state service pursuant to rules 106 and 108 was held defective because
the return did not contain a sworn statement by the person making it, stating that he
was a disinterested person competent to make oath of the fact.

This led to the setting

aside of a default judgment against an out-of-state party with actual knowledge. Note,
incidentally, that rule 109 in terms authorizes citation by publication of a defendant
who is "not within the continental United States, and is not in the Armed Forces of
the United States," and purports to dispense with the need for personal service in such

cases even if the address of the defendant is known. It is submitted that for reasons
which are developed more fully in the text such service by publication on nonresident
defendants in cases such as Dosamantesfails to meet due process requirements.
422. 500 S.W.2d at 237.

423. 162 Tex. 125, 131, 345 S.W.2d 706, 710 (1961).
424. Id.

425. Id. at 132, 345 S.W.2d at 710-11.
426. Id. at 131, 345 S.W.2d at 710,
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not, however, actually proved these matters at the trial on the bill of review,
the Texarkana court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment below denying
the bill.
With respect for the court's decision, this disposition of the case cannot
be accepted as correct. The Supreme Court of the United States held in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections. '427 In the instant case, the Texarkana court expressly found that there had been no such reasonable effort
to give notice, and its determination of this question, especially of the language issue, surely deserves approval. 428 Once it is established, however,
that a judgment defendant was deprived of due process by constitutionally
insufficient notice, this defect may not be cured by a subsequent proceeding
in the cause which places upon the defendant the burden of affirmatively
showing that he had a good defense. In Armstrong v. Menzo 429 the United
States Supreme Court expressly held such a shifting of the burden upon
judgment defendant under Texas law in defective-notice cases to be a denial
of due process. In that case, the Court held that the opportunity to be
heard must 'be granted "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 430 Only the setting aside of the decree and an adjudication de novo,
the Court wrote, "would have wiped the slate clean" and "restored the petioccupied had due process of law been
tioner to the position he would have
43
1
place."
first
the
in
him
to
accorded
It should nevertheless be added that in the Dosamantes case, this constitutional blemish almost has the appearance of harmless error. The controversy was unusually stale, especially for divorce litigation; some six years
had elapsed between the Texas judgment and the disposition of the bill of
review. The recrimination defense was soon to be abolished by the legislature; desertion was no longer a defense to a no-fault divorce suit. True,
in such a suit, the respondent still has the right to litigate the issue of the
possibility of reconciliation. 432 In the instant case, however, Manuel had
himself obtained a seemingly unimpeachable ex parte divorce from June in
Mexico, 433 and he was accordingly estopped by conduct if not by record
from raising this defense. Thus, despite the lack of notice and the shifting
of the burden which are, as pointed out, defects of constitutional magnitude,
it is difficult to see how Manuel was actually disadvantaged, and just as difficult not to find some sympathy with Chief Justice Calvert's statement in Mc427.

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

428. See text accompanying note 421 supra; Julen v.Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325,
101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972); Comment, Citado a Comparecer: Language Barriers and
Due Process, 61 CALIF. L. REV.1395 (1973); 83 YALE L.J. 385 (1973).

429. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
430. Id. at 552.
431. Id.
432. See note 413 supra, and accompanying text.

433. 500 S.W.2d at 235. There seems no doubt that Manuel Dosamantes was domiciled in Mexico, and his wife June received notice of the proceedings.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

Ewen that without such a showing of disadvantage, "the setting aside of the
' '434
judgment would be a vain act and a trespass on the time of the court.

B. Alimony and Support
There is no post-divorce alimony in Texas, but Texas courts give effect
to sister state alimony decrees to the extent required by the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution. As presently construed by
the Supreme Court, that clause does not require the enforcement of accrued
alimony claims under sister state decree if under the law of the state of rendition, the accrued sum is subject to judicial modification. 43 5 In Brazeal
v. Renner43 6 this rule was applied by the Dallas court of civil appeals to
deny the enforcement, by way of a Texas money judgment, of arrears accumulated under an Oklahoma custody and child support decree. As Oklahoma law was not proved and since no motion was made pursuant to rule
184a to take judicial notice of Oklahoma law, the Dallas court presumed
that law to be identical with Texas law. At the time, the latter permitted
the modification or suspension of child support decrees from time to time
as the facts, circumstances and justice might require. 437 Consequently, the
plaintiff had not established that under the law of the state of rendition,
the support decree had become absolute and final as to each installment as
it fell due.
The outcome would in all probability be different today because pursuant
to section 14.08(c) of the Family Code, an order providing for child support
may be modified "only as to obligations accruing subsequent to the motion
to modify."' 43 8 Thus, under the shadow of the Texas presumption of identity, the defendant father would have had the burden of proving a different
rule of Oklahoma law, or at least of making the appropriate motion for judicial notice. The new situation is preferable, but still hardly satisfactory.
Runaway fathers are not in need of special protection by the American federal system. Quite the contrary, the general enactment of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act shows that the prime area of concern
in this field is the fate of wives and children abandoned by their foot-loose
breadwinners. Under the new Family Code which reflects the Texas variant
of that Act, the obligee of a foreign support order may register that order
in a Texas court. The court of registry has power to adjudicate arrearages,
and future enforcement of the order thus registered is "as in civil cases, including the power to punish the defendant for contempt as in the case of
other orders for payment of temporary alimony, maintenance, or support entered in this state.

'439

Brazeal need not happen again.

434. 162 Tex. at 132, 345 S.W.2d at 710.
435. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964); Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77
(1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910). See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note

199, at 187-88.
436. 493 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973); see text accompanying notes
141-42 supra.

437. Ch. 127, § 1, [1953] Tex. Laws 439 (repealed 1973); Menner v. Ranford, 487
S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1972).
438. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c) (Supp. 1973).
439. Id. § 21.66. See also id. §§ 21.62-.65.
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C.

Custody and Visitation Rights

Section 14.07(a) of the new Family Code states, in familiar terms, that
"[t]he best interest of -the child shall always be the primary consideration
of the court in determining questions of managing conservatorship, possession, and support of and access to the child."1440 Although or perhaps because this fundamental principle is universally recognized, interstate child
custody disputes continue to be troublesome. The evaluation of the best
interests of the child is subject to constant revision according to changing
circumstances, and no award of custody has the finality of a money judgment. The problem of recognition of sister-state custody decrees is thus to
some extent comparable to the question of the effect of foreign support orders. The Supreme Court of Texas has taken the position, however, that
sister-state custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit as to the determination of the best interests of the child at the time of the decree, so
that modification is permissible only if it is established that the factual situation changed after the effective date of the decree which is challenged or
flouted. 441 The new Family Code goes one step further, and provides for
the preemptory enforcement of sister state and foreign-nation custody decrees through habeas corpus proceedings unless it is determined that the
rendering court did not have jurisdiction over the parties or that the child
has been in Texas for at least twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the writ.4 42 The new Penal Code makes the taking of children out
of the state in knowing violation of a custody decree, or with knowledge
of the pendency of a custody or divorce proceeding, a felony of the third
degree. 443 It is understood that this penalization is intended to facilitate
the extradition (or, more realistically, the threatened extradition) of obdurate child-nappers.
With this unmistakable trend to render custody decrees more effective,
the initial localization of custody adjudications has assumed added significance. The new Family Code has commendably broken with past tradition
here as well, and has enacted a detailed scheme for venue in custody cases,
designed to assure the elimination of parallel proceedings and adjudication
in the most appropriate forum. Pursuant to section 11.04 of the Code, this
is generally the county where the child resides as therein defined, but section 11.06(c) provides that on the timely motion of any party, the court
may, "If]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest
of justice

. . .

transfer the proceeding to a proper court in any other county

in the state. '444 It should be noted that where a custodian or guardian has
been appointed for a child by order of a court of another state or nation,

440. Id. § 14.07(a).
441. Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1966). This rule is applied with
commendable firmness. See Meucci v. Meucci, 457 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1970).
442. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.10(a), (b) (Supp. 1973). Note, however, the
exception that "[t]he court may issue any appropriate temporary order if there is a
serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child." Id. § 14.10(p).
443. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.03(c) (1974). See also text accompanying note
488 infra.
444. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(c) (Supp. 1973).
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for venue purposes the child legally resides in the county of residence of
such guardian or custodian. 445 It would seem to follow that unless the child
is actually in Texas and appears not to be under the care and control of
any adult, 44 6 no custody determination may now be made by a Texas court
to the detriment of a non-resident foreign court-appointed guardian or custodian. Where the parents live in different states and there has as yet been
no adjudication of custody, however, the child resides, for custody venue
purposes, in the county where the parent having custody and control of the
447
child resides.
As shown once more by Hinds v. Hinds,448 this last mentioned fact pattern is quite usual in the interstate context as well. The parties were married in Louisiana in 1969, and lived there together until May 1972, when
the wife left for San Antonio, taking along the two minor children of the
marriage. In June 1972, the husband filed suit in Louisiana, seeking a separation and custody of the children. The wife was personally represented
at the Louisiana hearing 'by both Texas and Louisiana counsel, but nevertheless brought a custody suit in San Antonio ten days after the Louisiana proceedings had been filed by the husband. The latter specially appeared in
the Texas proceedings under rule 120a, and urged that the San Antonio
court was without jurisdiction because of the pendency of a prior suit on
the same matter at the marital domicile.
The San Antonio court of civil appeals affirmed a dismissal below of the
wife's suit for want of jurisdiction. Writing for the court, Chief Judge Barrow stated that "[i]t is settled law that a Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over the custody of a child which is physically present in the state, although the child's legal domicile may be in another state."' 4" 9 This, he went
on to state, did "not mean, however, that our courts must or should take
450
jurisdiction in every case where the child happens to be before the court.'
In this connection, he quoted the following passage from the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Texas in Wicks v. Cox: "Ordinarily the courts of the domiciliary state are in a better position to pass intelligently on the matter of
the child's welfare, and good order frequently requires that they do so to
the exclusion of courts of other states in which the child is temporarily resident."'451
Chief Judge Barrow went on to point out that the Louisiana court had
a prior suit pending, involving the same issue, and both parties were before
that court; that the marital domicile of the couple was in Louisiana; and,
therefore, that the witnesses would be much more accessible in Louisiana.
Furthermore, the wife might still be held to be domiciled in Louisiana, although she had been in Texas about three weeks, and testified that her intention was to permanently reside here. Consideration of these facts, he
445. Id. § 11.04(c)(5).

446. In such cases, the child is deemed to reside where found. id.§ 11.04(c) (6).
447. Id.§ 11.04(c)(3).
448. 491 S.W.2d 448 (Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973).
449. Id. at 449.

450. Id.
451.

146 Tex. 489, 493-94, 208 S.W.2d 876, 878 (1948).
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concluded, "fully justified" the trial court in declining jurisdiction. 45 2
Hinds reaches an eminently sound result, and deserves to be followed
widely. Nevertheless, some of the language in Chief Judge Barrow's opinion
seems less than precise. There can be little doubt that the San Antonio
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the children, and the wife,
though probably not over the husband. 458 Its refusal, for good reason, to
on lack of comexercise that jurisdiction in the instant case is grounded not 454
petence, but on an enlightened use of forum non conveniens.
That doctrine is now recognized for change-of-venue purposes in the Family Code, 455 and its analogous application to interstate custody disputes does
not pose the difficulty encountered in civil and commercial cases. Both
Louisiana and Texas apply the best interests of the children as the overriding criterion, and Louisiana, as the state of the marital domicil, is better
equipped to judge this issue. 456 It is to be hoped that the doctrine of H.
Rouw Co. v. Railway Express Agency4 57-if it should indeed withstand reexamination-will not apply to custody cases. Otherwise, Texas might become a haven for child-napping spouses from other states who are alert
enough to move before their former home states find the time to make a
custody adjudication, and glib enough to claim Texas as their new permanent homes.
In Rodgers v. Williamson45 8 the Supreme Court of Texas faced another
perennial problem in interstate custody battles: . the attempt to relitigate issues supposedly agreed upon between the parties. Lauretta and Ronald
Rodgers were divorced in 1965 in Texas, and Lauretta was awarded custody of their son, Scott. She then moved to 'Illinois and married Williamson.
In 1969 the Williamsons filed a petition in Chicago for the adoption of Scott.
Ronald Rodgers, the natural father, appeared both in person and by
counsel, but then agreed to consent to the adoption on the basis of a stipulation reciting that he had the "right of visitation" with Scott at certain designated times and places. This stipulation was incorporated into the order
of the Illinois court approving the adoption. The Williamsons later moved
to Dallas, and Rodgers, who lived near Arlington, sought an order enforcing
his rights and setting up a new visitation schedule in view of the proximity
of the parties. The Williamsons cross-claimed for a judgment declaring the
visitation agreement to be unenforceable.
One ground urged in support of this latter position was that a visitation
agreement between a natural parent and an adopted child was contrary to
452. 491 S.W.2d at 448-49, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 79 (1971).
453. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952); see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 199,
at 188-90.
454. See text accompanying notes 80-99 supra.
455. "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice,
the court, on the timely motion of any party, may transfer the proceeding to a proper
court in any other county in the state." TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.06(c) (Supp.
1973).
456. See text accompanying note 452 supra.
457. 154 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941), error ref.; see text accompanying notes 87-99 supra.
458. 489 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1973).
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Texas public policy. This argument was rejected by the court for the reasons discussed above. 459 The Williamsons also claimed, and the lower courts
held, that the visitation provision was a private agreement rather than a
court order. 46 0 The supreme court arrived at the opposite conclusion in
view of the language of the stipulation, and held that "[t]he Illinois order
did decree visitation for the natural father and that this feature of the order
is entitled to full faith and credit as would be given a child custody decree
' 46
of another state." '
Somewhat surprisingly, the court went on to state that if contrary to public policy, the Illinois stipulation could nevertheless be refused effect in
Texas. "This," Mr. Justice Reavley wrote, "is a decision we are at liberty
to make since the Supreme Court of the United States has not held that
an equitable decree of one state must be given full faith and credit by a
sister state. ' 462 This language appears to be somewhat unguarded, and
likely to draw into question the steadfast and commendable recognition of
sister-state equity and custody decrees by the Supreme Court of Texas. 463
Fortunately, as the court found that Texas public policy had not been violated, the passage just quoted appears to be a dictum.
The matter of visitation itself, Judge Reavley held, had to be reexamined
"according -to the welfare of the child under present circumstances. '464 He
immediately went on to add, however, that it is "not necessary for either
party to show the change of circumstances required for a change of custody,"
and that if the prior order is "unworkable and inappropriate, the trial court
may modify it."' 465 It thus appears that visitation rights decreed by sister
states are entitled to much less weight in Texas than are sister-state custody
decrees. Especially in cases like Rodgers where the natural father irrevocably gave up his most valuable right as a parent in exchange for a courtordered visitation agreement, the logic of this distinction is not so readily
apparent.
D. MaritalProperty
As Texas continues to attract prosperous new residents who have accumulated part of their wealth while living in common-law jurisdictions, the integration of such previously-acquired property rights into the marital property
and succession scheme of this state is becoming increasingly important. 466
In Parson v. United States (an estate tax case) the Fifth Circuit held that
"[u]nder Texas law, property acquired by a husband and wife in another
459.
460.
Annual
461.

1966).

See text accompanying notes 228-33 supra.
This earlier phase of the litigation is discussed by Thomas, Conflict of Laws,
Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 165, 170-71 (1973).
489 S.W.2d at 560, citing Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.

462. 489 S.W.2d at 560, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
102, comment c (1971).

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

463. See McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961). See also
Meucci v. Meucci, 457 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1970); Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528
(Tex.1966).
464. 489 S.W.2d at 561.
465. Id.
466. See generally Comment, Rights of a Surviving Spouse in Texas in Marital

PropertyAcquired with Domicile Elsewhere, 45

TEXAS

L. Rv. 321 (1966).
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state prior to their moving to Texas will retain the character of ownership
it had in the state from which it was removed," and that property which
was characterized as separate at the time of acquisition "remains separate,
although subsequently paid for with community funds, subject to the com4' 67
munity's right of reimbursement.
The second rule laid down in Parson is of eminent significance in terms
of estate planning for couples who move to Texas from a common-law state.
Life insurance policies typically will constitute a major part of the movable
assets of solvent estates. In Parson the Fifth Circuit held that Texas would
adopt the so-called "inception-of-title" approach, with the result that the insurance policies acquired by the decedent while domiciled on the Arkansas
side of Texarkana continued to be his separate property even after the family had moved to the Texas side, and despite the fact that subsequent to
46 8
this move the premiums were paid out of community funds.
Employee retirement benefits comprise the one type of asset for which
the Texas courts follow a proration or apportionment approach in classifying
the separate or community character of the pension benefits. This stems
from recognition that the employer's contributions to the plan are a form
of indirect compensation to the employee, and that the income earned by
either spouse during marriage is community property.4 69 Thus if a husband
accumulates pension plans while married and domiciled in Kentucky, and
thereafter moves to Texas, the pension plan benefits are part separate property and part community property, in proportion to the contributions or years
of service in the common law state vis-h-vis the community property state.
If the issue of the separate or community character of employee benefits
is raised in the context of a divorce, however, the importance of an accurate
classification of the benefits is diminished by the new "just and right" partition power authorized by section 3.63 of the Family Code.4 70 These principles are illustrated by Gaulding v. Gaulding.4 71 United States civil service
pension benefits had been accumulated while the husband was domiciled in
common-law states (17.667 years) and, later, in Texas (19.667 years).
The Eastland court of civil appeals properly held that the trial court had
erred in classifying the entire pension benefits as community property, but
then held that the error was harmless because "[t]he Court was authorized
in awarding Mrs. Gaulding a portion of Mr. Gaulding's separate property
in bringing about a fair and just division of the property [under section
3.63]."472
VIII.

PUBLIC AND PENAL LAW

Mention has already been made of cases involving escheat, 4 73 the proof
467. 460 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1972).
468. Id. at 234.
469. Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968), error
dismissed.
470. Id. at 663; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Supp. 1973).
471. 503 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973).
472. Id. at 618.
473. State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co., 497 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error granted; see text accompanying notes 154-56 supra.
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and the counting of prior convictions in sister states for the purpose of estabfishing multiple-offender status under Texas law, 474 and the application of
the Texas antitrust laws to contracts in intrastate and interstate commerce. 4 75
The escheat and recidivism cases illustrate the danger inherent in the
blanket assertion that one state does not enforce the public, penal, or revenue laws of another. As regards revenue claims, mention might also be
made of article 20.17 of the Texas Tax Code, which prescribes that Texas
courts "shall recognize and enforce liabilities for sales and use taxes lawfully
imposed by any other state, provided that such other state extends a like
comity to this State."'470 Since there is no state income tax in Texas, this
provision is, however, of limited utility. The extent of Texas state interest
in the application of state antitrust law in interstate situations is apparent
from a curious proviso in the Bill of Rights in the current state constitution,
to the effect that "when the witness resides out of the State and the offense
charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence
admitted by deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may
'4 77
hereafter provide.
As illustrated by this constitutional provision, it is nevertheless true that
Texas is concerned primarily not with the enforcement of foreign public law
within this state, but with the application of Texas public law, especially of
penal law, to acts and transactions with foreign elements and local impact.
The 1973 Penal Code marks the first attempt by the legislature to address
itself to this issue in a systematic manner.
Section 1.04 of the 1973 Penal Code, which is entitled, "Territorial Jurisdiction," generally regulates the spatial and the personal scope of Texas
penal law. The State of Texas is defined, for this purpose, as including "the
land and water (and the air space above the land and water) over which
this state has power to define offenses.

' 478

Texas criminal jurisdiction is

asserted if "(1) either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs inside this state; (2) the conduct outside this state constitutes
an attempt to commit an offense inside this state; (3) the conduct outside
this state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense inside this state, and
an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs inside this state; or (4) the
conduct inside this state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to
commit, or establishes criminal responsibility for the commission of, an offense in another jurisdiction that is also an offense under the laws of this
state. '479 Furthermore, "an offense based on an omission to perform a duty
474. Norris v. State, 488 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see text accompanying
notes 157-60 supra.
475. E.F.I., Inc. v. Marketers Int'l, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1973), discussed at text accompanying notes 284-91 supra.
476. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.17 (1969).
477. TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 10. Oddly enough, the pertinent legislation was enacted
before the constitution was amended. Ch. 12, [1907] Tex. Laws 16 (now codified at
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.16-.19 (1968)). Neither this statute nor its
predecessors appear to have been judicially construed in a published decision.
478. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.04(d) (1974).

479. Id. § 1.04(a).
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imposed on an actor by a Texas statute is committed inside this state regardless of the location of .the actor at the time of the offense. '48 0 In homicide
cases, a "result" within the meaning of section 1.04(a)(1) includes either
the physical impact causing death or the death itself. If the body of a criminal homicide victim is found in Texas, it is presumed that the death occurred here. If death alone is the basis for jurisdiction, it is a defense to
the exercise of Texas jurisdiction that the conduct that constitutes the offense
48
is not made criminal in the jurisdiction where the conduct occurred. 1
This section is a carefully drawn general delimitation of the spatial and
personal reach of Texas penal law. Pursuant to section 1.03(b) it applies
to Texas penal legislation outside of the Penal Code "unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise." Some of the wording of section 1.04
is borrowed from the 1962 Permanent Official Draft of the Model Penal
Code, but the final version is (but for a stylistic modification) the work of
the Texas State Bar Committee on Revision of the Penal Code, which submitted its draft in 1970.482
The Committee Comment states that section 1.04 departs from existing
law, and establishes "a broad jurisdictional base for the prosecution in Texas
of offenses involving persons, property, and public interests in this state. '48 3
The "primary policy considerations" underlying this section are articulated
as follows: "(1) the state seeking to prosecute for an offense should have
a substantial interest in or connection with the criminal event, and (2) law
enforcement should be facilitated by plugging gaps in the existing law when
a course of conduct goes beyond the boundaries of a single state.

' 48 4

It

is further said to be a basic tenet of section 1.04 that "an actor's location
within or without the state when the offense is committed and his legal relation to the offense (perpetrator, nonperpetrating party, or facilitator) are
immaterial for jurisdictional purposes if the formal requisites of the statute
'485
are met."

Generally speaking, the section combines what the Committee terms the
subjective and the objective territorial principles: jurisdiction is conferred
"over offenses commenced within the state but completed without (subjective) and for offenses commenced without the state but consummated within
(objective).

'4 6

A detailed examination of the manifestations of these two principles in
the various clauses of section 1.04 seems unnecessary for present purposes.
It should be noted, however, that as regards the assertion of Texas jurisdiction over offenses based on the omission of a duty imposed by Texas law
regardless of the location of the actor at the time of the offense, the Commit480. Id. § 1.04(c).

481. Id. § 1.04(b).
482. STATE BAR COMMnrEE ON THE REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, TExAs PENAL
CODE, A PROPOSED REVISION § 1.04 (Final Draft 1970); cf. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
483. STATE BAR COMMIrrEE ON THE REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, supra note 482,
at 8.
484. Id. at 9.
485. Id.

486. Id. at 8-9.
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tee commented that the "usual application" of that subsection would probably be in the field of domestic relations (e.g., nonsupport), but that it was
487
not so limited.
As already mentioned, the delimitation of the spatial and the personal
scope of Texas penal law is generally regulated by section 1.04, even as
to matters not covered by the Penal Code itself. That is, however, not so
if the statute defining the offense provides otherwise; and two such exceptions can be found in the Penal Code itself. One of them, relating to the
removal of children from the state, has already been discussed and requires
no further comment. In that case, the territorial element is really part of
the definition of the offense itself, which is the frustration of the effective
488
and direct enforcement of Texas custody jurisdiction.
Not so, however, with the definition of bigamy in section 25.01. Pursuant
to that section, an individual commits bigamy if, although legally married,
he "purports to marry or does marry a person other than his spouse in this
state, or any other state or foreign country, under circumstances that would,
but for the actor's prior marriage, constitute a marriage," or if, knowing another person to be legally married, he "purports to marry or does marry that
person in this state, or any other state or foreign country," under like circumstances. 48 9 Since the same section makes bigamous cohabitation "in this
state under the appearance of being married" a separate offense, 490 it would
appear that the language underlined above must be read to signify that even
in the absence of such subsequent cohabitation in Texas, out-of-state bigamous marriage ceremonies are criminal offenses under Texas law.
This seeming adoption of the principle of universality for, of all things,
an offense that in the opinion of many carries its own punishment, seems
almost bizarre. Obviously, Texas could not, consistently with international
law, punish the polygamous marriages of Moslems in Sri Lanka; 491 obviously
again, it could not, consistently with the Constitution of the United States,
punish the bigamous marriages of Californians in Nevada without regard to
Nevada and perhaps to California law. 492 The Bar Committee draft does
not contain this aberration. 493 It is to be hoped that judicial construction
in line with constitutional and international law constraints will keep the territorial and personal application of the bigamy section within reasonable
bounds. On the positive side, it should be noted that reasonable belief that
one's own prior marriage is void, or had been dissolved by death, divorce,
487. Id. at 10.
488. TEX. PEN. CODE
supra.

ANN.

§ 25.03 (Supp. 1973); see text accompanying note 443

489. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 25.01(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added). This language is not contained in the State Bar Committee draft.
490. Id. §§ 25.01(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B).
491. See Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Reid, [19651 A.C. 720 (Ceylon); Hodgson
v. Union de Permisarios Circulo Rojo, S. de 'R.L., 331 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (S.D. Tex.
1971); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109
Cal. Rptr. 219 (1973).

492. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964). See generally
George, ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 62128 (1966); cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 74-79 (1940).
493. STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, supra note 482,
§ 25.01.
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or annulment, is a defense to bigamy prosecutions, and that under the Family Code, a bigamous marriage is convalidated by cohabitation as husband
and wife subsequent to the dissolution of the prior marriage that constituted
494
the impediment.
There is a public law subject which deserves brief mention for the sake
of completeness and because of its great importance to this state. In Texas
v. Louisiana495 the United States Supreme Court adopted a Special Master's
report, fixing the boundary between these two states in the geographic middle of the Sabine Pass, Lake, and River. The Court deferred, pending further proceedings in which the United States was invited to participate, the
question of title to islands in the west half of the Sabine. In this connection,
496
it should be noted that more recently, in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,

the Court has held that the acquisition and the loss of title to land by riparians due to the surfacing or the submerging of land by navigable rivers is
governed not by state law, but by federal common law. 497 This rule will
now be applicable to Texas riparians of the Sabine river.
IX.

CONCLUSION

This Survey has been much too long; the conclusion can be brief. Three
points deserve special mention.

First, the "Texas convention" is waning,

and the conflict of laws is here to stay. 498 We have covered some three
dozen Texas federal and state court decisions. Even allowing for the slightly
expanded time span, this output is impressive when compared with California where state trial court decisions are not reported, and still respectable
when compared with New York where they are. 499 Texas, by the way, may
soon rank directly between these two states in population. Of course, to
quote Chafee, all cases are not created equal. This is not say that significance has a price tag; the $6,020 in child support arrears are as important to
Mrs. Brazeal and 'as important to fatherless children in Texas as is the $3.5
million loss of the Chaparral to Zapata and its Texas shareholders. But the
quality of performance and the interest of the bar have a way of improving
in relation to the object in controversy. The lessons of the PPG-Continental
donnybrook (with $200 million in possible damages at stake) and of CDC's
494. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.01(c) (Supp. 1973); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22
(Supp. 1973). See also the declaration of state policy thereat: "When two or more
marriages of a person to different spouses are alleged, the most recent marriage is presumed to be valid as against each marriage that precedes it until one who asserts the
validity of a prior marriage proves its validity." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Supp.
1973).
495. 410 U.S. 702 (1973).
496. 94 S. Ct. 517, 38 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1973).
497. Id. at 523-28, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 534.
498. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) has been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court, by the Fifth Circuit in a Texas appeal, and by
two Texas courts of civil appeals within the survey period. Dailey v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 475 F.2d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1973); Rodgers v. Williamson, 489 S.W.2d 558,
560 (Tex. 1973); Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas
1973); Hinds v. Hinds, 491 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1973).
499. The current New York Survey, Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV.
11 (1974), is based on some forty-five cases and five statutes.
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$290 million cash tender offer to Texasgulf shareholders are reasonably
clear. Nor is the Texas lawyer's role limited to the Lone Star State: Zapata, involving a Texas party with Texas counsel, has already been before
the English Court of Appeal and the United States Supreme Court, where
it generated one of the most important transnational conflicts opinions of
recent years. It may eventually reach the House of Lords as well, where
(with respect) it may generate as many as five more.
Secondly, Texas conflicts law is largely statutory. This almost goes without saying for long-arm jurisdiction including service of process, and even
applies to a lesser extent to the proof of foreign law. What is most remarkable, however, is that choice-of-law, too, is rapidly becoming statutory or
even codified. There are statutory choice-of-law rules for insurance contracts; for transactions subject to the Uniform Commercial Code; for workmen's compensation; for out-of-state injury and wrongful death and their
prescription; for materialman's liens; for the perfection of security interests
in goods, commercial paper, title certificates, accounts, and minerals; and
for penal law in general and for bigamy in particular. Even in the area
of the enforcement of foreign judgments, the question is no longer concluded
by the full faith and credit clause plus "comity" as judicially developed;
there are now specific provisions for the enforcement of foreign support orders and custody decrees. This list is not exhaustive, and counsel will ignore
pertinent Texas statutes at client's peril. (It would be indelicate to single
out illustrative cases during the current Survey period.)
Thirdly, finally, and most importantly, this statutory mass of Texas conflicts law is beginning to emerge as a coherent framework capable of organic
expansion. This is most directly apparent in the case of the two Codes.
The Uniform Commercial Code is, as we know, applicable to all transactions
bearing an "appropriate" relation to this state, but the parties may, subject
to several exceptions, choose the law of another jurisdiction to which the
transaction has a "reasonable" connection. The Penal Code, we are told
by the Bar Committee which drafted it, is to permit the vindication of a
"substantial (Texas) interest in or connection with the criminal event." As
Elliott Cheatham put it so eloquently:
With a broad code drafted so carefully, there is all the more reason
to do what many have urged for important statutes-to treat the statutory policy and principle as a source of law no less than common-law
policy and principle. Justice Harlan Stone made the point in his Harvard Tercentary address: 'I can find in the history and principles
of the common law no adequate reason for our failure to treat a statute
much more as we treat a judicial precedent, as both a declaration and
source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning.' 500
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently had occasion to
demonstrate the utility of this approach, and its example is likely to be fol500. Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1229, 1233
(1963).
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lowed.5 0 ' The determination of the spatial and the personal reach of Texas
law through the construction of Texas legislation in the light of its purpose
and of general choice-of-law policies adopted 'by the legislature for cognate
areas is the first step in the direction of the development of a rational choiceof-law system. The time has come for a return to this basic "premise for
legal reasoning," and thus aided, for taking that first step.

501. Morange v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390-93 (1970), noted in 82
YALE L.J. 258 (1972); Barclay's Bank DCO v. Mercantile National Bank, 481 F.2d
1224, 1230-32 (5th Cir. 1973).

